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Abstract 
This research proposes a risk management framework and develops generic risk-based 
decision-making, and risk-assessment models for dealing with potential Hazard Events 
(HEs) and risks associated with uncertainty for Operational Safety Performance (OSP) in 
container terminals and maritime ports. Three main sections are formulated in this study: 
Section 1: Risk Assessment, in the first phase, all HEs are identified through a literature 
review and human knowledge base and expertise. In the second phase, a Fuzzy Rule Base 
(FRB) is developed using the proportion method to assess the most significant HEs 
identified. The FRB leads to the development of a generic risk-based model incorporating 
the FRB and a Bayesian Network (BN) into a Fuzzy Rule Base Bayesian Network (FRBN) 
method using Hugin software to evaluate each HE individually and prioritise their 
specific risk estimations locally. The third phase demonstrated the FRBN method with a 
case study. The fourth phase concludes this section with a developed generic risk-based 
model incorporating FRBN and Evidential Reasoning to form an FRBER method using 
the Intelligence Decision System (IDS) software to evaluate all HEs aggregated 
collectively for their Risk Influence (RI) globally with a case study demonstration. In 
addition, a new sensitivity analysis method is developed to rank the HEs based on their 
True Risk Influence (TRI) considering their specific risk estimations locally and their RI 
globally. Section 2: Risk Models Simulations, the first phase explains the construction of 
the simulation model Bayesian Network Artificial Neural Networks (BNANNs), which 
is formed by applying Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). In the second phase, the 
simulation model Evidential Reasoning Artificial Neural Networks (ERANNs) is 
constructed. The final phase in this section integrates the BNANNs and ERANNs that 
can predict the risk magnitude for HEs and provide a panoramic view on the risk inference 
in both perspectives, locally and globally. Section 3: Risk Control Options is the last link 
that finalises the risk management based methodology cycle in this study. The Analytical 
Hierarchal Process (AHP) method was used for determining the relative weights of all 
criteria identified in the first phase. The last phase develops a risk control options method 
by incorporating Fuzzy Logic (FL) and the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity 
to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) to form an FTOPSIS method. The novelty of this research 
provides an effective risk management framework for OSP in container terminals and 
maritime ports. In addition, it provides an efficient safety prediction tool that can ease all 
the processes in the methods and techniques used with the risk management framework 
by applying the ANN concept to simulate the risk models.  
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Chapter 1 ― Introduction 
Summary  
This chapter introduces the research background analysis followed by the discussion of 
the research aim and objectives. The challenges of conducting the research, the research 
methodology, and the scope of the thesis are also described. The objectives and 
hypotheses of this thesis set out a logical platform aimed at addressing the outlined 
problems. The structure of the thesis is outlined to show how the study addresses the risk-
based methodologies for decision support of maritime ports and risk management of 
maritime container terminals’ operations.  
1.1. Background 
 The impact of maritime activities on the economy is significant for any coastal state. 
Container terminals are critical and costly engineering systems that enable economic 
development through the transfer of goods and services between national and 
international destinations (Vis & de Koster, 2003). Ports are gearing up to meet the 
challenge of handling mega-vessels capable of carrying 10,000–12,000 Twenty-Feet 
Equivalent Unit (TEU) and above (Baird, 2006). Accordingly, a container terminal must 
advance its operational and managerial technology basis (Kang et al., 2008) in order to 
cope with such progressive developments. Container terminal infrastructure is 
characterised by large investments, tight time schedules, and evolving technology, 
sometimes through unproven conditions (Koster et al., 2009). These challenges result in 
high-risk exposure along with more opportunities to be exploited in terms of risk 
management. Inland container terminals are, due to their operational business and 
environmental conditions, exposed to several risks having different consequences 
(Stahlbock & Voß, 2008).  
Research and subsequent improvements in related areas including operational, 
organisational, economic, business, and natural conditions that affect seaports and marine 
terminals have been carried out for many years, which is evident in major maritime 
academic journals such as the Journals of Maritime Policy and Management, Marine 
Science and Technology, Marine Policy, Offshore Engineering, Offshore Technology, 
Maritime Economic, Maritime Economic and Logistics, Marine Pollution Bulletin, 
Transport Management, Transportation Research, Research in Transportation Economics, 
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and Environmental Impact Assessment Review. Improvements based on research can 
also be seen in other academic journals such as the Journals of Operational Research, 
Hazardous Materials, Reliability Engineering System Safety, Business Continuity and 
Risk Management, Economics and Business, World Development, Productivity Analysis, 
Industrial Economics, Industrial Engineering, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, and Expert 
Systems with Applications. In addition, international bodies involved in the maritime 
industry such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), United Nations 
Conferences on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Bank, European 
Commission, and Asian Development Bank have been contributing towards the 
improvement within the five major areas mentioned previously. Current risk assessment 
methods for maritime container terminals are gradually taking into account dramatic 
events in security issues such as terrorist attacks. However, the impact on safety aspects 
has not been addressed adequately in research (Lois et al., 2004; Shang & Lu, 2009). 
The IMO as a regulatory body since 1958 has proposed many instruments, guidelines and 
codes related to the maritime industry such as the use of a risk assessment method, 
including offshore operators, in order to mitigate the risk (Trbojevic & Carr, 2000). This 
method contributed to the adoption of a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) (IMO, 2002). 
Since the adoption of FSA, many parties have been encouraged to contribute evolving 
developments to perform risk assessment such as maritime ports, and classification 
societies (HSE, 2001) because risk assessment emerges as an important engineering 
discipline in the maritime and port industries (Wang & Ruxton, 1998).  
The FSA methodology can provide desirable results by mitigating risk and enhancing 
maritime safety because it has a systematic mechanism that enables decision-making 
based on risk assessment and, more importantly, the cost-benefit analysis of the risk 
controlling option (Wang & Trbojevic, 2007). The FSA principles have been widely used 
by many maritime related industries (Pillay and Wang, 2003a; Bai and Jin, 2016) and 
other industries involved with risk management. Therefore, in this study, the FSA method 
will be adopted towards container terminal infrastructure and transportation systems 
safety to offer a clear and justifiable rationale for a risk management based methodology. 
Moreover, this research is an in-depth investigation of the risks associated with container 
terminal infrastructure and transportation systems on operational safety aspects, as well 
as a description of how to effectively implement the risk management based methodology. 
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Risk assessment techniques in general are a creative practice which benefits the decision-
making mechanism (Wang, 2002). Decision makers often encounter the problem of 
selecting a solution from a given set of alternatives. The chosen alternative is the one that 
meets certain predefined objectives/goals (Liu et al., 2008a). The criteria of container 
terminal infrastructure and transportation systems’ decision making are slightly more than 
alternative choices of risk mitigation options; these criteria also exist to evaluate the 
resilience and flexibility of strategies aimed at dealing with any disturbances throughout 
the systems’ lifecycle. Therefore, the challenge for decision-makers is to select the most 
suitable set of alternatives based on reliability, availability and cost-benefit criteria 
(Martorell et al., 2010). This research classifies decision problems that arise in container 
terminal infrastructure and transportation systems in order to develop a risk management 
framework that applies systemic thinking, logic, and a variety of approaches and tools to 
frame and potentially solve complex safety issues. 
1.2. Justification for the Research and Statement of the Problem 
This research is motivated by the lack of an appropriate risk management framework 
addressing the Operational Safety Performance (OSP) in container terminals and 
maritime ports that are linked directly to the business functions and decision-making 
processes within marine ports, especially for the purpose of their operations and 
management. Furthermore, the problem facing container terminal stakeholders is a lack 
of research upon which to base safety measures for the stakeholders’ complex terminal 
activities; a general lack of a model that approximates the risk management realities of 
the terminal; and confusion over uncertainty, terminology, approaches, and methods in 
the discipline. There is an imperative need to form a generic model that can highlight the 
safety issues facing container terminal stakeholders including risk managers, human 
resource managers, site control managers, safety officers, and port facility security 
officers. 
A gap in knowledge exists concerning the applications of risk management in container 
terminals and marine port operations. Similarly, there is a need for more practical research 
at the academic level to improve the best practice of risk management methods, to ensure 
proper implementation of the methods in these logistics infrastructures, and to cope with 
potential requirements in the future. 
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The following guiding questions have been generated to ensure that the objectives of this 
research are met and to provide a base for conducting this research. 
 What are the hazards or risk sources with uncertainties associated within container 
terminals and maritime ports affecting safety performance, and how can they be 
identified?  
Hazard, risk, and uncertainty are different terms that need to be distinguished. There are 
different types and categories of hazards that can endanger a container terminal and/or a 
maritime port, including personnel, facilities technologies, and environment. While there 
are different methods and techniques for hazard identification, there are a number of 
common features of importance. 
 What are the risk parameters that each hazard would have the greatest impact upon? 
How would the impact affect the performance safety of container terminals and 
maritime ports operations, and how can these risk parameters be identified?  
Risk (R) is a simple value of Likelihood or occurrence probability (L), the Consequences 
(i.e., severity) (C), and Detection incapability (D) that can be presented as follows 
(O'Connor, 2001; Braglia et al., 2003; Berg, 2010):  
ܴ	 ൌ 	ܮൈ	ܥൈ	ܦ                                           (1.1) 
The higher the R for any hazard, the more important it is that corrective action should be 
taken. However, are there any other risk parameters that can be included for the container 
terminals and maritime ports operations to improve safety performance? 
 What are the most appropriate and useful tools for evaluating each risk factor 
individually (i.e., locally) and for evaluating all risk factors aggregated 
collectively (i.e., globally) with associated uncertainties for container terminal and 
maritime port OSP in real practises, and how can these tools be applied? 
In any risk-based model application (i.e., risk factors identified and ranked accordingly), 
human judgement is inevitable, especially when uncertainties are involved. Each risk 
factor should be evaluated individually for its specific risk estimation locally and its Risk 
Influence (RI) to a port’s safety system globally. There is a variety of techniques and 
tools-based software for analysing knowledge-based decision support systems that can be 
used. 
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 How can the identified hazards or risk factors be prioritised and ranked? 
The prioritisation of hazards or risk factors is a fundamental step of any safety analysis. 
All risk factors are ranked locally and globally. Accordingly, there are various approaches 
that can be used depending on the risk factors under consideration and the particular 
methodology being employed. 
 What are the most effective tools to analyse the causes and effects of the most 
significant identified risk factors, and how can they be employed? 
Each risk factor needs to be investigated individually by carrying out a cause and effect 
analysis, and that analysis should not be limited to known causes; it should also address 
the potential causes that have not happened yet but that may lead to total or partial loss in 
the future. All the effects should be identified, taking into account the ones that have 
occurred. Therefore, a careful analysis is required to ensure that all the potential causes 
and effects for each risk factor are listed and acknowledged. There are numerous tools 
and techniques to perform such an analysis. 
 How can a risk management based methodology and strategy be mapped and 
implemented for the most significant risk factors locally and globally? 
 Risk management based methodologies and approaches can be implemented on any 
system or organisation including container terminals and maritime ports. However, an 
effective and efficient risk management based methodology and strategy can be applied 
if an appropriate and detailed safety analysis is done at each step of the process and 
properly conducted with sufficient knowledge of the system or organisation.  
 How can the identified hazards or risk factors be mitigated and controlled?  
The last link to close the risk management based methodology cycle is assigning a proper 
decision-making tool or technique to select the best available strategies in order to 
mitigate and control the risk factors. There is no single correct technique for a particular 
decision problem, but some techniques are more suitable than others based on a wide 
range of elements related to infrastructural design, planning, and management that help 
to optimise the operational efficiency of the system or organisation. 
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1.3. Research Objectives and Relevant Hypothesis 
1.3.1. Aim of the investigation 
This study aims to develop a risk management framework with uncertainty treatment 
based decision-making analysis methodology that can support the selection of cost 
effective risk measures for container terminal infrastructure and transportation systems at 
both the operational and managerial levels on a safety basis. 
1.3.2. Research objectives 
The main objectives are defined as follows: 
I. Analyse the complex activities in the lifecycle of container terminal operations in 
order to identify the Hazard Events (HEs), (i.e., failure modes in which an 
equipment or machine failure can occur, also, human error including managerial 
and container handling procedures). While Hazard is the basic material or 
behaviour that results in failure. 
II. Review the risk assessment and decision-making techniques (quantitative and 
qualitative) that have been widely developed and applied in safety analysis and 
engineering design systems, particularly those capable of dealing with uncertainty 
and incompleteness of risk data records.  
III. Develop a risk management framework and the associated supporting modelling 
techniques to solve complicated safety aspects in container terminals with various 
types of uncertainties. 
IV. Design a risk-based decision-making support system that offers a systemic 
approach to improve the OSP and decision-making process of container terminals 
and their implementation in the port industry. 
V. Demonstrate the above framework using real test cases.  
1.4. Research Achievements   
The research hypothesis develops an advanced, novel framework for the assessment of 
risks and vulnerability within container terminals on a safety basis that enables industrial 
stakeholders to identify, assess, and mitigate the risk factors with uncertainties that affect 
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container terminal and maritime port OSP. In addition, this research is directed towards 
a risk-based decision-making analysis methodology for container terminal infrastructure 
that demonstrates the theory of the strategic risk management approach and reveals the 
effective implementation of the risk management principle and integration into all 
functions and processes in complex container terminal and maritime port operations.  
The objectives of the hypothesis rely on widely used application for uncertainty treatment 
such as Fuzzy Logic (FL), Bayesian Network (BN), Evidential Reasoning (ER), 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), FL and Technique for Order Preference by 
Similarity to Ideal Solution (FTOPSIS), and Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). The 
proposed models are intended to provide practical tools in the application and study of 
container terminal and maritime port OSP. 
1.5. Research Methodology and Scope of the Thesis 
The Research methodology formulates the course for solving the research problem in a 
systematic and rational manner. A Risk management based methodology is an ongoing 
process to identify, assess, and mitigate risk factors for any system or organisation by 
setting plans and strategies to control all potential sources of risks associated with 
uncertainties. The proposed framework affects the effectiveness of risk management 
based methodology by its ability to re-evaluate the system or organisation and to adjust 
the mitigation strategy in order to determine the best practice and implementation, even 
with changed circumstances or environment. Therefore, various methods and techniques 
to be used throughout the implementation of the methodology are consistently taken into 
account.  
The detailed research methodology is as follows: 
Section 1: Risk Assessment 
Phase 1: Identify hazards through an appropriate literature review and brainstorming 
session with various experts involved in container terminals and maritime port operations. 
Phase 2: Develop a Fuzzy Rule Base (FRB) in order to assess the most significant HEs 
identified.  
Phase 3: Develop a generic risk-based method by incorporating an FRB and BN to form 
an FRBN method using Hugin software. The FRBN method should be capable of helping 
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container terminals and maritime port stakeholders to assess each risk factor (i.e., HE) 
individually for its specific, local risk estimations. 
Phase 4: Develop a generic risk-based method by incorporating an FRB and ER to form 
an FRBER method using the IDS software to assess all risk factors (i.e., HEs) aggregated 
collectively for their global Risk Influence (RI). More importantly, the new sensitivity 
analysis method was developed and carried out to rank HEs by taking into account their 
specific local risk estimations and their RI to a port’s system safety. 
Section 2: Risk Models Simulations 
Phase 1: Construct a simulation model BNANNs based on the generic risk method FRBN 
by employing the ANNs concepts using Matlab software. 
Phase 2: Construct a simulation model ERANNs based on the generic risk method 
FRBER by employing the ANNs concepts using Matlab software. 
Phase 3: Construct the AnBnEvR model by integrating BNANNs and EvRANNs models 
that enable the prediction of the risk magnitude for HEs locally and globally. 
The complexity of handling a large amount of data dealing with two different 
methodologies (i.e., FRBN and FRBER) with reference to its software would burden the 
stakeholders with non-user-friendly processes to measure, predict, and improve their 
system safety and reliability performance, motions, and planning of actions. Therefore, 
two models simulating FRBN and FRBER are constructed.  
The constructed models in the simulation section present a high-quality representative 
model in terms of accuracy and reliability assurance that can provide a favourable solution 
in the risk evaluation process. The model can help to predict the risk magnitude, explain 
the real safety performance, and develop a continuous risk management strategy for 
complex systems such as container terminals and maritime ports. More importantly, it 
can significantly overcome the mathematical complexity involved in the algorithms of 
the fuzzy BNs and ER in Section 1 and realise the integrity of BN and ER using ANN.   
Section 3: Risk Control Options 
Phase 1: Use the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) method for determining the relative 
weights of all criteria identified.  
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Phase 2: Develop a risk control options model (FTOPSIS) by incorporating Fuzzy Logic 
and TOPSIS.   
The best risk mitigation strategies were introduced and evaluated in the form of ideal 
solutions for mitigating the identified risk factors by offering the preferred safety control 
measures. These measures, such as automation solutions, had to be capable of addressing 
both operational efficiency and risk reduction in container terminals. 
1.6. Structure of Thesis 
Figure 1.1 gives a visual model of the thesis structure that leads the reader to the stated 
research methodology in Section 1.5. A brief description of each chapter presented in the 
thesis is as follows. 
Chapter 1 corresponds to the research background and justifies conducting this research. 
Research questions are generated to ensure that the research objectives are met. At the 
end of the chapter, the risk management framework and structure of the thesis are 
described. 
Chapter 2 reviews the maritime container terminals market to exhibit the impact 
magnitude of containerisation on container terminal operation. The operational lifecycle 
of a container terminal operation is described, followed by a careful analysis of the widely 
applied risk management based methodologies with reference to container terminal safety 
legislations introduced by national and international parties. Risk, hazard, and uncertainty, 
all three of which are important terms in the risk management process, are defined and 
distinguished.   
Chapter 3 starts with the first phase of section 1, Risk Assessment, by identifying the 
most significant HEs in container terminal operation followed by the development of an 
FRB as the second phase. The third phase is the end of this chapter, where a generic risk-
based method (FRBN) is developed in order to assess the most significant HEs identified 
individually for their specific risk local estimations.  
Chapter 4, as the last phase in section 1, concludes the risk assessment process by 
developing a generic risk-based method (FRBER) to assess all risk factors (i.e., HEs) 
aggregated collectively for their RI for container terminals and maritime port safety 
system globally. In addition, a new sensitivity analysis method is developed and carried 
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out to rank the HEs by taking into account their specific risk estimations locally and their 
RI globally. 
Chapter 5 is the first phase of section 2, Risk Models Simulations, and the chapter 
includes the construction of the simulation model BNANNs for the FRBN method. This 
simulation model is followed by the second phase of the construction of the simulation 
model ERANNs for the FRBER method using Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). The 
final phase in this section entails integrating the BNANNs and ERANNs in order to 
construct AnBnEvR, which enables the prediction of the risk magnitude for HEs locally 
and globally. 
Chapter 6 uses the AHP method for determining the relative weights of all criteria 
identified in the first phase of section 3, Risk Control Options. It is followed by the last 
phase, which develops a risk control options model using FTOPSIS.  
Chapter 7 draws the conclusions and contributes to the knowledge concerning risk 
management for container terminals and maritime port safety systems. Additional 
suggestions for further research are recommended. 
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Figure 1.1: Research methodology 
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Chapter 2 ― Literature Review 
Summary 
This chapter reviews the fundamental elements that influenced and contributed to this 
research. It commences by highlighting the impact of containerisation growth on 
maritime container terminals operation taking into account the direct and indirect effects 
on terminal operation safety including container ships, terminal facilities, technology 
overview, rules and regulations, and handling equipment interfacing. Also discussed is 
the range of the comprehensive literature related to container terminal safety and a 
critical analysis of risk management process in maritime ports. 
2.1. Introduction 
Containerisation was first introduced in the 1960s, and has subsequently become the most 
common method for transporting industrial and consumer products seaborne. 
Consequently, the containerisation development process has cause major transformation 
among port terminals. Container transportation began in the United States in 1920 with 
Pennsylvania Railways. Then container transportation expanded to Europe, where 
McLean Industry Ltd established and developed a connecting system of piggyback and 
marine transport in 1955. Pan Atlantic Shipping Lines began the first container shipping 
transportation between New York and Houston in 1956 and later launched Gateway City, 
the first full container vessel, into operation for the route in 1957 (Inamura et al., 1997). 
Container shipping is performed by companies that operate frequently scheduled liner 
services with pre-determined port calls, using a number of owned or chartered vessels of 
a particular size to achieve an appropriate frequency and utilisation level for each service 
(Heejung et al., 2015).  
Maritime container transportation occupies an increasingly important position in world 
trade and is the fastest growing sector of international shipping, benefiting from a shift 
towards unitisation in cargo transport, as well as from world trade developments. The 
share of containerised trade in the total volume of global trade steadily rose from 11% in 
2000 to 14% in 2010 (Drewry, 2009). 
Containerisation has a number of advantages compared with other shipping methods, 
including: 
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 Less cargo handling: once the contents of a container are loaded into secure con-
tainers, they are not directly handled until reaching the final destination. 
 Efficient port turnaround: container ships are loaded and unloaded in significantly 
less time and at a lower cost than other cargo vessels, using quay cranes and other 
terminal handling equipment. 
 Highly developed intermodal network: the intermodal industry has developed so-
phisticated and intelligent modes to support container transportation, such as 
physical integration of the container with other intermodal transportation equip-
ment, including the staging or storage areas, to final destinations.  
As this thesis focuses on container terminal port operations safety, it is necessary first to 
review and discuss the existing risks outlined in maritime shipping industry literature as 
a whole, then to concentrate on container terminal port operations safety. 
2.2. Container Terminal Market Overview  
Ports are characterised by their geographical and operational settings. Each port may have 
several terminals, and each terminal is operated by one or many operators (Yip et al., 
2011). The advent of global terminal operators is a profound organisational change in the 
development of container terminals. Container terminal operators are firms that operate 
one or several container terminals at a port. Regulatory requirements, limited land 
availability, and steep capital requirements for building container terminal capacity all 
impose high barriers on the container terminal market features (Pawlik et al., 2011). The 
cost of building infrastructure is highly dependent on the region and type of construction 
required. Constructing a new container terminal on existing infrastructure can cost several 
tens of millions GBP (British Pound), whereas the construction of an offshore port can 
cost several billion GBP.  
Many projects involve local governments providing terminal infrastructure, with long-
term concessions delegated to the most attractive terminal operators. The development of 
new terminals is often constrained by national planning procedures and legislation, 
involving many stakeholders throughout the planning process; this system contributes to 
long lead times, and sometimes results in significant implementation and execution delays. 
As a result, global growth in new container capacity lags behind growth in container trade 
(Global Ports, 2011). 
14 
 
Logically, shipping lines are the main customers of container terminal operators. Both of 
them (i.e., shipping lines and container terminal operators), consequently, are mainly 
dependent on the level of world seaborne trade and the corresponding demand for 
container terminal services that the level generates. 
Increased participation of private investors in managing container ports and the 
establishment of new ports have both increased pressures on port efficiency (Bergantino 
et al., 2013). Container terminal operators are compelled to provide high-quality service 
levels at competitive prices (Araujo De Souza et al., 2003). They should invest in facilities, 
service, and management systems to gain and sustain competitiveness. They should also 
increase expenditure to improve crane capacities, information technology efficiency, and 
transhipment facilities, as well as shorten vessel turnaround movements (Notteboom, 
2002). 
In 2013, the global container fleet reached 320.9 million Twenty-Feet Equivalent Unit 
(TEU). A variety of container types make up this fleet. Dry containers are the majority; 
historically, they comprised about 93% of the fleet, but they decreased to 89% in 2012. 
While, the other 7% was split between insulated reefer containers and tanks; the latter 
made up approximately 0.75% for transporting various liquids, and the former occupied 
the remaining 6.25% of the global fleet. Based on these ratios, the size of the dry container 
fleet in 2012 was approximately 290.3 million TEU. Reefer containers filled out about 
20.1 million TEU of the global fleet, and tank containers comprised about 9.6 million. 
Subsequently, the global container fleet is set to grow another 1.6 billion TEU in 2013, 
that made the global container fleet about 421.5 million TEU (WSCa, 2015). 
2.2.1. Global containerisation market 
Many elements determine terminal performance, including labour relations, numbers and 
types of cargo handling equipment, quality of backhaul areas, port access channels, 
landside access, and customs efficiency, as well as potential concessions to international 
terminal operators. In 2009, terminal operators faced extraordinary challenges posed by 
the economic crisis, substantially affecting volumes. However, most of the global 
container terminal operators sustained and returned to a healthy volume growth in 2010 
(UNCTAD, 2011). 
DSC (2012) attested that average terminal utilisation (i.e. increase the transhipments and 
the handled container between maritime container ports) grade was generally increasing, 
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and operators were increasing their Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, And 
Amortisation (EBITDA) compared with 2009; also, EBITDA margins in percentage 
terms were largely maintained, as shown in Table 2.1, with percentage forecasting up to 
2016. As an example, Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH) was the most profitable global 
container terminal operator, with an EBITDA of over 2 billion U.S. dollars, up from 1.8 
billion in 2009. Port of Singapore (PSN) achieved an EBITDA of around 1.3 billion U.S., 
and Dubai Ports International (DP) World achieved an increased EBITDA of 1.24 billion 
U.S. compared with 1.1 billion the previous year. International Container Terminal 
Services (ICTSI), PSN, HPH, DP World, and Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG (HHLA) 
achieved an EBITDA margin in excess of 40% in 2010. Arnold Peter Møller – Maersk 
Group (APM Terminals), meanwhile, increased its margin to just over 20%.  
Table 2.1: Average regional container terminal utilisation 2010 and 2016 forecast 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants (2012) 
Region 2010 Actual Utilisation 2016 Forecast Utilisation 
Far East 69.3% 97.8% 
South East Asia 72.2 % 93.5% 
South America 66.3% 87% 
Middle East 76% 88.6% 
Central America 67.3% 83.2% 
Africa 70.4% 78.9% 
North America 54.1% 67.1% 
North Europe 60.2% 66.2% 
South Asia 76.4% 61.2% 
World 66.5% 84.2% 
 
The main international terminal operators broadly maintained their TEU positions in 2010, 
and those with significant interests in Chinese ports achieved particularly high growth. 
The international terminal operators’ EBITDA margins remain in a 20–45% range, and 
the 2014 financial performance was similar to that in previous years, showing the 
consistency and reliability of container terminal operators’ profitability. However, it is 
difficult to maintain these margins in the face of the demands from larger container ship 
deployments, combined with the creation of larger shipping line alliances. These 
interrelated factors are stimulating significantly greater demands on ports and terminals 
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and have far-reaching consequences, driving up operating costs and capital expenditure 
requirements (Drewry, 2015). 
As a result, by 2013, most shipping companies increased orders of large vessels to 
improve efficiency and reduce operational costs per TEU. The containership order book 
grew from 41 million dwt at the beginning of 2013 to 43 million at the beginning of 2014, 
representing about 20% of the fleet in service (UNCTAD, 2014). 
DSC (2012) analyses, as shown in Table 2.2, nominated PSN as the leading global 
container terminal operator in 2010, with an equity adjusted throughput of 51.3 million 
TEU, approximately 14% higher than in 2009. Hutchison Ports is ranked second, with 36 
million TEU, followed by DP World with 32.6 million TEU, APM Terminals with 31.6 
million TEU, and Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) in fifth with 13.6 million 
TEU. This shows a steady upward worldwide trend among the leading container operators. 
Table 2.2: World container terminal ownership ranking, 2010 
Source: DSC (2012) 
No. Operator Million TEU 
Share 
percentage
1.  PSN 51.3 9.4% 
2.  HPH 36 6.6% 
3.  DPW 32.6 6% 
4.  APMT 31.6 5.8% 
5.  SIPG 19.5 3.6% 
6.  China Merchants Holding International 17.3 3.2% 
7.  COSCO 13.6 2.5% 
8.  MSC 9.9 1.8% 
9.  SSAMarine/Carrix 8.6 1.6% 
10.  Modern Terminals 8.3 1.5% 
An additional 168 million TEU of port traffic will bring the global total to nearly 850 
million TEU in 2019; this assumes that Asia accounts for more than 60% of the forecast 
global demand growth and that the deployment of ultra large container ships with new 
mega alliances is adding to capacity pressures on international terminal operators. The 
predicted average global container port demands a growth of 4.5% per annum through to 
2019 (Drewry, 2015). 
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The growing vessels and increase in demands for global maritime container ports are 
forcing terminal operators to make significant investments in additional capacity. 
According to DSC (2015), APM Terminals and DP World are most actively developing 
new projects in the pipeline, but PSN International is adding the most capacity in the port 
of Singapore. Hutchison, CMA CGM, TIL, and ICTSI also have significant plans, with 
the latter’s expansion representing a 40% increase over the current capacity of its portfolio, 
as shown in Figure 2.1. The primary expansion focus of international terminal operators 
is greenfield developments in emerging market locations, with acquisition and divestment 
activity decreasing from last year.  
 
Figure 2.1: Project capacity expansion for major global terminals operators by 2019 
(DSC, 2015) 
2.2.2. Global containerisation growth 
World container traffic comprised 38,9 million TEU container movements in 1980. That 
figure increased to 88,1 million TEU in 1990, to 236,7 million in 2000, and to 419,8 
million in 2010. The Compound Average Growth Rate (CAGR) of world container traffic 
from 2000 to 2010 is estimated at 8.6% compared with a global real gross domestic 
product (GDP) CAGR of 2.6% for the same period. After a decline of approximately 9% 
in 2009 caused by the global economic crisis, global container shipping throughput 
increased by 13.8% in 2010, exceeding pre-downturn volumes. The 2011 world container 
movements are estimated to reach approximately 439,2 million thousand TEU (Global 
Ports, 2011). 
In the recent years, the use of containers for intercontinental maritime transport has 
dramatically increased. Between 1990 and 2008, container traffic has grown from 28.7 
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million to 152.0 million TEU, an increase of about 430% (Drewry, 2007).  Figure 2.2 
displays world container traffic and throughput from 1980 to 2010. 
 
Figure 2.2: The world container traffic and throughput (DSC, 2007) 
In 1998, Rayan observed that “the growth in containerized trade continues as more and 
more cargo are transferred from break-bulk to containers.” Today, more than 60% of the 
world's deep-sea general cargo is transported in containers, and some routes, especially 
those between economically strong and stable countries, are containerised up to 100% 
(Drewry, 2015). 
The growth rate of container flows from 2002 to 2020 is still expected to be 7.5% per 
year. Every major port is expected to double and possibly triple its cargo by 2020 (Liu et 
al., 2002). At the same time, existing and newly planned terminals are trying to attract as 
much volume as they can handle, making the container-handling sector very competitive. 
Furthermore, since globally acting industrial companies have considerably increased their 
production capacities in Asian countries, the container traffic between Asia and the rest 
of the world has steadily increased (Wang, 2005). 
Ports are crucial in interfacing sea and land transportation systems, and by extension the 
economy, leading to a high share of imports in GDP and worldwide economic growth. 
Asian ports continue to dominate the league table for port throughput and terminal 
efficiency, as shown in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3: Top 10 world container ports 
Source: (WSC, 2015b; Alphaliner, 2015) 
Rank Port 
Volume 
2011 
(Million 
TEU) 
Volume 
2012 
(Million 
TEU) 
Volume 
2013 
(Million 
TEU) 
Volume 
2014 
(Million 
TEU) 
1 Shanghai, China 31.74 32.53 33.62 35.29 
2 Singapore 29.94 31.65 32.6 33.87 
3 Shenzhen, China 22.57 22.94 23.28 24.04 
4 Hong Kong, S.A.R., China 24.38 23.12 22.35 22.23 
5 Ningbo-Zhoushan, China 14.72 16.83 17.33 19.45 
6 Busan, South Korea 16.18 17.04 17.69 18.68 
7 Guangzhou Harbor, China 14.42 14.74 15.31 16.63 
8 Qingdao, China 13.02 14.50 15.52 16.62 
9 Jebel Ali, Dubai, United Arab Emirates 13.00 13.30 13.64 15.25 
10 Tianjin, China 11.59 12.30 13.01 14.05 
The leading global container ports are mostly from China which ranks among the top five 
along with 7th and 8th place from 2011 to 2014. Singapore placed in the second place of 
the leading global container ports ranking, while Busan in 6th and Jebel Ali in the 9th 
(WSC, 2015b; Alphaliner, 2015). The leading global container port is Shanghai, with an 
equity-adjusted throughput of 35.29 million TEU, approximately 5% higher than in 2013. 
Table 2.4 shows the throughput percentage rate for each port.  
Table 2.4: Leading global container ports throughput percentage rate 
Rank Port Throughput percentage rate 
1 Shanghai, China 5% 
2 Singapore 4% 
3 Shenzhen, China 3.3% 
4 Hong Kong, S.A.R., China -0.6% 
5 Ningbo-Zhoushan, China 12.1% 
6 Busan, South Korea 5.6% 
7 Guangzhou Harbor, China 7.2% 
8 Qingdao, China 7.1% 
9 Jebel Ali, Dubai, United Arab Emirates 11.8% 
10 Tianjin, China 3.8% 
Over the last four decades, the container has been an essential part of unit loads; the 
concept is now an integral part of international sea freight transportation. With ever-
increasing containerisation, the amount of seaport container terminals and competition 
among them has become quite remarkable. As seen in previous industrial statistical 
analyses, investments in containerisation continue to grow steadily. Moreover, there is 
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evidence of increased privatisation, and the container shipping industry proved in 2009 
that it is economically resilient in the face of adversity. Ports, operators, customers, and 
investors clearly recognise this advantage.  
2.3. Container Terminal Port Operations Overview 
Containers entered the market for international conveyance of sea freights almost five 
decades ago. Containers are large boxes used to transport goods from one destination to 
another. The use of containers has several advantages, namely less product packaging, 
fewer damages, and higher productivity (Agerschou et al., 1983). The standardisation of 
metal boxes also offers customers many advantages, as it protects against weather and 
pilferage and improves and simplifies scheduling and controlling, resulting in a profitable 
physical flow of cargo (Steenken et al., 2004). 
Container dimensions have been standardised using the term TEU, which refers to one 
container with a length of 20 feet. Containers are measured in TEU (i.e., 40 and 45 feet 
containers represent two TEUs). Different types of containers are available; the most 
common is the standard dry cargo container. Some other types are referred to as special 
equipment and include open end, open side, open top, half height, flat rack, refrigerated 
(i.e., reefer), liquid bulk (i.e., tank), and modular containers. All are built to the lengths 
and widths of standard dry cargo containers. 
Every container has a unique unit number, often called a box number, that can be used by 
ship captains, crews, coastguards, dock supervisors, customs officers, and warehouse 
managers to identify a container’s owner or shipping user; they are even able to track the 
container anywhere in the world. 
Several modes can be used to transport containers from one destination to another: ships 
that carry transport over the sea; trucks or trains over land; and some other special modes, 
which will be in Section 2.3.3, used for handling processes within terminal operations. 
2.3.1. Container ship-related port operations  
Large container ships are being built with the justification that they will produce 
economies of scale, as evidenced by the maritime container industry movement towards 
capacity expansion and growing container ship sizes. Encounter Bay was one of the first 
to be launched in 1968, with 1530 TEU, and 337 ships of 338,627 TEU were delivered 
between 1968 and 1973 (Levinson, 2010). In six years, the fleet grew 9.02 times the ship 
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amount and 17.97 times carrying capacity. Vessel production increased beyond 1,000 
TEU, becoming the largest group with about 95 new ships, totalling 132,172 TEU. The 
expansion continued in the 1970s by over 16% per year, delivering 176 ships and totalling 
219,072 TEU. The sub-panamax generation also emerged, with 2,000–2,999 TEU, and 
grew quickly to deploy 61 ships, totalling 152,167 TEU (Tran & Haasis, 2015). 
CSCL Globe was the world’s largest container ship at the end of 2014, carrying over 
19,000 TEU. The vessel did not keep this title for long, however, as MSC Oscar 
Mediterranean Shipping announced in early January 2015 that its latest vessel had a 
nominal capacity of 19,224 TEU (Martín et al., 2015). The container ship revolution is 
an on-going process, and ships as large as 22,000 TEU are expected to be in service as 
early as 2018. Capacity expansion and container ship growth since 1968 are described in 
Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3: Container ship size growth and capacity expansion 
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In the quest for economies of scale, capacity expansion is being achieved through growth 
of ship size rather than the number of ships, because the unit costs of transport service 
decrease with vessel size; consequently, the earnings per unit of transport service increase 
with vessel size if freight rates hold steady (LIM, 1998). However, the employment of 
increasingly large container ships increases the risk of serious overcapacity, especially 
when several operators are introducing new vessels to the same trade routes. The operator 
with the largest capacity has an early cost advantage, putting pressure on other operators 
on mainstream trade routes to move quickly and aggressively for large and economical 
containerships to stay competitive. There is a strong tendency toward overbuilding, 
reaching far beyond foreseeable needs (Wu & Lin, 2015). 
In regards to container ship safety from an engineering perspective, it is always much 
easier to increase vessel breadth or width than length in order to maintain ship stability. 
On the other hand, emerging torsion problems of ship hulls should be considered. 
In addition, and more relevant to this research, ports and terminals have responded to the 
expansion of container ship capacity by making large and rapid investments in 
infrastructure and handling equipment. These investments could provide adequate service 
capacity, but the next ship generation, namely echelon, has elicited great concern from 
terminal operators’ points of view (AGCS, 2014). 
Operational managers are confronted with issues besides infrastructure: environmental 
concerns related to terminal size growth; containership loading problems with an 
increased quantity of TEU handling; restrictions on cranes; limited outreach; lack of 
qualified workforce; 24/5 or 24/7 customs check availability; hinterland transportation 
operations, in which truck route competition is likely to increase; and the most critical 
aspects of berth depth and time. 
The movement towards larger ships presents port authorities with a number of pressing 
issues regarding investing in stronger tugs: deepening and/or widening approach channels, 
as larger ships have access to fewer ports due to the limited draught of the ports and 
turning basins; environmental and regulatory constraints; expansion projects; traffic 
organisation; and environmental, social, and business interruption costs (Sys et al., 2008). 
Capacity expansion and container ship size growths have significant impacts, not only on 
shipping companies’ businesses, but also on ports and container terminal operators. Ports 
and terminals continue responding to size growth by making large capital expenditure 
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and investment plans, as the main limiting factors of the water depth in ports, navigable 
waterways and the length of the vessel are not breached. In addition, operation of bigger 
vessels raises terminal, intermodal, and commercial issues. According to previous 
analysis, container ship size growth and optimum terminal operations are interrelated; 
both concepts develop similarly regarding transport modes, terminal types, trade lanes, 
and technology. 
2.3.2. Container terminal port overview 
A container terminal is a facility in which containers are transhipped between different 
destinations for onward transportation. Transhipment within a terminal is namely 
between container ships (seaside), yard (stack), and land transportation vehicles 
(landside). Figure 2.4 presents an example of terminal layout at Altenwerder (CTA) in 
Hamburg. 
Maritime container terminals tend to be part of a larger port, and the biggest maritime 
container terminals are situated around major harbours. Inland container terminals tend 
to be located in or near major cities, with transportation mode connections to maritime 
container terminals. 
Both maritime and inland container terminals usually provide storage facilities for both 
loaded and unloaded (empty) containers. Loaded containers are stored for relatively short 
periods while waiting for onward transportation. Unloaded containers may be stored for 
longer periods awaiting their next use. Containers are normally stacked for storage, and 
the resulting stores are known as container stacks. 
 
Figure 2.4: Container terminal layout, Altenwerder (CTA) in Hamburg 
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In general, container terminals are considered material-handling systems that have two 
interfaces for input and output flows. The interfaces are waterside when loading and 
unloading containers from ships, and landside for trucks and trains. In the heart of the 
container terminal is a stacking area, where containers are temporarily stored. The marine 
apron is a space designed for travelling vehicles, located between the stacking area and 
berth quay. 
2.3.3. Container terminal port operation process 
In recent years, methodological advances regarding container terminal operations have 
considerably improved. Although container terminals considerably differ in size, function, 
and geometric layout, they consist of the same sub-systems (Murty et al., 2005). The ship 
operation, or berthing area, is equipped with quay cranes for loading and unloading 
vessels. Import and export containers are stocked in a yard, which is divided into a number 
of blocks. Special stack areas are reserved for reefer containers that need an electrical 
supply for cooling or to store hazardous goods. Separate areas are used for empty 
containers. Some terminals employ sheds for stuffing and stripping containers or for 
additional logistics services. 
The operation process commences when a ship arrives at a port, and the import and 
tranship containers have to be unloaded from the ship by the Quay Crane (QC). Next, the 
prime mover transfers the containers from the QC to connection units that travel between 
the ship and container yard. The containers are stored until the Rubber Tired Gantry (RTG) 
crane transports them to their next destination. After another period of time, the prime 
mover retrieves and transports the containers to ships or feeder vessels. This process can 
be executed in reverse order to load export or tranship containers onto a vessel. The 
containers stacked on the yard and vessel can be piled, meaning that not every container 
is directly accessible, which limits storage space (Vis & Koster, 2003). The process is 
illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
The truck and train operation area links the terminal to outside transportation systems. 
The unloading and loading process at a typical modern container terminal is illustrated in 
Figure 2.6. After the container arrivals at the terminal by truck or train, it is identified and 
registered using its major data (e.g., content, destination, outbound vessel, and shipping 
line), picked up by internal transportation equipment, and distributed to one of the storage 
blocks in the yard (Günther et al., 2006). 
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Figure 2.5: Operation areas of container terminal and flow of transports 
The respective storage location is given by row, bay, and tier within the block and is 
assigned in real time upon arrival in the terminal. Specific cranes or lifting vehicles are 
used to store containers at the yard block. Finally, after the arrival of the designated vessel, 
the container is unloaded from the yard block and transported to the berth, where QCs 
load the container onto the vessel in a predefined stacking position (Stahlbock & Voß, 
2008). 
                      Quayside                Landside 
 
Figure 2.6: Transportation and handling chain of a container 
The operations necessary to handle an import container are performed in reverse order. 
Figure 2.7 illustrates sub processes that correspond with the systems of Figure 2.6. 
Scheduling the huge number of concurrent operations, as well as the different types of 
transportation and handling equipment, is an extremely complex task. 
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Figure 2.7:  Processes at a container terminal  
2.3.4. Container handling operations  
Seaport container terminals greatly differ by transportation type and handling equipment 
(Günther et al., 2006). When a ship arrives at port, QCs take the import containers off the 
ship's hold or deck. In fact, QCs serve as single or dual-trolley cranes that can move along 
the crane arm to transport the container from the ship to the transport vehicle and vice 
versa. An example of a QC is given in Figure 2.8. QCs are manned because automating 
this process presents practical problems, such as exact positioning of containers (Vis & 
Koster, 2003), and QCs are used at both automated and manned terminals. The containers 
are picked up with a spreader, a pick-up device attached to the trolley. 
 
Figure 2.8: Quay cranes 
The QCs move on rails to the different holds, where they take/put containers off/on the 
deck and holds. One QC can unload a container while another simultaneously loads. 
Decisions at the operational level, such as which cranes should go where, which 
containers should be on the ship, and which containers should be taken out of the hold 
first, are in practice made by the crane driver or determined by the loading and unloading 
plan. Very little literature studies these types of problems (Stahlbock & Voß, 2008).  
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2.3.5. Yard handling equipment 
As aforementioned, containers have to be transported from the ship to the stack and vice 
versa. Vehicles like forklift trucks, yard trucks, or straddle carriers can be used when 
designing a terminal. Straddle carriers and forklift trucks can pick up containers from the 
ground. A crane is needed to put the container on the yard truck (Vis & Koster, 2003). 
The most common types of yard cranes are Rail-Mounted Gantry (RMG) cranes, RTG 
cranes, Straddle Carriers (SC), Reach Stackers (RS), and chassis-based transporters, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.9 (Günther et al., 2006). It is worth mentioning that only RMG 
cranes are suited for fully automated container handling operations, while SCs can both 
transport and stack containers in a yard. 
 
Figure 2.9: Different types of handling equipment 
(Günther et al., 2006) (Vis & Koster, 2003) 
Different types of vehicles can be used for both ship-to-yard transportation and interface 
between the yard and hinterland. The most common types are multi-trailer systems with 
manned trucks, Automated Guided Vehicles (AGVs), and Automated Lifting Vehicles 
(ALVs). The latter two types can load one 40’/45’ container or two 20’ containers, as 
seen in Figure 2.10.  
AGVs are robotic vehicles that travel along predefined paths and can perform multiple 
load operations. ALVs are capable of independently lifting containers (Yang et al., 2004). 
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Figure 2.10: Automated guided vehicle (AGV) 
In terms of operations, a route must be chosen by operation managers, as well as which 
vehicle transports which container. 
2.3.6. Yard transhipment 
A stack stores import and export containers for certain periods of time, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.11. A stack is divided into multiple blocks or lanes, each with a number of rows. 
Stacking height varies per terminal, ranging between two and eight containers high. A 
transfer point is situated at the end of each lane, and the crane takes/places the container 
off/on the vehicle transporting the container. Empty containers are usually stored 
separately (Steenken et al., 2004). 
 
Figure 2.11: Schematic top view of the stack area  
There are two methods for storing containers: storing on a chassis system in which each 
container is individually accessible; and piling containers on the ground, meaning that not 
every container is directly accessible. Due to limited storage space, stacking on the ground 
is currently more common (Stahlbock & Voß, 2008).  
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2.4. Maritime Port Safety 
Seaport safety is playing an increasingly important role in ensuring supply chain 
resilience and sustainability, and is inspiring risk-related research from operational, 
organisational, and economic perspectives (Trbojevic & Carr, 2000; Soares & Teixeira, 
2001; Marlo & Casaca, 2003; Legato & Monaco, 2004; Garrick et al., 2004; Madni & 
Jackson, 2009; Fabiano et al., 2010; Mokhtari et al., 2011;). However, compared to 
shipping risk analysis (Hänninen, 2014; Wu et al., 2015; Banda et al., 2015), studies on 
seaport risk and safety management are scarce in the literature. A review by Pallis et al., 
(2010) on 395 port-related journal papers published between 1997 and 2008 discloses 
that, despite the criticality of safety and security in efficient supply chains and 
international trade, risk analysis persistently occupies a backseat role within port research; 
it is overwhelmed by other aspects, such as efficiency analysis, port competition, 
geographical analysis, spatial evolution, and policy and governance. 
A review of 984 papers published in the Journal of Maritime Policy and Management by 
Notteboom et al., (2013) reveals that core themes in seaport studies over the past 40 years 
include frameworks and techniques around many fields, including geography, 
econometrics, welfare economics, operations research, logistics/supply chain 
management, and strategic management. In the last five years, port research has been 
dominated by transport and supply chains, port governance, and port competition. During 
the first two decades of the Journal of Maritime Policy and Management, research 
attention focused on regulatory issues referring to competition, pricing, financing, 
environmental, safety, and security-related policy practices. Since then, port terminals, 
including container terminals, have developed rapidly and aggressively, creating a 
growing interest in examining the prospects and limits of port operation safety. 
Over the last decade, the limitations on maritime port safety analysis has been 
acknowledged in the existing risk management approaches for port complex systems and 
resilience engineering. Therefore, significant effort is ongoing to enhance the port safety 
systems by developing a robust, flexible and effective methods to optimise critical 
systems operations safety (Wang, 2006; Mokhtari et al., 2011 and John et al., 2014). 
Risk management of a maritime port systems is a highly complex task due to the dynamic 
interactions among its interrelated components of technical, organisational, operational, 
safety and security aspects of their daily operations. US Department of Homeland 
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Security described the level of interdependences and complexity of the system’s 
operations as: ‘‘all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering 
on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, 
infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels and other conveyances.’’ (Moteff and Parfomak, 
2004). One logical way to conduct an effective risk management framework of a seaport 
is by breaking down the system into functional structure comprising subsystems and 
components. The risk-based decision support methodology of the functional structure can 
be carried out to examine the interrelationships and then the system safety management 
model can be formulated for risk based modelling in all phases of the system’s life, from 
its conception and design to its operation, maintenance and decommissioning (John et al., 
2014).  
Risk management as a subset of any management system, aims to develop, plan, 
comprehend and follow operations processes to implement an effective risk management 
framework that provides preventive actions to eliminate and/or mitigate risks related to 
the safety of people, environment and property (Hänninen, 2014). Maritime risk 
management framework covers several subareas of organizational management that 
describing the elements of maritime port operations on how these elements interact to 
provide useful information on the functioning of the risk-based decision support 
methodology in order to serve as an assessment and monitoring tool that help stakeholders 
for continuous improvement and decision making when managing maritime port 
operations safety. 
The scholarly community has proposed several frameworks to assess the organizational 
aspects effects on risk within different domains, to name but a few (Embrey, 1992; Paté-
Cornell & Murphy, 1996; Øien, 2001; Roelen et al., 2003; Mohaghegh, Kazemi, & 
Mosleh, 2009), in the maritime transportation field (Trucco et al., 2008; Oltedal & 
McArthur, 2011; Ek et al., 2014) and maritime port disruptions and resilience (John et al., 
2014; Zhang et al., 2015; Lam &   Su, 2015; John et al., 2016) However, safety 
management have not been adequately addressed and there is not safety management 
model based on the established safety management norms or standards have been 
published (Hänninen, 2014). in the light of the above facts and arguments, the existing 
models are rather limited and don’t have a comprehensive reasoning of the maritime risk 
management mechanisms based decision-support. The maritime risk management 
subarea interactions seem to be lacking an appropriate risk management framework and 
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research upon that approximates the risk management realities for maritime terminals’ 
and ports’ complex activities, especially on the operational aspects. 
In addition, large numbers of regulations and legislations on maritime port safety have 
been proposed by various international and professional bodies to enhance the operational 
safety and efficiency of maritime ports systems including maritime port terminals which 
will discussed in details in Section 2.5.3. 
Safety and reliability of maritime ports is important for the protection of human life and 
health, the environment, and the economy. Safe port terminal operation has a profound 
impact on service quality, productivity cost, and lifestyle. Therefore, system safety 
evaluations that include the early detection of hazards are critical in avoiding performance 
degradation and damage to human life or machinery. Furthermore, the development and 
enforcement of a robust forecasting mechanism can eliminate or reduce the effect of 
accidents and/or disasters that jeopardise terminal operations. Many engineering systems 
are repairable, and their safety measures are evolving; implementing these changes going 
forward can evaluate and improve the growth or deterioration of systems (Hu et al., 2010). 
The necessity and importance of evaluating a system safety is dependent on the fact that 
decision makers are generally interested in predicting future system failures for resource 
planning, inventory management, development of realistic policies for age replacement, 
and logistics support.  
2.5. Container Terminal Port Safety  
Maritime infrastructure, such as container terminals, is critical, as well as costly 
engineering systems that enable economic activities through the transfer of goods and 
services between national and international destinations. Given the significance of their 
operations to the world economy, container terminals face a variety of operational and 
environmental uncertainties that make them vulnerable to hazards (Mansouri et al., 2009). 
Container terminal operations are conducted by a large number of workers at different 
facilities, sites, and workplaces, and safety issues are of significant importance to the 
operation of these sites and workplaces. Quantitative research on safety and security 
analysis of container terminal operations has not yet been well conducted, but Yang, Ng, 
and Wang (2014) have raised the issue. If risks cannot be quantified, industrial 
stakeholders may not be motivated to confidently take control measures. A container 
terminal safety study by Fabiano et al., (2009) examines the factors that affect 
32 
 
occupational accident frequency in ports and terminals; it discloses that scientific research 
has not properly explored the container revolution’s impact on port safety. 
Sea ports and marine terminals (i.e., infrastructures) are essential economic elements of 
any coastal state; therefore, recent years have seen research and subsequent improvements 
in areas that affect seaports and marine terminals, including operational, organisational, 
economic, business, and natural conditions. Researchers have carried out significant work 
over recent years. International bodies such as the IMO, UNCTAD, World Bank, 
European Commission, Asian Development Bank, and Academic Bodies have been 
leaders in marine port and terminal research. Professional and academic bodies aim to 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of marine ports and terminals. 
In regards to container terminal operational safety from a practical point of view, 
constantly changing elements can determine the performance of different container 
terminals, taking into account a range of internal and external factors influencing the 
system’s productivity (Legato & Monaco, 2004). 
Growing public concern over supply chain safety and security in the past decade has 
stimulated risk analysis of container terminals (often deemed safety-critical 
nodes/components in container supply chains); this risk analysis is considered an 
effective solution for reducing/mitigating the negative impacts caused by possible 
hazardous events (Mokhtari et al., 2011). The risk analysis of large maritime engineering 
systems, such as container terminal infrastructure, is affected by many factors related to 
transport safety, including shipping efficiency, supply chain distribution reliability, and 
loss prevention. 
In regards to operational improvement, performance indicators are important factors in 
determining the efficiency of the seaports and marine terminals (UNCTAD, 1996; World 
Bank, 2001; Marlo & Casaca, 2003). The performance of marine ports and terminals can 
be determined by different, constantly changing elements and a range of internal and 
external risk factors that influence the system’s productivity (Legato & Monaco, 2004). 
Regarding marine port organisational improvement, Shannon et al., (1997) note that the 
relationship between different organisational culture including the role of management 
style, information technology and the workforce has a great impact on health and safety. 
Liu et al., (2002) and Steenken et al., (2004) investigate container terminal optimisation 
improvements, including automated equipment, terminal operation-related computer 
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technology, and management of various types of activities within ports. In reviewing 
technological opportunities for container terminals, Frankel (2001) explains that 
advanced technology enables seaports to integrate cargo transfer into individual customer 
logistical requirements. Günther et al., (2006) research recent developments and examine 
research issues concerning quantitative analysis and decision support for container 
terminal logistics. 
In terms of economic improvement perspectives for ports and terminals, UNCTAD (1996) 
and World Bank (2001) examine how competitiveness among ports and terminals can 
influence different countries’ economies and trade values. Palmer (1999) emphasises the 
need for efficient port facilities and operations to improve their competitive positioning. 
Goss (1990) expresses that efficient seaports can positively influence a nation’s 
economies of scale. Many researchers have studied businesses with respect to individual 
ports and terminals and included case studies and reviews of seaport development to 
enhance efficiency, as discussed in Section 2.2. 
In terms of natural conditions’ impacts on marine ports and terminals, seaports have 
demonstrated a high vulnerability to seismic motion, and associated ground failures 
severely impact health and the economy (Pachakis & Kiremidjian, 2004). The 1995 
Japanese Hyogoken Nanbu earthquake showed that low resilience of port activity in the 
wake of natural disasters results in severe economic losses. Past experience shows that 
earthquakes can significantly impact port components, including quay walls, piers, cranes, 
and warehouses. Natural disasters can severely disrupt terminal operations and negatively 
affect a region’s economy (Na & Shinozuka, 2009). 
The increasing number of publications in the last decade indicates the importance of the 
aforementioned areas of research. However, dynamic and enforced changes occurring in 
marine ports and offshore terminals including operational, organisational, economic, 
business, and natural factors related to environments have made it imperative to study 
safety aspects, including recent risk-management related issues regarding externally and 
internally driven elements. Therefore, this study mainly focuses on operational aspects, 
including technical and personnel factors, leaving other risk aspects to be addressed in 
future work. Other risk concerns influencing port safety—such as management, policy 
implications, and natural and political issues—also need investigation in order to provide 
a panoramic view on terminal risk analysis. 
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2.5.1. Some Noteworthy Accidents 
The shipping industry is regulated by a complicated international legal framework. 
Basically, it is based on the recommendations and guidelines of more than 50 conventions 
with numerous protocols and amendments (Knapp and Velden, 2010). These conventions 
are developed mainly by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) with the support of various national and 
international bodies. However, there are still some loopholes in their enforcement system, 
which can lead to incidents. Shipping incidents tend to carry very high economic costs, 
due to the large asset values and the high operational risks involved in shipping. 
 
Despite the efforts being made by IMO‟s member states to change this process, 
preventive actions are still uncommon, resulting in the creation or amendment of 
legislation being reactive and typically following the outcome of a major disaster. 
Ultimately in terms of legislation in practice, the maritime ports industry has suffered a 
lot in the past and produced some disjointed, conflicting regulations, mainly in response 
to disasters involving considerable loss of life, property, and environmental damage. 
 
The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) analysis showed that 50% of maritime 
accidents were initiated by observable erroneous human action, while another 30% of 
maritime accidents occurred due to failures of verifiable human actions to avoid an 
accident (ABS, 2003). However, the magnitude of damage inflicted by a major shipping 
accident increases virtually with the public attention paid to those accidents and their 
negative influence on the perceived safety of shipping. Unfortunately, it is a fact of life 
that design for safety and safety operational practices are only appreciated after serious 
accidents have occurred. 
2.5.1.1. Chicago Port disaster 
On the evening of July 17, 1944, the SS Quinault Victory and SS E.A. Bryan, two 
merchant ships, were being loaded and packed with 4,600 tons of explosives. Another 
400 tons of explosives were nearby on rail cars. At 22:18, a series of massive explosions 
over several seconds destroyed everything and everyone in the vicinity. Every building 
in Port Chicago was damaged, 320 people were killed, 390 others were injured and fire 
with smoke extended nearly two miles into the air. The pilot of a plane flying at 9,000 
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feet in the area claimed that metal chunks from the explosion flew past him (Jones et al., 
2006). 
 
The exact cause of the explosion was never revealed. However, the inquiry covered 
possible explosion scenarios involving problems with steam winches and rigging, 
organizational problems within the management system and lack of handling training, but 
it was mainly poor safety procedures and misconducting handling practices that led to the 
catastrophe.  
2.5.1.2. Tianjin Port disaster 
Late in the evening of 12 August 2015, a series of explosions at a container storage station 
at the Port of Tianjin, China was occurred. The first two explosions occurred within 30 
seconds of each other at the facility, which is located in the Binhai new Area of Tianjin. 
The second explosion was far larger and involved the detonation of about 800 tonnes of 
ammonium nitrate. Fires caused by the initial explosions continued to burn uncontrolled 
for the next three days, repeatedly causing secondary explosions, with eight additional 
explosions occurring on 15 August (Independent, 2015). 
 
One month after the explosion, the casualty report was 173 deaths, 8 missing, and 797 
non-fatal injuries. The accident has cost nearly 1bilion GBP. The official report into the 
disaster found 123 people, including senior officials, responsible for the illegal storage of 
11,300 tonnes of hazardous chemicals. The cause of the explosions was not immediately 
known, but an investigation concluded in February 2016 that an overheated container of 
dry nitrocellulose was the cause of the initial explosion. 
 
Over the past nine years more than 1,200 accidents occurred in maritime container ports 
have been brought to the attention of the Health and Safety Executive, 120 major incidents 
which have caused fatal or serious injuries to staff while at work (HSE, 2008). Lack of 
compliance with safety practice and misconducting proper inspections has been found as 
main root causes for many cases. Still no one has argued strictly for lack of complying 
with a generic or any specific risk management based methodology for OSP in container 
terminals and maritime ports. The accidents described above together with other disasters 
may justify the need for the maritime industry to improve its safety culture and so move 
towards a risk-based regime in both design and operations. 
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2.5.2. Existing container terminal port safety-related methodologies 
The increasing number of container shipments causes higher demands on seaport 
container terminal management and logistics, as well as on technical equipment 
(Steenken et al., 2004); this heightened demand has led to significant research on logistics 
issues that arise from decision-making problems. Academic work has been devoted to the 
analysis of security and environmental issues (Yip et al., 2002; Yang et al., 2010; Riahi, 
2010) or container terminal optimisation, including management and automated 
technology (Liu et al., 2002; Vis & Koster, 2003; Steenken et al., 2004; Günther et al., 
2006). 
Very little research, however, has focused on container terminal safety and transportation. 
In a broader scope, few scholars have paid attention to the performance reliability of ports’ 
transportation systems. Container transportation began five decades ago, and 
containerisation has developed rapidly since then; its impact on safety, from ships and 
ports to global trade patterns, has not been properly explored in scientific research. 
Trade globalisation has led to a rapid increase in container vessel movements in many 
seaports. As trade continues growing, most busy seaports face risks related to economic 
wealth, operational efficiency, personnel safety, and terminal security. The increasing 
number of container shipments put high demand on container terminal management. 
While significant academic effort is devoted to port-centred logistics and operational 
optimisation (Liu et al., 2002; Vis & Koster, 2003; Steenken et al., 2004; Güntheret et al., 
2006), relatively few studies examine port safety and risk (Yip et al., 2002; Yang et al., 
2010), revealing a major research gap. Safety analysis is broadly defined as the study of 
system failure consequences in relation to possible harm to people and/or damage to 
environment or property, including financial assets (HSE, 1997). 
Safety has been an issue for centuries, from the beginning of the shipping industry, and 
will likely remain an issue as industry growth continues. When tracking the industry’s 
history, the need for measured risk-control implementation is often recognised after 
catastrophic accidents. For instance, the Titanic disaster in 1912 led to the first 
International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). In 1960, following the 
capsize of liner Andrea Doria, the United States hosted the International Safety 
Conference advocating for ship safety measurement. The International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution (MARPOL) from Ships was initiated during the 1970s due to 
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several oil tanker accidents. The 1990 Exxon Valdez disaster resulted in the mandated 
use of double hull tankers. All aforementioned incidents and the subsequent acts from 
member states or international bodies indicate the constant necessity for introducing 
modern risk management methods to the maritime industry. 
A systematic focus on risk-based methodology began in the aerospace sector following 
the fire of the Apollo test AS-204 in 1967 as the basic method of probabilistic risk 
assessment. The nuclear industry developed probabilistic safety assessments in the 1970s, 
introducing the first full-scale application of this method, including the reactor safety 
study WASH-1400 which analysed the accident’s consequences (Jensen, 2002). The 
chemical industry used Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) in the 1970s, which the 
Norwegian offshore industry developed and applied in the 1980s after the Alexander 
accident (Bai & Jin, 2016). The development of Safety case as a mandatory requirement 
in the UK after the Piper Alpha accident in 1988 (HSE, 1992). After Lord Carver’s 1992 
investigation of the capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the UK proposed the FSA, 
a safety regime risk management framework, to the IMO in 1993.  
Various industries perform risk-based methodologies. Most, if not all, of these 
methodologies function in one of three main categories (i.e., quantitative, qualitative, and 
a combination of both) to identify, evaluate, and mitigate the impact of risk factors on the 
industry. The following subsections briefly describe the most widely applied risk-based 
methodologies. 
2.5.2.1. Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) 
QRA, also called Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) or Probabilistic Safety Analysis 
(PSA), is being applied to many domains, including transportation, construction, energy, 
chemical processing, aerospace, the military, and financial planning and management 
(Bedford & Cooke, 2001). Relevant authorities have adopted QRA approaches as part of 
the schematic framework for many industries. QRA methodology provides numerical 
evidence to other sectors to ensure safety claims or determine the need for further 
improvement (Haigh, 2003). 
QRA is not a standard practice, as proven by the trend in many domains to support 
management decision-making and risk management strategizing. However, QRA varies 
in goals, size, complexity, and techniques depending on each sector’s characteristics. 
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Essentially, QRA answers the following three questions (Farquharson & McDuffee, 
2003): 
 What can happen? Or, what are the initiators or initiating events (i.e., undesirable 
starting events) that lead to adverse consequences? 
 How likely is it to happen? Or, what are their frequencies? 
 Given that it occurs, what are the consequences? Or, what and how severe are the 
potential determinants? 
Risk is defined by identifying possible hazards, quantifying frequencies, and determining 
the severity of consequences (Bedford & Cooke, 2001). The analytical process of QRA 
is illustrated in Figure 2.12. 
 
Figure 2.12: Analytical process of QRA 
Detailed answers to these three questions are obtained by performing an analytical pro-
cess phase for each question. The first phase requires technical knowledge and specialised 
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information on the possible causes of harmful outcomes from a given action or activity. 
Rationale techniques and logic tools such as Master Logic Diagrams (MLD) and Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are useful for focusing on the most important initi-
ating events. The second phase calculates frequency of initiating events using Boolean 
Logic methods for model development, as well as probabilistic or statistical methods for 
the quantification portion of model analysis. Boolean logic tools include inductive logic 
methods like Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Event Sequence Diagrams (ESD), and de-
ductive methods like Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
When an event’s frequency is fully defined by historical statistical data, it can be used if 
the uncertainty in the data is very low. For some system failures events in which there is 
no historical failure data or the data are very sparse, quantitative failure models are de-
veloped with deductive logic tools, such as FTA, or inductive logic tools such as Relia-
bility Block Diagrams (RBD) and FMEA. In the second and third phases, developing and 
quantifying accident scenarios tracks the chains of events linking initiating events to the 
detrimental consequences (Stamatelatos, 2000). 
The third phase requires a deterministic analysis to describe the severity of consequences 
that could occur from the accident. Beginning with the initiating events, the chain forms 
a risk curve by plotting the frequency of consequence value excess and a function of the 
consequence values. The risk curve illustrates the frequency of a certain number of casu-
alties in a given period of time, as shown in Figure 2.13. 
   
Figure 2.13: Risk curve 
As a risk-based method, this may look quite similar to offshore safety case procedures. 
However, the process for conducting each step, as well as the use of techniques and tools, 
may differ from safety case applications. 
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2.5.2.2. Safety case  
A safety case aims to ensure an adequate level of safety for a particular facility, based on 
management and control of the facility’s associated risks. A central feature of a safety 
case is a facility’s designers and operators (i.e., duty holders) assessing the risks 
associated with their facility, as well as documenting how the safety management system 
appropriately limits those risks (Sutton, 2014b). The document that contains risk 
assessment details and the safety management system is called a safety case. The safety 
case demonstrates, to duty holders, customers, and society at large, that ship operation 
risks are adequately understood and controlled. 
A safety case includes a comprehensive description of the facility, its operation, and the 
environment within which it operates. Risk assessment is conducted using a number of 
established techniques, such as FMEA, Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) studies 
for hazard identification, FTA, and ETA. Risks are then quantified to the appropriate 
extent. Risk criteria are set, relevant to the facility and its operational context, and usually 
in accordance with the “As Low As is Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP) principle. The 
safety management system includes key elements of safety case concepts for setting 
policy, including organising, planning, and implementation, as well as monitoring, 
review, and feedback of performance against the policy to ensure that safety objectives 
are achieved efficiently and without damaging the environment (HSE, 1992). The key 
elements of the case concepts are illustrated in Figure 2.14 and described below (Wang, 
2002; Sutton, 2014b). 
 
Figure 2.14: The key elements of the safety case concepts 
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1. Identify hazards. 
2. Estimate risks for all identified hazards. All hazards can generally be classified in 
accordance with the ALARP principle as the intolerable, tolerable, and negligible 
risk regions (HSE, 1992), as shown in Figure 2.15. 
3. Reduce risks associated with significant hazards, and institute mitigation 
measures should a major incident occur. 
4. Utilise risk control to take the most appropriate action in the event that a hazard 
becomes a reality to minimise its effects on operators, facility, and the 
environment. 
5. Develop and implement a Safety Management System (SMS) and ensure that it 
meets pertinent health and safety rules and regulations. SMS effectiveness is usu-
ally monitored and verified by means of regular audits and inspections to ensure 
compliance with safety case requirements. 
 
Figure 2.15: The tolerability of risk (HSE, 1992) 
2.5.2.3. Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
FSA as a risk-based methodology is, in some aspects, similar to the safety case regime 
used for the UK Continental Shelf. The philosophy of both methods is generally the same, 
but while a safety case is applied to specific maritime shipping sectors, FSA is generally 
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applied to any maritime shipping sector for common safety issues; the actual content of 
each step, however, as well as the techniques and tools used, may differ from offshore 
applications. This framework is due to the unique maritime industry structure, which has 
no universal regulator, culture, education, or qualification system. FSA is a tool for 
decision makers to rationalise their process and achieve a balance between maritime 
safety and protection of environment and costs (IMO, 2002). The functional components 
in the FSA process are listed below and then illustrated in Figure 2.16. 
1. Hazards identification 
2. Risk analysis 
3. Risk control options 
4. Cost benefit assessment 
5. Recommendations for decision-making 
 
 
Figure 2.16: FSA process and functional components  
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FSA’s use in shipping represents a fundamental cultural change, from a largely reactive 
approach to a structured and systematic methodology that uses risk evaluation and is 
integrated, proactive, and effective (Pillay & Wang, 2003). FSA’s main characteristics 
are below.  
 FSA is a systematic approach for sociotechnical systems that may consist of 
hardware, environment, human organisations, operations, and procedures. 
 Hazards are proactively identified through the hazard identification process, and 
may apply different hazard identification approaches.  
 Risks associated with various hazards are described and analysed. Usually, risk is 
a composite of the likelihood and consequences of a potential undesirable event 
arising from a hazard; other risk attributes can be assigned to the conventional risk 
composition to improve the system’s safety. Risk analysis covers the time span of 
operational life, and may involve various quantitative or qualitative tools to 
perform risk composition calculations.  
 Risk quantification determines risk level and whether it is acceptable or 
significant based on predefined acceptance criteria. When risk is significant, it is 
necessary to devise regulatory measures to control and reduce that risk. 
 The above step may be followed by cost-benefit analysis to compare 
preventive/protective measure costs with benefits. 
 Basic elements are integrated into a risk model with information about the hazards, 
their associated risks, and the cost effectiveness of alternative risk control options. 
The objective is to recommend the most cost-effective, preventive, and mitigating 
measures for a risk management strategy. 
FSA was designed as a tool to assist maritime stakeholders and, generally, the entire 
shipping industry; it was not intended for application to individual ships. The main 
features of FSA are formalised procedure, audible process, communicated safety 
objectives, and priorities based on cost effectiveness (Bai & Jin, 2016). These elements 
have made FSA a more rational risk management method within the maritime industry in 
regards to improving safety aspects by addressing the impact of risk factors.  
2.5.2. Risk management process 
Various industries have carried out risk management for many years. However, the QRA 
approach is increasingly being applied and developed, particularly for its probabilistic 
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approach to risk assessments (EMSA, 2012). The nuclear, aviation, and process industries 
have been performing QRA for many years, for instance. These industries are dealing 
with equipment whose failures can have catastrophic consequences; therefore, it is 
necessary that they operate at very high reliability levels (Haigh, 2003). In such complex 
systems and operational situations, qualitative and global assessments alone are unable to 
cope with the technical and operational specifics; this has created a need not only for 
quantified risk assessments, but also for systematic and transparent risk management 
approaches.  
Pressure from the public and the scientific community has raised the maritime industry’s 
awareness of needing risk-based methodology. FSA is the term most often used to 
distinguish new methods from earlier risk management approaches. Although other 
industries use different terms, such as QRA, Safety Case, and FSA, the main features of 
any risk-based methodology are the same. Beyond their names, risk assessment 
procedures consist of similar phases that identify, evaluate, and mitigate the impact of 
risk factors affecting an industry and addressing those three phases in different risk-based 
processes. 
Risk management has an important role in many risk-based decisions, as seen through 
on-going developments in modern risk-management approaches, particularly for 
decisions involving uncertainty and deviation from standard practice, for which 
regulations including the maritime sector are less appropriate (HSE, 2002). In fact, 
institutional diversity can offer considerable advantages when addressing complex, 
uncertain, and ambiguous risk problems, because risk problems with different scopes can 
be managed at different levels. Furthermore, an inherent degree of overlap and 
redundancy makes non-hierarchical adaptive and integrative risk governance systems 
more resilient and therefore less vulnerable; in addition, the larger number of actors 
facilitates experimentation and learning (Renn et al., 2011). 
2.5.2.1. HAZard IDentification (HAZID) 
The first and most important phase in any risk assessment process is HAZID (Sutton, 
2015; UNCTAD, 2006; IMO, 2002; HSE, 2000; Jensen, 2002). HAZID should be carried 
out to ensure that all situations with the potential to cause harm to people and/or damage 
to a system’s environment or property have been identified, and the risk factors as a result 
of these causes are defined (Bai & Jin, 2016). In engineering and industrial sectors, 
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HAZID is a general term used to describe a practice whose goal is to identify all 
significant activities that have the potential to result in significant consequences (Pillay 
& Wang, 2003; Wang & Trbojevic, 2007). The HAZID process can differ depending on 
evaluated facility/system characteristics (such as an operation’s complexity, activity 
magnitude, work force, and equipment) and accessible resources. 
A variety of techniques are used to perform HAZID, including qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, which in turn include literature review and research, physical inspection, 
flow charts, check lists, specialist brainstorming, What-If Analysis/Structured What-If 
Technique (SWIFT), safety audits, organisational charts, HAZOP, Task Analysis (TA) 
and FMEA (HSE, 2000; ABS 2003; Dickson, 2003). These are popular techniques for 
identifying conceivable and relevant hazards, although some are complex to perform to 
the appropriate standard, and have been used for a long time; these include HAZOP, FTA, 
safety audits, FMEA, and TA (HSE, 2000). Many reviews contain information on more 
than one technique, and where possible, have not been used as a basis to describe the 
technique. 
The literature reviews as one of the HAZID can provide a high quality analysis where the 
hazard based data has been searched and justified for related topic which can be used in 
conjunction with the other qualitative and quantitative methods (ABS, 2003; Saunders et 
al., 2007). In addition, HAZID is more efficient and less costly than other techniques. 
HAZID brainstorming sessions are generally used to analyse technical systems and 
thereby generate main qualitative results. These sessions are conducted by a team of 
specialists to determine potential consequences of a deviation. Teams should represent a 
cross section of disciplines and functions—including operations, engineering, 
maintenance, management, and process design—to ensure that all hazard scenarios are 
detected and discussed (Sutton, 2015; Bai & Jin, 2016). Hazards usually have multiple 
causes, and the collaboration among team members helps uncover the hazards that may 
be caused by miscommunication or misunderstandings between departments (Sutton, 
2015). For instance, QC breakdowns may be caused by management miscommunication, 
operating errors, or equipment malfunction. Redundancy can also be important; as 
common failure modes, can affect several parts of a system at once. These sessions should 
therefore list and acknowledge as many hazard causes as possible. 
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2.5.2.2. Risk evaluation 
Risk evaluation develops a total risk estimation by consolidating all information for 
specific hazards, including events/scenarios, frequencies/likelihoods, and consequences. 
Risk estimation uses gathered information to identify affected parts of a high-risk system 
and the main risk contributors (Bai & Jin, 2016). The key element related to risk 
evaluation is predefined acceptable risk levels. After obtaining total estimation, risk can 
be evaluated according to risk levels. The results of any risk evaluation are conditional 
based on evaluation background knowledge, including phenomenological understanding, 
models, data, and expert statements (Berner & Flage, 2016). 
Many techniques can be used in the risk evaluation process, including qualitative, semi-
quantitative, and quantitative methods (HSE, 2000; Krishna et al., 2003). In general, 
qualitative techniques are easiest to apply because they require the least resource demands 
and additional required skill sets, but they also provide the least amount of insight. 
Conversely, quantitative techniques are the most demanding techniques in terms of 
resources and skill sets, but they often deliver the most detailed understanding and 
provide the best basis if significant expenditure is involved. Semi-quantitative approaches 
lie between these extremes (HSE, 2000). However, due the potential sources’ highly 
subjective nature, lack of information, or simplistic assumptions, it is usually difficult to 
accurately determine risk attributes (i.e., frequencies/likelihoods and impact). The most 
practical and common way to express these attributes is through qualitative verbal 
expressions (i.e., linguistic terms), especially using expert judgments; this makes it easier 
for experts to provide input (Borek et al., 2014). Often, this method is a combination of 
empirical data, technical/engineering knowledge of the system, comparison with similar 
phenomena, and other expert sources (Luko, 2014). For instance, to evaluate 
frequency/likelihood, the method may use such linguistic terms as low, medium, and high. 
The same linguistic terms and variables may be used with consequence evaluation, 
including slight, minor, moderate, critical, and catastrophic. 
A variety of risk evaluation techniques have been introduced by the Academic Bodies 
and used by the industries, including ALARP, FMEA, Failure Mode Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA), BN, ER, FTA, ETA, Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), 
Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA), and Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), all of 
which use either qualitative or quantitative techniques (HSE, 2000; Dickson, 2003; Luko, 
2014; Borek et al., 2014; Alyami et al., 2014, 2016; Sutton, 2015; Bai & Jin, 2016). These 
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techniques have been developed in different industrial settings, usually in response to 
practical system problems. The project manager or safety officer needs to choose the right 
approach for the system, which can be difficult given the different risk evaluation 
techniques and many different specific methods involved. While there is no single correct 
approach for a specific activity or system features, some approaches are more suitable 
than others, and a decision framework is helpful in the selection process.  
2.5.2.3. Risk mitigation  
Once the risks have been evaluated, the next phase is to identify the options available for 
controlling them. These can range from doing nothing to introducing risk control options 
in order to eliminate the cause of the risk altogether or reduce the cause to secure certain 
benefits to a system’s people, environment, and property, with the confidence that the risk 
is under control and worth taking. There are two methods for controlling risk: 
 Reactive approach to reduce the severity of failure 
 Proactive approach to reduce the frequency of an initiating event  
A reactive approach, or a mitigating option approach, refers to risk mitigation actions 
initiated after risk events occur, and can be seen as a contingency plan initiation. A pro-
active approach, or preventive approach, refers to actions initiated based on the probabil-
ity of a risk event occurring, such as marine insurance domains that use risk mitigation 
option strategies (Kartam & Kartam, 2001; Bai & Jin, 2016). Risk management can apply 
a combination of these two approaches to reduce the likelihood and consequences of risk; 
this can be extended further to risk avoidance, transfer, or retention (RMS, 2005). The 
basic goal is risk reduction, and the key test is one of reasonable practicability; that is, the 
cost of further risk reduction is grossly disproportionate to benefits gained which involves 
cost benefit analysis. 
Risk events jeopardise and disrupt system objectives/operations when harmful effects are 
realised due to unexpected circumstances. Systematic and detailed risk management at-
tempts to cover all aspects of system activities so that all controllable events have a risk 
control plan (Ahmed et al., 2007). Strategies for risk control include applying engineering 
practice and implementing regulatory procedures. Reanalysing the risk and comparing 
these results to the can be determined the effectiveness of risk control actions; if they 
were ineffective, utilised strategies must be changed (Bai & Jin, 2016). Available courses 
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of action are varied, and they are chosen depending on the need for a reactive or proactive 
approach during the risk mitigation phase. For instance, Functional Safety and the IEC 
61508 series, Safety Integrity Level, Protection layers include Basic Process Control Sys-
tem, Critical Alarms and Human Intervention, and Safety Instrumented Functions. Phys-
ical protection and emergency response were used for risk control measure in the process 
industry and all mitigate the frequency of occurrence or mitigate the severity consequence 
(Lassen, 2008).  In addition, all statutory regulations introduced by international bodies 
including classification society rules and IMO Conventions and Codes are typical exam-
ples of strategies used for risk control. 
In this phase, the risk management objective is to avoid accidents, and can be measured 
by evaluating the avoidance of harm to people and damages to property, environment, 
and other costs. To achieve a balance, risk control action benefits must be compared to 
implementation cost using a cost benefit analysis (Bai & Jin, 2016). Risk control meas-
ure’s costs are estimated by taking into account both enforcement cost, such as personnel 
work force which includes inspection, auditing and installation and regulatory capital and 
compliance costs (EUC, 2013). Similar to how cost estimation process estimates benefits, 
each option’s net worth value can be calculated by deducting cost benefits. Sensitivity 
analysis estimates the level of confidence attached to calculated net worth value of each 
option; then, risk control options are ranked based on cost effectiveness (HSE, 2001; Ah-
med et al., 2007). Risk control options are selected based on cost effectiveness and by 
using ALARP to judge the level of acceptable risk; regardless of costs, intolerable risk 
must be controlled. Several methods analyse benefit analysis, usually referred to as 
MCDM techniques. Among these techniques, and widely used in academic research, are 
TOPSIS (Kahraman et al., 2007), AHP (Golec & Taskin, 2007), Analytic Network Pro-
cess (ANP) (Yuksel & Dagdeviren, 2007), ELECTRE (Wang & Triantaphyllou, 2005), 
PROMETHEE (Dagdeviren, 2008), and Axiomatic Design (AD) (Kulak & Kahraman, 
2005). There is no single correct technique, but some are more suitable than others 
(Mergias et al., 2007).    
2.5.3. Container terminal port safety-related legislation 
Seaports and maritime terminal infrastructures face risk challenges from various 
perspectives, including economic, operational, technical, and environmental perspectives. 
As discussed in Section 2.5.1, the scholarly community has intensively researched 
logistics and operational optimisation in order to improve terminal productivity; along 
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with this, some leading International Bodies are involved in the maritime shipping sector. 
However, the paradigm has been steadily shifted. The latter (i.e. leading International 
Bodies) took initiative to direct this shift. For instance, between 1971 and 2007, the 
perspective at UNCTAD changed from focusing on the development of ports and 
terminals, management efficiency improvements, commercial challenges, and 
organisational issues to initiating descriptions and developing a systemic strategy for 
safety and security risk assessment and management framework. 
Another example is the United States Government Accountability Office (USGAO), 
which recently focused on ports’ risk management strategy, identifying hazards, 
prioritising protective measures at marine ports, and other critical infrastructures that need 
to be refined and assessed (USGAO, 2005; 2007). In addition, in 2009, the UK’s 
Department of Transport (DFT) required all marine ports to perform risk assessment of 
marine operations to implement a safety management system. 
The IMO, a specialised agency of the United Nations, has set a global standard for safety, 
security, and environmental performance of international shipping, aiming to create a fair 
and effective regulatory framework for the shipping industry. Other International Bodies 
that have close relationships to the shipping industry represent different maritime interests 
concerning regulatory, operational, and legal issues. These bodies work to ensure safety 
either through their own firm or through a joint effort with other International Bodies 
whose main purposes are also to avoid and prevent potentials for different hazards or risk 
factors and/or to take preventive and corrective actions. 
Recently, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the World Shipping Council 
(WSC) have developed guidelines on Industry Best Practices, including Safe Transport 
of Containers by Sea. In 2010, they issued a joint statement calling on the IMO Maritime 
Safety Committee (MSC) to establish an international legal requirement that all loaded 
containers should be weighed at the terminal port facility before being stowed aboard a 
vessel for export (ICS, 2011). Miss-declared container weights have contributed to severe 
consequences related to container loss at sea and other terminal operational safety 
problems. On November 21, 2014, the MSC 94 officially adopted the new SOLAS 
requirement for vessel loading that container weights be verified before the shipper 
boards them on ships. The SOLAS container weight verification requirement became 
legally binding on July 1, 2016 (IMO, 2014). 
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In 2008, the ICS and the WSC published Transport of Containers by Sea, an industry 
guide for shippers and container stuffers when loading containers, as proper handling is 
very important to the safety and stability of the containers, ships, trucks, and trains (ICS, 
2008). 
The Marine Safety Agency (MSA) emphasised the necessity of safe operational practice 
and qualified duty holders by proposing FSA to the IMO for the purposes of improving 
safety of and pollution prevention within ports to reduce and mitigate the negative impacts 
caused by possible risk factors and to ensure strategic safety oversight (Trbojevic & Carr, 
2000). However, there is no evidence of international safety standards addressing safety 
performance in container terminals operation. 
The IMO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) have 
updated the Code of Practice for Packing of Cargo Transport Units (CTU), which outlines 
specific procedures and techniques for safety improvement, including equal weight 
distribution within containers and proper positioning, blocking, and bracing according to 
cargo type. The code was published in 1997 and needed revisions. Following 
recommendations from an IMO-organised 2011 Global Dialogue Forum, IMO, ILO, 
UNECE, and ILO developed a joint code for packing intermodal CTU, which received 
final approval in November 2014 (IMO, 1997). 
In May 2012, the Port Equipment Manufacturers Association (PEMA) published new 
industry recommendations on equipment protection and human safety in container yards, 
addressing minimum safety specifications for quay container cranes. PEMA’s 
compilation of its initial publications regarding safety standards for QCs was published 
in June 2011 as a joint initiative with the Through Transport Mutual Insurance 
Association Limited (TT Club) and the International Cargo Handling Co-ordination 
Association (ICHCA). It was prompted by results of a TT Club global analysis showing 
that 34% of asset-related insurance claims were directly related to QCs (Stiehler, 2012). 
Several individual contributions worked toward safety practice in container terminals in 
respect of offshore terminals’ operations. For instance, the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) focused on health, safety, and environmental issues for offshore terminal 
operations, particularly after the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster (Mokhtari et al., 2011).  
In October 2010, the HSE cooperated with the UK ports industry to publish the Guidance 
on Container Handling (GCH) to help container terminal industry workers under the 
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health and safety legislation to identify relevant risk sources in various terminal 
operations. However, the impact of containerisation appears to have advantages regarding 
the expense of safe terminal operations. The application of safe operational practice and 
qualified duty holders is essential, but these requirements are not widely recognised by 
many in the container terminal industry, and it is a matter of individual choice (Soares & 
Teixeira, 2001). In addition, the UK Department of Transport required all marine ports to 
perform risk assessment of their marine operations in order to implement the Port Marine 
Safety Code (DFT, 2009).  
In terminal sectors, risk-based process activities and operation safety are discussed mainly 
under integrity management, safety, reliability management, or engineering (Sutton, 
2014). Most aforementioned international and/or local bodies are trying to manage 
existing hazards by using guidelines and/or codes of conduct-related terms and applying 
risk mitigation methods to justify that they were involved in a risk management-related 
processes. None are using a generic risk management framework or methodology to 
address container terminal operation safety.  
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the maritime container terminals market to exhibit the expansive 
impact of containerisation on container terminal operation. Container terminal 
operational processes, including container ships, terminal facilities, and equipment 
interfacing handling were described, followed by a careful analysis of the widely applied 
risk management-based methodologies. The impetus for this study lies in the 
comprehensive literature review related to container terminal safety and the critical 
analysis of risk management processes in maritime ports. Furthermore, the literature 
review concerning the methods and modelling techniques for FL, BN, ER and ANN are 
carried out in related technical chapters. 
Publications focusing on the maritime container terminal sector are very comprehensive 
and consistent in how they employ managerial strategic efficiency and logistics 
optimisation concepts, but they fail to address tactical safety aspects related to operational 
issues—a research gap that must be addressed. The increasing number of publications in 
the last decade indicates the importance of operation research methods in the field of 
optimising container terminal operations. However, most publications deal with logistical 
issues that arise from decision-making problems at manned container terminals and 
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automated container terminals. The lack of research on safety compared to optimisation 
makes it imperative to examine safety issues in order to protect lives and resources, as 
well as increase efficiency on the operational and managerial levels, which will reflect 
negatively or positively on revenue. 
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Chapter 3 ― Modelling Container Terminal Risk Evaluation (CTRE) 
Summary 
Risk analysis plays an increasingly important role in ensuring port operation reliability, 
maritime transportation safety, and supply chain distribution resilience. However, the 
task is not straightforward given that port safety is affected by multiple factors related to 
its design, installation, operation, and maintenance and that traditional risk assessment 
methods such as quantitative risk analysis cannot sufficiently address uncertainty in 
failure data. Further, a careful literature search has also disclosed that safety is not often 
primary within port research, being overwhelmed by other aspects involving efficiency 
evaluation, port competition, geographical analysis, policy, and governance. 
Furthermore, among the studies addressing port safety, many have focused on policy 
issues based on descriptive or qualitative approaches which, together with the above 
challenges, critically point out the need for developing a robust and efficient quantitative 
risk analysis approach to prioritise hazards. This chapter adapts a novel FMEA approach 
incorporating Fuzzy Rule Base Bayesian Network (FRBN) to evaluate risk criticality of 
the HEs in a container terminal. Compared to conventional FMEA, the new approach 
integrates FRB and BN in a complementary way, in which the former provides a realistic 
and flexible way to describe input failure information while the latter allows easy update 
of Risk Estimation (RE) results and facilitates real time safety evaluation and dynamic 
risk-based decision support in container terminals. The proposed approach can also be 
tailored for wider applications in other engineering and management systems, especially 
when instant risk ranking is required by the stakeholders to measure, predict, and 
improve their system safety and reliability performance. 
3.1. Introduction 
Traditional QRA methods such as FMEA can be used to identify high-risk hazards in 
situations in which objective failure data is available. However, a careful literature search 
reveals that a high level of data uncertainty and incapability of FMEA to address such 
uncertainty exists in port risk analysis. Novel risk approaches are needed. To overcome 
such intrinsic drawbacks, many new methods based on uncertainty treatment theories 
such as FL, Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory, grey theory, Monte Carlo simulation, BN, 
Markov models, and AANs have been proposed in the literature to enhance the 
performance of FMEA, especially when criticality analysis is concerned (Yang et al., 
2008). However, such new methods contribute to the development of more precise failure 
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criticality analysis and also render themselves vulnerable by losing visibility and easiness, 
which are advances of the conventional FMEA method. 
Yang et al., (2008) proposed a new hybrid methodology to explain in a complementary 
way the role of Bayesian marginalisation (BN) in FRB risk inference, in which the BN 
rule is used to aggregate all relevant IF-THEN rules with belief structures and produce 
failure priority values expressed by posterior probabilities of linguistic risk expressions, 
while FRB is used as an effective tool to elicit expert judgments for rationalising the 
configuration of subjective probabilities. Although attractive, such a method still reveals 
a significant application problem, which is the associated with determining how to 
incorporate the importance of risk parameters into the establishment of FRB with belief 
degrees.  
This chapter aims to develop a novel FMEA approach FRBN by incorporating FRB and 
BN to rationalise the Degrees of Belief (DoB) distribution in order to evaluate risk 
criticality of the HEs in a container terminal. To achieve the aim, this chapter is organised 
as follows. An analytical overview of ports and container terminals risk analysis and 
FuRBaR proposed by Yang et al., (2008) in FMEA particular concerning its application 
in port risk analysis is carried out in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the novel FMEA 
framework capable of incorporating different weights of risk parameters into FRB. A 
particular test case regarding container terminal safety evaluation is investigated to 
demonstrate the feasibility of the new methodology in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 develops 
a discussion based on the results obtained. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
Consequently, this study will make a contribution to facilitating the FMEA applications 
in risk theoretical research and to enhancing practical safety management for container 
terminals. 
3.2. Research Background 
3.2.1. Fundamental aspects of the notion of risk 
Risk as a concept has been researched at all levels from various national and international 
industries and governments as discussed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. Correspondingly, 
literature on the subject has expanded, and the words “risk,” “hazard,” and “uncertainty” 
are used to refer to many different risks, including safety, business, economic, investment, 
social, political, and military. It is important to draw distinctions between these words to 
establish a uniform and consistent usage. 
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3.2.1.1. The distinction between risk and hazard 
Scientific literature includes few empirical studies that distinguish between hazard and 
risk (Wiedemann et al., 2010). Moreover, language dealing with risk assessment is mainly 
grounded in English, where there is a clear linguistic distinction between “risk” and 
“hazard.” However, this crucial linguistic distinction is not the same in Arabic, Swedish, 
German, or Dutch (Lofstedt, 2011) leading to greater confusion. Arabic and Swedish, for 
instance, do not have specific expressions for risk or hazard; instead, the closest word is 
“ﺮﻄﺧ (i.e., khatar) in Arabic or fara in Swedish”, meaning danger.  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a hazard as “a potential source of danger” and risk 
as “the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen.” In terms of 
work activities for regulatory control of risk from occupational hazards, HSE (2001) 
defines hazard as “something (i.e., an object, a property of a substance, a phenomenon, 
or an activity) that can cause adverse effects.” Risk is “the likelihood that a hazard will 
actually cause its adverse effects, together with a measure of the effect.” This is a two-
part concept, and both parts should be considered to make sense of the term. Likelihoods 
can be expressed as probabilities (one in one hundred), frequencies (10 cases per year), 
or qualitative terms (negligible, significant). In terms of maritime safety, IMO (2002) 
defines hazard as “a potential to threaten human life, health, property or the environment,” 
and risk as “The combination of the frequency and the severity of the consequence.” 
In the light of these definitions, information about a hazard is different from that of a risk, 
even if this difference is not always made clear. Hazard as the potential for harm arising 
from an intrinsic property or disposition of something to cause detriment, and risk as the 
chance that someone or something that is valued will be adversely affected by the hazard. 
Hazard, therefore, exists as a source. Risk includes the likelihood of conversion of that 
source into delivery of loss, injury, or some form of damage. This is the sense in which 
these words should be used.  
3.2.1.2. The distinction between risk and uncertainty 
The understanding and definitions of uncertainty vary substantially between different 
academic disciplines involved in risk assessment. The term “uncertainty” is used to 
describe a wide variety of attributes in an investigation, ranging from quantitative to 
qualitative, and even unquantifiable ignorance (Walker et al., 2003).  Discussions about 
uncertainty and risk are complicated by the varying ways in which these concepts are 
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defined and applied, both within and between disciplines (Brown & Damery, 2009). 
Numerous classifications of uncertainty have been proposed in recent years, especially in 
economics (Alessandri et al., 2004; Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Liesch et al., 2011). These 
include many types of classifications for uncertainty, such as imperfect knowledge, error, 
indeterminacy, and ignorance (Suter et al., 1987; Smithson, 2012; Regan et al., 2002). As 
the major sources of uncertainty vary between cases, it is common for detailed studies to 
employ different terminologies (Brown & Damery, 2009). However, there is a similar 
pattern in strategic management that treats risk and uncertainty synonymously (Alvarez 
& Barney, 2005). Furthermore, a trend in this research is that many container terminal 
stakeholders, including managers, safety officers, and workers, struggle to identify and 
define whether they are dealing with risk or uncertainty, as seen in questionnaires and 
narrative expositions. This section therefore distinguishes risk and uncertainty involved 
in risk assessment. 
Frank Knight and John Keynes originally distinguished between risk and uncertainty in 
the 1920s, and their definition remains fundamental today. Economist Knight drew the 
first conceptual distinction between decisions under risk and uncertainty. Risk refers to 
situations in which the decision-maker knows with certainty the mathematical 
probabilities of possible outcomes of choice alternatives; uncertainty refers to situations 
in which the likelihood of different outcomes cannot be expressed with any mathematical 
precision (Weber & Johnson 2008). However, the notion of risk involves both uncertainty 
and some kind of potential loss or damage (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). Risk and 
uncertainty have different implications on decision-making, although the concept of 
uncertainty is not always consistently applied. For instance, uncertainty may refer to 
situations with either unknowable futures or futures that are knowable but not measurable. 
Risk refers to decisions in which the consequences of a given outcome are subject to 
known probability distributions (Knight, 2012). 
Based on the above analysis, the first distinction between risk and uncertainty depends 
on the probability of occurrence. Risk involves a situation with known possible outcomes 
for which a numerical probability distribution can be defined, whether objective or 
subjective. An uncertain situation occurs when either the set of outcomes is unknown or 
the probability distribution cannot be calculated. Uncertainty exists due to the limitedness 
or even absence of adequate knowledge (data and information from qualitative or 
quantitative approaches), which makes it difficult to precisely assess the probability and 
possible outcomes of harmful effects (Renn et al., 2011; Aven & Renn, 2009; Filar & 
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Haurie, 2010). In the context of risk assessment, it is essential to acknowledge that human 
knowledge is always incomplete and selective, and thus contingent upon uncertain 
assumptions, assertions, and predictions (Functowicz & Ravetz, 1992; Renn, 2009). 
The other distinction between risk and uncertainty lies in the definition of uncertainty, 
which is a lack of precise knowledge or confidence of the truth, whether qualitative or 
quantitative (NRC, 1994; Brown, 2004). Risk refers to a lack of confidence, in which the 
precise outcome is unknown but one or more possible outcomes of action may cause harm. 
Uncertainty here is a lack of confidence about human knowledge. Human confidence may 
vary from being certain that something is correct, incorrect (i.e., in error), or irrelevant; 
this extends the concept of uncertainty to decision making where the potential for loss is 
known (e.g., in terms of time, money, property, handling machinery, or human life), but 
the precise nature of the loss, including the probability of occurrence, is unclear (Brown 
& Damery, 2009). 
Risk and uncertainty both affect the nature and content of decisions or actions, based on 
the fact that the future can never be accurately predicted; therefore, using expectations 
and assumptions about the future has varying degrees of confidence and uncertainty when 
planning safety measures and assessing hazard events, exposure, and consequent risks to 
human health (Liesch et al., 2011); (Ramsey, 2009). Classifying risk in relation to 
complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity is not a trivial task. Some risks might look simple 
early in an analysis, then turn out to be more sophisticated, uncertain, or ambiguous than 
originally assumed; therefore, a group of interdisciplinary experts, stakeholders, and risk 
managers should make judgments at the beginning of the assessment process and reassess 
them later, particularly during the evaluation phase (Dreyer et al., 2009; Renn et al., 2011). 
Other scholars, including Hertz & Thomas (1983), expand this distinction to include 
strategic and tactical risk. Strategic decision-making situations involve strategic 
uncertainty or uncertainty about the structure and outcome of the problem, and strategic 
risk is therefore particularly pertinent to the public decision-making process. Another 
dimension to distinguishing between risk and uncertainty is that the uncertainty does not 
imply risk if there are no direct consequences to the individual or decision-maker. 
Uncertainty is therefore a necessary condition for risk, but it is not sufficient, and reducing 
uncertainty in a system does not necessarily reduce risk (Gough, 1988). 
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3.2.2. A brief review of fuzzy FMEA 
FMEA is one of the most widely applied hazard identification and risk analysis methods 
due to its visibility and simplicity (Braglia et al., 2003). The traditional FMEA method 
has three fundamental attributes, namely failure occurrence likelihood (L), consequence 
severity (C), and probability of failures being undetected (P). These three attributes are 
used to assess the safety level of failure modes and to calculate their Risk Priority 
Numbers (RPN) (Wang et al., 1996). 
The classical RPN approach suffered from some critical drawbacks (Yang et al., 2008). 
The method has therefore incorporated advanced uncertainty modelling techniques such 
as fuzzy sets, grey theory, ER, and BNs to facilitate its practical applications in maritime 
and offshore engineering safety (Sii et al., 2001), system reliability and failure mode 
analysis (Braglia et al., 2003) and engineering system safety (Liu et al., 2005), and 
maritime and port security (Yang et al., 2009). 
Among the quantitative development of FMEA (through incorporating advanced 
uncertainty modelling techniques), a hybrid Fuzzy Rule-based Bayesian Reasoning 
(FuRBaR) methodology was proposed by Yang et al., (2008) to delineate the role of 
Bayesian Reasoning in FRB risk inference in a complementary way and to achieve 
sensitive failure priority values without compromising the simplification of the 
traditional RPN approach. All steps required for developing criticality analysis using the 
FuRBaR approach are outlined in Yang et al., (2008): 
1. Establishment of FRB with belief structures in FMEA; 
2. Failure estimation and transformation; 
3. Rule aggregation using a Bayesian reasoning mechanism; 
4. Development of utility functions for failure ranking; and 
5. Validation using benchmarking and sensitivity analysis. 
Compared to the RPN approach, FuRBaR used domain expert knowledge to develop FRB 
with a structure of DoB and to establish the connections between the three risk parameters 
L, C and P. For example,  
IF L is very low, C is negligible and P is highly unlikely 
 THEN the safety level is good with a 100% DoB. 
IF L is very low, C is negligible and P is unlikely 
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 THEN the safety level is good with 91% DoB and average with a 9% DoB. 
The approach uses the Bayesian marginalisation rule to accommodate all relevant IF-
THEN rules with belief structures and calculates failure priority values in posterior 
probabilities. An FRB is employed as an effective way to elicit expert judgments for 
rationalising the configuration of subjective probabilities. Although showing much 
potential, the approach still has a significant applicable problem. This problem is 
associated with the establishment of an FRB with a rational structure of DoB; the problem 
needs to be appropriately addressed in order to stimulate the implementation of FuRBaR 
in real safety critical systems. 
This work aims to develop an advanced safety analysis FRBN approach to evaluate the 
criticality of the HEs in a container terminal. The new method rationalises the DoB 
distribution and develops a new risk-based decision support tool for effective seaport risk 
evaluation. 
An FRB with belief structures is more informative and realistic than the traditional IF-
THEN rule because of its high effectiveness in functional mapping between antecedents 
and the conclusion, particularly in view of vague knowledge representation (Yang et al., 
2008). 
The BN mechanism is a simple mathematical formula for calculating conditional and 
marginal probabilities of a random event. Conditional probability is the probability of an 
event given the occurrence of an influencing event whereas marginal probability is the 
unconditional probability of an event. BN is used as a tool to perform FRB risk inference 
to model uncertainty in a domain or system. It also deals with subjective probability that 
may represent the degree of belief from an expert and applies it in a precise and relevant 
manner (Jones et al., 2010). 
3.3. Methodology for modelling CTSE 
Due to the lack of objective failure data, a subjective knowledge-based fuzzy IF-THEN 
rule-based approach is proposed to model CTRE in this section. A rule-based method 
consists of IF-THEN rules and an interpreter controlling the application of the rules, 
which in FMEA risk analysis is described as the relationship between risk parameters in 
the IF portion and risk levels in the THEN portion. These IF-THEN rule statements are 
used to formulate the conditional statements that comprise the complete knowledge base. 
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The steps for developing novel FMEA analysis for modelling CTRE based on the 
proposed FRBN approach are outlined as follows: 
1. Establish a FRB with belief structure in FMEA for CTRE. 
2. Identify HEs (i.e., failure modes) in container terminals. 
3. Prioritise the HEs using the new approach with rational distribution of DoBs in 
FRB. 
4. Validation by using sensitivity analysis techniques. 
3.3.1. Establishment of an FRB with belief structure in FMEA of CTRE 
In traditional FMEA, three risk parameters, L, C, and D, are used to evaluate the safety 
level of each failure mode. However, when conducting CTRE, the impact (I) of a failure 
to the resilience of port operational systems is crucial and is being taken into account in 
this study. Consequently, the four risk parameters (L, C, D, and I) are constructed to form 
the IF portion while the Risk Evaluation (RE) of failures is presented in the THEN portion 
in an FRB. To facilitate subjective data collection, a set of linguistic grades of High, 
Medium, and Low is employed to describe L, C, D, I, and RE (Tah & Carr, 2000; Wang 
et al., 2008). The degrees of the parameters estimated for each HE is based on knowledge 
accumulated from past events, and their definitions are presented in Table 3.1, taking into 
account domain experts’ judgements. 
Table 3.1: The linguistic grades for each HE 
Parameter Linguistic Grades Definition 
HE occurrence 
probability 
 
        (L) 
High (H) Occurs more than once per month 
Medium (M) Occurs once per quarter 
Low (L) Occurs less than once per year 
HE 
consequences/ 
severity 
 
(C) 
 
High (H) 
Death or permanent total disability; 
loss/damage of major facilities; severe 
environmental damage 
Medium (M) 
Minor injury; minor incapability of 
systems, equipment or facilities that 
disrupts operations over 3 hours; minor 
damage to the environment. 
Low (L) 
Minor medical treatment; slight 
equipment or system damage but fully 
functional and serviceable; little or no 
environment damage. 
Probability of HE 
being undetected 
 
High (H) 
Impossible or difficult to be detected 
through intensive or regular checks or 
maintenance 
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A belief structure is introduced to model the incompleteness in the THEN portion. It has 
been formed as follows (Yang et al., 2008).  
ܴ௞: ܫܨ	ܣଵ௞	ܽ݊݀	ܣଶ௞	ܽ݊݀	ܣଷ௞	ܽ݊݀	⋯ܽ݊݀	ܣ௠௞ , ܶܪܧܰ	ܴ௞																				3.1 
where, the	݇th rule is defined as a multiple-inputs and single-output rule and 
݉th represents the number of the antecedent parameters. 
It is noted that the subjective judgements from multiple experts identify all the parameters 
and the DoB of the rules at the knowledge acquisition phrase. For example,   
Rule 1: If L is Low, C is Low, P is Low and I is Low, 
Then R is Low with a 100% DoB, Medium with a 0% DoB and High with a 0% DoB. 
Rule 2: If L is Low, C is Low, P is Low and I is Medium,  
Then R is Low with a 75% DoB, Medium with a 25% DoB and High with a 0% DoB. 
Rule 3: If L is Low, C is Low, P is Low and I is High, 
Then R is Low with a 75% DoB, Medium with a 0% DoB and High with a 25% DoB. 
Such rules suggest that a proportion method is used to rationalise the DoB distribution. 
Specifically, the DoB belonging to a particular grade in the THEN portion is calculated 
by dividing the number of the risk parameters, which receive the same grade in the IF 
portion, by four. 
For example, in Rule 1, the number of the risk parameters receiving the Low grade in the 
IF portion is four. The DoB belonging to Low in the THEN portion is therefore computed 
as 100% (4/4 = 100%). In Rule 2, the numbers of the risk parameters receiving the Low 
and Medium grades in the IF portion are three and one, respectively. The DoBs belonging 
(P) Medium (M) Possible to be detected through intensive checks or maintenance 
Low (L) Possible to be detected through regular checks or maintenance 
HE impacts on 
the resilience of 
port operational 
systems 
 
(I) 
 
High (H) 
Loss of ability to accomplish the 
operations or operation failure in 
the port 
Medium (M) Degraded operations capability or readiness of the port 
Low (L) Little or no adverse impact on operations capability of the port 
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to Low and Medium in the THEN portion are therefore 75% (3/4 = 75%) and 25% (1/4 
= 25%). It can be formed as follows. 
ܦ݋ܤ௛ ൌ
∑ ܦ݋ܤ௛௫௥௝ୀଵ
ݎ 																																																																																							3.2 
where, ݄th represents the linguistic terms number ሺ݄	 ൌ 	1, … , 3ሻ, 
ݎ	represents the total number of the inputs attributes, and  
ݔ represents individual inputs attribute.  
It can be further expressed for the benefit of this model application as follows. 
ܦ݋ܤ௛ ൌ
∑ ܦ݋ܤ௛ଵ ൅ ܦ݋ܤ௛ଶ ൅ ܦ݋ܤ௛ଷ ൅ ܦ݋ܤ௛ସସଵ
4 																																												3.3 
 Similarly, the FRB used in CTRE containing 81 rules (3×3×3×3) with a rational DoB 
distribution can be obtained and partially shown in Table 3.2, and fully presented in 
Appendix I-1. 
Table 3.2: The established FRB with a belief structure for CTRE 
Rules Four risk parameters in the IF part DoB in the THEN part 
No (L) (C) (P) (I) Low (R1) 
Mediu
m (R2) 
High 
(R3) 
1. Low (L1) Low (C1) Low (P1) Low (I1) 1 0 0 
2. Low (L1) Low (C1) Low (P1) Medium (I2)  0.75 0.25 0 
3. Low (L1) Low (C1) Low (P1) High (I3) 0.75 0 0.25 
4. Low (L1) Medium (C2) Low (P1) Low (I1) 0.75 0.25 0 
5. Low (L1) Medium (C2) Low (P1) Medium (I2) 0.50 0.50 0 
… … … … … … … 
77. High (L3) Medium (C2) High (P3) Medium (I2) 0 0.50 0.50 
78. High (L3) Medium (C2) High (P3) High (I3) 0 0.25 0.75 
79. High (L3) High (C3) High (P3) Low (I1) 0.25 0 0.75 
80. High (L3) High (C3) High (P3) Medium (I2) 0 0.25 0.75 
81. High (L3) High (C3) High (P3) High (I3) 0 0 1 
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3.3.2. Identification of the HEs in container terminals 
Container terminals are often described as open systems of container flows within a 
quayside for cargo loading and/or unloading and a landside where containers are moved 
from or to trucks and/or trains. A stacking area for storing containers normally between 
the quayside and landside is equipped with various facilities for the decoupling of the 
quayside and landside operations. The hazardous events investigated in this study are 
those that occurred in the terminal areas defined above. The risks associated with the 
external interfaces of the terminals such as berth and port waters are not taken into 
account as depicted in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Scope of container terminal operations  
In terms of container terminal operations conducted by a large number of workers and 
equipment in a variety of activities at different sites, safety issues are of significant 
importance. Regarding container terminal operational safety, the performance of 
different container terminals can be determined by different elements that are 
continuously taking into account a range of internal and external factors influencing the 
productivity of the system (Legato & Monaco, 2004). 
The HEs associated with container terminal operations including cargo handling 
equipment and transport facilities were identified through a careful literature review 
which allowed for identification of the sources of significant hazards in container 
terminals and provides a good view on possible solutions to some hazards. 
Therefore, the investigated HEs were taken into account from a literature review of the 
major HEs associated with container terminal operations in terms of consequences or 
severity, while others HEs were taken into account from several domain experts involved. 
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For example, one of the most significant HEs in terms of severity is moving the crane 
without raising the boom of the gantry crane, which can result in damage to the 
accommodation superstructure (Shang & Tseng, 2010).  
Christou (1999) analysed many accidents related to fire, explosions and release of toxic 
materials, indicating that risk factors connected with the handling and storage of 
dangerous goods in port areas mainly originates from the complicated nature of the 
activities taking place. Darbra and Casal (2004) observed an increasing trend in the 
occurrence of fires, explosions, and gas cloud accident frequency during the period 1941–
2002, which included 471 accidents in seaports. They concluded that the trend could be 
attributed to the increase in port activity and the growth of hazardous substances moving 
through seaports. 
The HSE in 2010 identified more than fifty risk factors to help workers of the container 
terminal industry in various duties in GCH. According to the Pacific Maritime 
Association, from 2008 to 2009 the total of coast wide container terminal tonnage 
declined 16%, yet the injury rate increased 19%. The top eight categories of the accidents 
were placed in the container yard area (PMA, 2010). 
The next step is the process of determining the investigated HEs is conducted by using a 
“What-If Analysis” technique in a brainstorming meeting with several domain experts 
involved. There are seven steps in performing a “What-If Analysis” technique (Golfarelli 
& Rizzi, 2009) as follows: 
I. Define the activity or system of interest. 
II. Define the problems of interest for the analysis. 
III. Subdivide the activity or system for analysis. 
IV. Generate what-if questions for each element of the activity or system. 
V. Respond to the what-if questions. 
VI. Further, subdivide the elements of the activity or system (if necessary). 
VII. Use the results in the decision-making process. 
The preliminary study of determining the investigated HEs took place in July 2012 in the 
UK with seven safety and security officers, port managers and scholars. Further, in 
September 2012, another meeting took place in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) with 
five safety and security officers and port managers to further study the investigated HEs. 
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The experts selected, based on their experience in Table 3.3, have been actively working 
in container terminals and/or researching on container terminals for over 20 years. 
During the meetings, they identified the major threats and impacts posed by 76 risk 
sources and hazard events in container port operations. Consequently, a hierarchy of 24 
significant hazards and the origin of their types in terms of container terminal operations 
is constructed and presented in the following list. The graphical presentation of the 
hierarchal structure is depicted in Figure 3.2. 
Table 3.3: Experts’ knowledge and experience 
Experts Position Company Working Experience 
1 Senior operational 
managers 
A leading port 
in the UK 
Involved in port safety and 
operational services  2 
 
3 
 
A professor, Head of 
port management 
studies and Director of 
maritime research 
institute 
A university 
in the UK 
Involved in maritime safety, port 
operational management and 
container supply chain 
management 
4 
 
A senior lecturer in 
maritime transportation, 
marine engineering and 
qualified chief engineer 
A university 
in the UK 
Involved in maritime port/ship 
operations and port safety and 
security management 
5 
 
A senior safety and 
security officer 
A leading port 
in the UK 
Involved import safety and 
operational services  
6 
 Senior security officers A leading port in the UK 
Involved in container customs 
and border protection 7 
8 
 
Head of safety 
department  
A leading port 
in the KSA 
Head of safety department in 
several container terminals 
worldwide  
9 
 Deputy safety manager 
A leading port 
in the KSA Fleet safety and security officer  
10 
 
An assistant terminal 
manager 
A leading port 
in the UAE 
Operations manager in UAE and 
employed as vessel planner, and 
vessel operations manager  
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11 
 
A harbourmaster and 
qualified master 
mariner 
A leading port 
in the UAE 
Safety officer in a number of 
container terminals worldwide 
and some shipping companies  
12 
 A safety officer 
A leading port 
in the KSA 
Involved in container terminal 
safety operations and assigned in 
many leading ports in KSA as a 
safety officer 
1) Collision between Rail-Mounted Gantry (RMG) crane and Trailer (CRMGT). 
2) Collision between Rubber-Tired Gantry (RTG) crane and Trailer (CRTGT). 
3) Collision between Straddles Carriers (SC) and Rubber-Tired Gantry crane CRTGSC). 
4) Collision between the Quay Crane and the Ship (CQCS). 
5) Collision between two Quay Cranes (CQC’s). 
6) Crane Breakdown due to human error (CBD).  
7) Moving the Crane Without Raising the Boom (Lifting Arm) of the Gantry Crane 
(MCWRLAGC). 
8) Leakage/ Emission of Dangerous Goods from a Container (LEDGC) 
9) Ignition Sources from Equipment near Dangerous Goods premises (ISEDG). 
10) Person Falls from height due to being too Near to Unprotected Edges (PFNUE). 
11) Person falls from height due to Non-Provision or Maintenance of safe access between 
adjacent Cargo Bays (PFNMCB). 
12) Person Slips, trips, and falls whilst working on Surfaces that are Not Even (PSNE). 
13) Person Slips, trips, and falls whilst working on surfaces with Presence of Leaking 
Cargo (PSPLC). 
14) Person Slips, trips, and falls whilst Working on surfaces with presence of water or Ice 
(PSWI). 
15) Person Slips, trips, and falls whilst working on Surfaces with presence of Oils (PSO). 
16) Person Struck by Falling Object(s) (PSFO). 
17) Person handling Dangerous Goods in containers that have Not been Declared 
(PDGCND). 
18) Person Struck by Quay Crane (PSTQC). 
19) Person Struck by Straddle Carrier (PSTSC). 
20) Person Struck by Chassis-Based transporters (PSTCB). 
21) Person Struck by Truck (PSTT). 
22) Person Crushed against a Fixed object and Ship or terminal structure (PCFS). 
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23) Person Crushed against a Fixed object and stacked containers and Suspended contain-
ers (PCFC). 
24) Person crushed against a fixed object and closing the twin lift container spreaders 
(PCB). 
 
Figure 3.2: Hierarchy of 24 significant hazards of container terminal operations 
 
3.3.3. Development of FRBN model  
3.3.3.1. Rule aggregation for prior probability of HEs  
Due to the possible uncertainty involved, some HEs inputs may be fed to the FMEA 
modelling using the defined linguistic grades with DoBs, such as High with a 50% DoB 
and Medium with a 50% DoB. That means that multiple rules will be employed in risk 
evaluation of a particular HE, requiring a powerful tool capable of synthesising the 
associated DoBs in the THEN portions of the different rules involved. The ability of BN 
to capture non-linear causal relationships, and modelling DoBs in the THEN portion of 
FRB, has been widely known (Yang et al., 2008). To use BN, the FRB developed in 
Section 3.3.1 needs firstly to be represented in the form of conditional probabilities. For 
example, Rule 2 in Table 3.2 can be displayed as follows: 
Rule2: IF Low (L1), Low (C1), Low (P1) and Medium (I2),  
THEN {(0.75, Low (R1)), (0.25, Medium (R2)), (0, High (R3))}. 
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It can be further expressed in the form of conditional probability as follows: 
Given L1, and C1, P1 and I2, the probability of the risk evaluation for each linguistic 
term (Rh) where Rh (R1 = Low, R2 = Medium, R3 = High) is (0.75, 0.25, 0) or 
p (Rh|L1, C1, P1, I2) = (0.75, 0.25, 0)                               3.4 
where “|” symbolises conditional probability. 
Port risk analysts can evaluate a HE using their subjective judgments based on real 
observations with respect to the four risk parameters and their associated linguistic grades. 
Averaging the DoBs assigned by multiple experts to the linguistic grades of each 
parameter enables the calculation of the prior probabilities p(Li), p(Cj), p(Pk) and p(Il) of 
the four parent nodes, NL, NC, NP and NI.  
3.3.3.2. Bayesian reasoning mechanism 
Using a BN technique, the FRB constructed in FMEA of CTRE can be modelled and 
converted into a five-node converging connection that includes the four parent nodes NL, 
NC, ND, and NI (Nodes L, C, D, and I) and the child node NR (Node R). Having transferred 
the rule base into a BN framework, the rule-based risk inference for the failure criticality 
analysis will be simplified as the calculation of the marginal probability of the child node 
NR from the four parent nodes, NL, NC, NP, and NI. 
To marginalise R, the required conditional probability table of NR, p (R|L, C, D, I), can be 
obtained using Table 3.2. It denotes a 3333 table containing values p (Rh|Li, Cj, Dk, 
Il) (h, i, j, k, l = 1, …, 3). The marginal probability of NR can be calculated as 
∑ ∑ ∑
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
)()()()(),,,|()(
   

i j k l
IlpDkpCjpLipIlDkCjLiRhpRhp  
Rh (R1 = Low, R2 = Medium, R3 = High )      3.5 
3.3.3.3. Utility functions for HEs ranking 
The overall belief structure provides a panoramic view that shows the ratings and 
intervals for each HE assessment with the DoBs assessed. However, in practical reality, 
the risk priority of HEs cannot be easily determined by analysing their overall belief 
structures. Thus, the overall belief structures need to be converted into expected risk 
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scores.The main aim of using a utility function is to prioritise the HEs and Rh (h = 1, …, 
3) requires the assignment of appropriate utility values URh. The utility values can be 
defined as UR1 = 1, UR2 = 10 and UR3 = 100. A new HE priority/Ranking Index (RI) can 
be developed as  
                                                                                 3.6 
where the larger the value of RI is, the higher the RE of potential HE. 
3.3.3.4. Prioritisation of the HEs using the new FRBN 
Based on the results of the HE priority/Ranking Index (RI) it can be easily nominating 
the most significant HE that have great impact on the safety of the container terminal 
operations. The higher the value of RI for HE the higher the risk on container terminal 
safety performance. Therefore, an effective measure should be applied to reduce or 
mitigate the risk. 
3.3.3.5. Model validation process 
A new proposed engineering model requires testing to ensure its reliability and sound 
applicability for applications. Testing is important, especially in the involvement of 
subjective elements in the generated methodology (Yang et al., 2008). One of the most 
popular mechanistic validation methods available for a methodology that has not been 
broadly used in practice is sensitivity analysis, which is conducted to test the accuracy of 
the belief structures based on subjective judgments. 
Testing the sensitivity in the FRBN method provides an analytical value judgment for 
the conclusions risk estimate ܴܫ  or the safety index. Parameter sensitivity is usually 
performed as a series of tests in which the modeller sets different parameter values to 
measure the changes caused by a change in the risk parameter (Lucia & Mark, 2001). 
There are two possible axioms that can be used as a mechanism for validating the 
proposed BN model (Yang et al., 2008; Jones et al., 2010), which are listed below. Denote 
that the axiom can vary depending on the study of interest and universally accepted as a 
principle or rule of statements that are taken to be true within the system of logic defined 
and self-evident truth that requires no proof. 
RI  p(Rh)URh
h1
3∑
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Axiom 1. A slight increase or decrease in the prior subjective probabilities of each input 
node should certainly result in the effect of a relative increase or decrease of the posterior 
probability values of the output node. 
Axiom 2. The total influence magnitudes of the combination of the probability variations 
from x attributes (evidence) on the values should be always greater than the one from the 
set of x – y (y ∈ x) attributes (sub evidence). 
3.4. Red Sea Gateway Terminal Company (RSGT) case study 
This section will demonstrate the applicability and the visibility of the FRBN method, 
along with the selected RSGT to conduct the CTRE. In order to evaluate the internal 
container safety as related to transportation issues, the five-step methodology presented 
in Section 3.3 is used.  
3.4.1. Establishment of fuzzy rule base with belief structure 
The FRB established in Section 3.3.2 is used in this study. The FRB provides a rational 
distribution of the DoB as well as transparency and low complexity in the risk parameters. 
It has the advantage of increasing flexibility in the definition of the DoB distributions in 
individual rules to enable an easy validation by experts and the possibility of inserting 
additional rules based on the experts’ experience, especially in areas that have not been 
covered by measurements.  
3.4.2. Identification of the HEs in RSGT 
Five sufficiently experienced safety officers and managers of the RSGT contributed their 
ideas and opinions on developing a scientific model and determining the HEs in their 
terminal. The experts selected are actively working at RSGT. Their knowledge is 
described in the following summaries: 
Expert A has been working in container terminal industry for over twenty years. He is 
primarily involved in container terminal risk analysis. He became the head of the safety 
department in several container terminals worldwide including in the United Kingdom, 
Ghana, India, and Saudi Arabia. 
Expert B has been working in the container terminal industry for over twenty years. He 
started his career as a management trainee at the Islamic Port of Jeddah in 1985. He 
 71 
 
worked in a number of shipping companies as a fleet safety and security officer from 
1986 to 2000. Since 2000 he has been working as the deputy safety manager in container 
terminal companies. 
Expert C has been working in the container terminal industry for over forty years. He was 
an Operations Manager at the Dubai World Container Terminal until 1994. Since 1995, 
he has been employed by the Gulf Shipping as an assistant terminal manager, a vessel 
planner, and a vessel operations manager and in the past three years as the head of the 
security department of RSGT. 
Expert D has been working in the container terminal industry for over fifteen years. He 
worked in a number of container terminals worldwide and some shipping companies from 
1990 to 2005. He is a qualified master mariner.  
Expert E has been working in the container terminal industry for over fifteen years. He is 
primarily involved in container terminal safety operations and has been assigned in many 
Saudi Arabian ports as a safety officer. 
A questionnaire is designed to identify the HEs. Noted that some of the existing HEs 
identified in this study were audited specifically for RSGT characteristics, listed as 
follows: 
1. Collision between Terminal Tractor (TT) and trailer. 
2. Collision between Rubber-Tired Gantry (RTG) crane and trailer. 
3. Collision between TT and RTG. 
4. Collision between quay crane and ship. 
5. Collision between two quay cranes. 
6. Crane break down due to human error. 
7. Moving the crane without raising the Boom of the gantry crane. 
8. Leakage or emission of dangerous goods from a container. 
9. Ignition sources from equipment near dangerous goods premises. 
10. Person falls from height due to being too near to unprotected edges. 
11. Person falls from height due to non-provision or maintenance of safe access be-
tween adjacent cargo bays. 
12. Working on surfaces that are not even. 
13. Person slips, trips, and falls whilst working on surfaces with presence of leaking 
cargo. 
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14. Person slips, trips, and falls whilst working on surfaces with presence of water or 
ice. 
15. Person slips, trips, and falls whilst working on surfaces with presence of oils. 
16. Person struck by falling object/s. 
17. Person handling dangerous goods in container that has not been declared. 
18. Person struck by quay crane. 
19. Person struck by Terminal Tractor (TT).  
20. Person struck by rubber-tired gantry (RTG) crane. 
21. Person struck by truck. 
22. Person crushed against a fixed object and ship or terminal structure. 
23. Person crushed against a fixed object and stacked containers. 
24. Person crushed by closing the twin lift container spreaders. 
In the questionnaire, the experts are requested to evaluate each of the 24 significant HEs 
identified with respect to the four risk parameters using their associated linguistic grades 
and DoBs. 
3.4.3. Development of FRBN model  
3.4.3.1. Rule aggregation for HEs prior probability 
The feedback received from the five experts is first combined (by conducting an average 
calculation) to produce HEs input values in terms of the four risk parameters. The 
averaged HEs input is then used in the new FRBN in Section 3.3 based on the new FRB 
with rational DoBs in Section 3.3.1 to rank the 24 HEs.  
Given the Equation 3.4, the prior probabilities of the four nodes in BN based FMEA can 
be obtained. For example, to evaluate HE1, Collision between Terminal Tractor (TT) and 
Trailer (CTTT), the HE input values in terms of the four risk parameters are obtained 
from the experts then the prior probabilities of the four nodes can be calculated, as shown 
in Table 3.4.  
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Table 3.4: Prior Probabilities of NL, NC, NP, and NI when evaluating CTTT 
   Attributes 
 
 
HE 
 
 
Experts 
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
Probability of 
failures being 
undetected  
Consequences/ 
Severity 
Impact of the 
HE on the 
resilience of port 
operational 
systems 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
Collision 
between 
Terminal 
Tractor (TT) 
and trailer 
A 100 0 0 40 40 20 80 20 0 30 30 40 
B 90 5 5 50 50 0 70 20 10 40 40 20 
C 100 0 0 40 40 20 85 10 5 40 40 20 
D 95 5 0 50 40 10 90 10 0 50 50 0 
E 80 20 0 55 25 20 95 5 0 50 50 0 
Prior 
Probability 93 6 1 47 39 14 84 13 3 42 42 16 
3.4.3.2. Bayesian reasoning mechanism 
Once the previously identified probabilities of the four nodes in BN based FMEA are 
obtained in Table 3.4, it can be converted to obtain p (Rh|Li, Cj, Pk, Il) and the RE of 
CTTT can be calculated by the Equation 3.5 as p (Rh) = {(8.5% Low, 25% Medium, 
66.5% High)}. The calculation can be computerised using the Hugin software (Anderson 
et al., 1990), as shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: Risk evaluation of CTTT using Hugin software 
3.4.3.3. Utility functions for HEs ranking 
The result can be explained as the RE of CTTT being low with an 8.5% DoB, medium 
with a 25% DoB and high with a 66.5% DoB. Next, the Equation 3.6 is used to calculate 
the risk ranking index value of CTTT as 69.1 (= 8.5% × 1 + 25% × 10 + 66.5% × 100). 
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Similarly, the ranking index values of all the 24 HEs can be obtained and presented in 
Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: Risk ranking index values of HEs 
HE#  HEs 
Risk evaluation Ranking 
index Low Medium High 
1.  Collision between Terminal Tractor 
(TT) and trailer. 
8.5 25 66.5 69.1 
2.  Collision between Rubber-Tired Gantry 
(RTG) crane and trailer. 
17.75 25.25 57 59.7 
3.  Collision between TT and RTG. 19.56 18.12 62.32 64.3 
4.  Collision between quay crane and ship. 13.25 13.25 73.5 75 
5.  Collision between two quay cranes. 18.75 8.5 72.75 73.8 
6.  Crane breakdown due to human error. 23.5 5.5 71 71.8 
7.  Moving the crane without raising the 
Boom of the gantry crane. 
24.75 9.75 65.5 66.7 
8.  Leakage/ emission of dangerous goods 
from a container. 
41 11.25 47.75 49.3 
9.  Ignition sources from equipment near 
dangerous goods premises. 
35 27.5 37.5 40.6 
10.  Person falls from height due to being 
too near to unprotected edges. 
25.5 22.75 51.75 54.3 
11.  
Person falls from height due to non-
provision / maintenance of safe access 
between adjacent cargo bays. 
19 21 60 62.3 
12.  Working on surfaces that are not even. 23 18.5 58.5 60.6 
13.  
Person slips, trips, and falls whilst 
working on surfaces with presence of 
leaking cargo. 
22 11.25 66.75 68.1 
14.  
Person slips, trips, and falls whilst 
working on surfaces with presence of 
water / ice. 
25 15.25 59.75 61.5 
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15.  
Person slips, trips and falls whilst 
working on surfaces with presence of 
oils. 
23.25 8.5 68.25 69.3 
16.  Person struck by falling object/s. 28.5 22.5 49 51.5 
17.  Person handling dangerous goods in 
container that has not been declared. 
43.5 12.5 44 45.7 
18.  Person struck by quay crane. 44.5 7.75 47.75 49 
19.  Person struck by Terminal Tractor 
(TT).  
45.24 16 38.75 40.8 
20.  Person struck by rubber-tired gantry 
crane (RTG). 
43.5 15.75 40.75 49 
21.  Person struck by trucks. 38.5 22 39.5 42 
22.  Person crushed against a fixed object 
and ship / terminal structure. 
41 16.25 42.75 44.8 
23.  Person crushed against a fixed object 
and stacked containers. 
37.75 23.25 39 41.7 
24.  Person crushed by closing the twin lift 
container spreaders. 
53 16.25 30.75 32.9 
3.4.3.4. Prioritisation of the HEs using the new FRBN 
Based on the results shown in Table 3.5, the most significant HEs can be prioritised as 
follows: 
 Collision between the quay crane and the ship (HE4). 
 Collision between two quay cranes (HE5). 
 Crane break down due to human error (HE6). 
 Person slips, trips and falls whilst working on surfaces with presence of oils 
(HE15). 
 Collision between Terminal Tractor (TT) and trailer (HE1). 
 Person slips, trips and falls whilst working on surfaces with presence of leak-
ing cargo (HE13). 
 Moving the crane without raising the Boom (lifting arm) of the gantry crane 
(7). 
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3.4.3.5. Model validation process 
The model of an engineering problem needs to be verified. The accuracy of the previous 
analysis result and the reliability of the model can be tested using validation techniques. 
A sensitivity analysis has been carried out to validate the reliability of the developed 
approach. In this chapter, the model with its simulation as illustrated in Figure 3.4 would 
be verified with the aim of satisfying the two axioms involved in the process described 
in Section 3.3.3.5. The examination of the model is conducted for CTTT as follows: 
By setting the prior probability value of the node “ consequences	severity ” to 
100%	“ܪ݄݅݃”, the posterior probability value of the output “ܴ݅ݏ݇	ܧݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ܪ݄݅݃” 
increases from 66.5% to be 70.5% respectively as shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4: The evaluation of RE given a piece of evidence to “C=100% High” to HE1 
The change that took place in Figure 3.4 and further change to the node 
“The	impact	of	the	HE	on	the	resilience	of	port	operational	systems” when set to 100% 
“ܪ݄݅݃” resulted in a further increase of the posterior probability value of the output 
“ܴ݅ݏ݇	ܧݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ܪ݄݅݃” from 66.5% to be 81% respectively as shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5: The evaluation of RE given evidence to “C=100% High and R=100% High” to HE1 
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Incorporating the changing of the previous probability values described in Figure 3.5 
with the additional change of the node “ܲݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	݋݂	݂݈ܽ݅ݑݎ݁” to 100%“ܪ݄݅݃” also 
resulted in yet a further increase of the posterior probability value of the output 
“ܴ݅ݏ݇	ܧݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ܪ݄݅݃” from 66.5% to 86.75% respectively as shown in Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6: The evaluation of RE given evidence to “C =100% High, R =100% High and D =100% 
High” to HE1 
The three figures described in this step suggest that the output node is sensitive to the 
change of the previous probability values of the input nodes. Furthermore, explanations 
of the model validation process are described as follows: 
Axiom 1: The output value of “ܴ݅ݏ݇	ܧݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݅݋݊=High” in Figure 3.4 is greater than the 
posterior probability value in Figure 3.3, which suggests that a slight change in the prior 
probability value of each input node resulted in the effect of the relative increase or 
decrease of the posterior probability values of the output node. 
Axiom 2: The output value of “ܴ݅ݏ݇	ܧݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݅݋݊=High” in Figure 3.5 is higher than the 
output values in Figures 3.3 and 3.5, suggesting that the total influence magnitude of the 
combination of the probability variations from two attributes on the values is always 
greater than one attribute. 
Axiom 3: The output value of “ܴ݅ݏ݇	ܧݒ݈ܽݑܽݐ݅݋݊=High” in Figure 3.6 is higher than the 
output values in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, indicating that the total influence magnitude of the 
combination of the probability variations from three attributes on the values is always 
greater than two attributes and one attribute. 
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3.5. Results and Discussion 
The HEs associated with container terminal operations may vary, depending on the 
unique safety characteristics of an individual container terminal. For the investigated 
container terminal, the new FRBN method delivers the result as shown in Table 3.6, 
through which the HE4 of a collision between a quay crane and a ship is the most 
significant, followed by HE5 (collision between two quay cranes), HE6 (crane break 
down due to human error), HE15 (person slips, trips, and falls whilst working on surfaces 
with presence of oils), HE1 (collision between Terminal Tractor (TT) and trailer), HE13 
(person slips, trips, and falls whilst working on surfaces with presence of leaking cargo) 
and HE7 (moving the crane without raising the Boom (lifting arm) of the gantry crane). 
Table 3.6: Most significant HEs in Red Sea Gateway Terminal 
HE # HEs 
Risk Evaluation Ranking 
Index Low Medium High 
4.  Collision between quay crane and 
ship. 
13.25 13.25 73.5 75 
5.  Collision between two quay cranes. 18.75 8.5 72.75 73.8 
6.  Crane breakdown due to human 
error. 
23.5 5.5 71 71.8 
15.  
Person slips, trips, and falls whilst 
working on surfaces with presence 
of oils. 
23.25 8.5 68.25 69.3 
1.  Collision between Terminal Tractor 
(TT) and trailer. 
8.5 25 66.5 69 
13.  
Person slips, trips, and falls whilst 
working on surfaces with presence 
of leaking cargo. 
22 11.25 66.75 68.1 
7.  
Moving the crane without raising 
the Boom (lifting arm) of the gantry 
crane. 
24.75 9.75 65.5 66.7 
3.6. Conclusion 
System safety analysis often requires the use of domain experts’ knowledge when risk 
records are incomplete. The combination of fuzzy set modelling and BNs, notably FRBN, 
provides an effective tool to incorporate subjective judgments for characterising a 
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criticality analysis on prioritising failures in FMEA under uncertainty. The new 
mechanism proposed to rationalise the DoB distribution of FRB by employing the same 
set of input and output data and facilitate its implementation in CTRE in practice. 
Compared to the conventional FMEA, this chapter also shows that the new method is 
capable of presenting sensitive and flexible risk results in real situations by simplifying 
the description of fuzzy failure information, improving both the accuracy and visibility 
of FMEA. 
More importantly, it provides a powerful risk evaluation tool for port safety management. 
The proposed method highlights its potential in facilitating risk analysis of system design 
and operations in a wide context when being appropriately tailored to use in other 
container ports. Managerial, policy implications, and natural and political factors can also 
be investigated in a similar way in order to provide a panoramic view on terminal risk 
analysis. 
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Chapter 4 ― Modelling Container Terminal Operation System (CTOS) 
Summary 
Globalisation has led to a rapid increase of container movements in seaports. Risks in 
seaports need to be appropriately addressed to ensure economic wealth, operational 
efficiency, personnel safety, and terminal security. As a result, the safety performance of 
the CTOS plays a growing role in improving the efficiency of international trade, 
maritime safety, and environmental protection. This chapter proposes a novel method to 
facilitate the application of FMEA in assessing the safety performance of CTOS. The new 
approach is developed through incorporating an FRBN developed in chapter 3 with ER 
in a complementary manner. The former provides a realistic and flexible method to 
describe input failure information for risk estimates of individual HEs at the bottom level 
of a risk analysis hierarchy. The latter is used to aggregate HEs safety estimates 
collectively, allowing dynamic risk-based decision support in CTOS from a systematic 
perspective. The novel feature of the proposed method, compared to those in traditional 
port risk analysis, lies in a dynamic model capable of dealing with continually changing 
operational conditions in ports. More importantly, a new sensitivity analysis method is 
developed and carried out to rank the HEs by taking into account their specific risk 
estimations (locally) and their RI to a port’s safety system (globally). Due to its generality, 
the new approach can be tailored for a wide range of applications in different safety and 
reliability engineering and management systems, particularly when instant risk ranking 
is required to measure, predict, and improve the associated system safety performance. 
In addition, the stakeholders should realise that a CTOS value depends on many variables. 
Therefore, in order to correct any deviation on time, it has to be evaluated appropriately 
and regularly. 
4.1. Introduction 
Maintaining safe and reliable operations in container terminals is of great significance 
for the protection of human life and health, the environment, and the economy. The 
adequate and correct functioning of container terminal operations has a profound impact 
on productivity, cost, and quality. Therefore, a system evaluation that includes the early 
detection of hazards is critical in avoiding performance degradation and damage to 
human life or machinery. Furthermore, accidents or disasters that would jeopardise the 
terminal operations will be avoided if a robust evaluation system forecasting mechanism 
is developed and effectively enforced. 
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In practical situations, most engineering systems are repairable and their safety measures 
change with time; by considering these changes as a time-series process, the “growth” or 
“deterioration” of the system can be evaluated and improved (Hu et al., 2010). The 
necessity and importance of evaluating the system safety lies in that decision makers are 
generally interested in estimating future occurrences of system failures for resource 
planning, inventory management, development of realistic policies for age replacement, 
and logistics support. 
The IMO aims to enhance maritime operation safety, including protection of life, health, 
marine environment, and property. As a result, the FSA was approved in 2002 and used 
as a rational and systematic process for assessing the risks associated with shipping 
activities and for evaluating the costs and benefits. Furthermore, the World Economic 
Forum (2014) also emphasised the need towards a structured evaluation of risks on 
critical maritime systems in order to ensure the safety, security, and resilience of their 
operations. An accurate risk management system can not only monitor safe operation 
performance and reliability but also offer valuable information for decision makers to 
use to take the correct actions in order to improve the quality and reduce the cost of their 
systems (Hu et al., 2010). 
The incapability of traditional quantitative risk analysis methods such as FMEA in 
addressing uncertainty in data in many contexts has stimulated the development of new 
methods based on uncertainty treatment theories such as fuzzy logic, D-S theory, grey 
theory, Monte Carlo simulation, BN, Markov model, and artificial neural network (Yang 
et al., 2008). Most of the current modelling schemes in FMEA were developed using 
linear or nonlinear multiple regression which is comparatively reliable. However, in 
many circumstances they may not perform well in terms of accuracy or speed, and suffer 
from a number of drawbacks such as lack of suitable models, exceptional assumption 
used in analysis due to the lack of applicable safety related data/records and a high level 
of uncertainty involved in the available failure data (Sii et al., 2001). The incapability of 
traditional FMEA in addressing uncertainty in data in particular contexts has stimulated 
the development of new methods based on uncertainty treatment theories such as fuzzy 
logic, ER, grey theory, Monte Carlo simulation, BN, Markov model, and artificial neural 
network (Yang et al., 2008). Safety evaluation and risk analysis involving MADM have 
also been developed by a large community of researchers.  
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Many decision problems in engineering and management systems involve multiple 
attributes of both a quantitative and qualitative nature with uncertain or missing 
information that causes complexity in multiple attribute assessment (Yang & Xu, 2002). 
Researchers have paid increasing attention to MADM models in a wide variety of 
practical applications that have evolved the assessments process. Examples of practical 
applications include urban and community planning; resource allocation; supplier 
evaluation; employee/organisation evaluation; marketing strategies; credit analysis; and 
engineering design evaluations including safety management (Eom, 1989; Eom & Lee, 
1990; Eom et al., 1998). Specific applications of MADM can found in the functional 
assessment for disability index and the ergonomics consultation (Jen & Min, 1994), the 
restoration planning for power distribution systems (Chen, 2005), the evaluation of the 
suitability of manufacturing technology (Chuu, 2009), expert systems (Beynon et al., 
2001), and motorcycle evaluation (Yang & Xu, 2002b). In recent years, different risk 
analysis models involving MADM have been proposed to evaluate and predict system 
safety and reliability. Examples of such models include a marine system safety 
assessments approach (Wang et al., 1995, 1996), a belief function model (Srivastava & 
Liu, 2003), a model for strategic research and development project assessments (Liu et 
al., 2008), a nonlinear programming model (Zhou et al., 2010) and failure mode and 
effects analysis using fuzzy evidential reasoning approach and grey theory (Liu et al., 
2008b). Thus, MADM has been increasingly used in safety management and risk analysis. 
In engineering risk analysis practice, safe operation is a fundamental attribute of system 
reliability for any modern technological system. Focusing on container operation safety, 
evaluation process and risk analysis aims at the quantification of the probability of the 
failure of the system. However, the task is not straightforward given the challenges, 
including that container operations are affected by multiple factors related to their 
capacity, workforce, machinery, management, and geographical location that deal with 
both numerical data and qualitative information with uncertainty. Therefore, rational 
decision analysis is essential to properly represent and use uncertain information in the 
aforementioned factors to enhance container terminal safe operation. 
In container terminals as such and for a similar complex engineering system, safety 
evaluation and risk analysis problems involve quantitative data and qualitative 
information, as well as various types of uncertainties such as incompleteness and 
fuzziness. As a result, under these circumstances, there is an urgent need to develop a 
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new safety management method for container terminals that can efficiently deal with 
various types of uncertainties and overcome the aforementioned drawbacks. 
This chapter aims to develop a novel method to facilitate the application of the FMEA 
approach in port safety analysis through incorporating MADM approaches (i.e. ER with 
FRBN) to prioritise each HE’s safety level individually in a container terminal and then 
to aggregate them collectively to evaluate the safety performance of CTOS as an entity 
and quantify the HE’s safety impact to the system accordingly. The True Risk Influence 
(TRI) for each HE is assessed taking into account their specific local risk estimations and 
their RI to a port’s safety system is then prioritised accordingly to facilitate the subjective 
safety based decision-making modelling for container terminal safety. The novelty of this 
method, compared to the relevant studies in the literature, primarily lies in that a) it for 
the very first time incorporates risk impact of components to the whole system into risk 
quantification of ports; b) it combines various uncertainty models, such as fuzzy 
Bayesian for HEs’ risk estimate and ER for risk synthesis from components to system 
levels, in a systemic way and c) it newly uses a “max and min” DoB (degree of belief) 
allocation approach to measure the risk reduction of a port system due to the best and 
worst safety performance of the investigated HE so as to test the sensitivity of the model 
and to prioritise hazards from both their own risk as well as their impacts on the system 
safety. From a theoretical perspective, the proposed hybrid method can be tailored for 
risk prioritisation of any large engineering system of similar features (i.e. a hierarchical 
risk structure).   
This chapter develops a novel method to facilitate the application of the FMEA approach 
in port safety analysis through incorporating MADM approach (i.e., ER) with FRBN 
(Alyami et al., 2014) developed in chapter 3 to prioritise each HE’s safety level 
individually in a container terminal and then to aggregate them collectively to evaluate 
the performance of CTOS as an entity and quantify the HE’s safety impact to the system 
accordingly. To achieve this aim, this chapter is organised as follows. An analytical 
overview of MCDM methods including ports and container terminals risk analysis is 
carried out in Section 4.2. A brief review of ER in MADM in particular concerning its 
wide application in academia including risk analysis and safety management and an ER 
algorithm explanation is conducted in Section 4.3. A novel modified FMEA framework 
capable of integrating different weights of risk parameters into ER and the aggregation 
process is described in Section 4.4. A particular test case regarding CTOS of RSGT is 
investigated to demonstrate the feasibility and applicability of the proposed methodology 
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in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 develops a discussion based on the results obtained. Section 
4.7 concludes the chapter. Consequently, this study contributes to facilitating FMEA 
applications for enhancing container terminals risk management in a situation where 
uncertainty in historical failure data is high and traditional probabilistic risk analysis 
methods relying on complete data are not applicable. 
4.2. Research Background 
4.2.1. A brief review of research on Evidential Reasoning 
The theory of evidence first presented by Dempster (1967) went through many 
modifications and improvements by Shafer (1972, 1976); often it is referred to as 
Dempster - Shafer theory of evidence or D-S theory. Originally, it was used for 
information aggregation in expert systems as an approximate reasoning tool (Buchanan 
& Shortliffe, 1984; Lopez de Mantaras, 1990). Thereafter it has been used in decision-
making under uncertainty (Yager, 1992; 1995). 
ER was developed in the 90s to deal with MCDM problems under uncertainty based on 
the D-S theory. The use of ER (Evidential Reasoning) as a decision making tool has been 
widely reported in the literature and has been developed by a large community of 
researchers. 
The major advantage, and perhaps the most important for applying ER to decision 
analysis, is to incorporate ER into traditional MCDM methods (Beynon et al., 2001). One 
realistic way to analyse unavailable data is to employ subjective assessment using the 
combination of fuzzy logic and an ER. The ER approach developed particularly for 
MCDM problems with both qualitative and quantitative criteria under uncertainty utilises 
individual’s knowledge, expertise, and experience in the forms of belief functions (Riahi, 
2010). In the ER approach, evidence is represented by DoB and then all pieces of 
evidence are aggregated to obtain the results. Unlike the traditional MADA methods, ER 
approach as a combination of the D-S theory (Dempster, 1967; Shafer, G., 1976) with a 
distributed modelling framework can provide engineering precision and logic on 
modelling complex MADA problems.  
In respect to traditional weighting MCDM methods, compared to ER, the criteria 
aggregation process is generally a non-linear process that is decided by the weights of 
criteria and the way each criterion is assessed. In other words, ER employs a belief 
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structure to represent an assessment as a distribution instead of as a single numerical 
score and it aggregate degrees of belief rather than scores (Yang et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, the ER frameworks not only provide flexibility in describing a MCDM 
problem, but also prevent any loss of information due to the conversion from a 
distribution to a single value in the modelling process (Guo et al., 2009). 
In addition, ER can handle the incomplete information by establishing the utility intervals 
to describe the impact of missing information on decision analysis, which provides a 
basis for improving the quality of original data and for conducting sensitivity analysis 
(Riahi, 2010). 
4.2.2. The applications of Evidential Reasoning 
A careful literature review has disclosed that there are many ER applications in risk areas 
(Wang et al., 1995, 1996; Yang & Sen, 1996; Yang, 2001; Yang et al., 2005; Yang et al., 
2009). Some other typical studies have made a useful contribution towards the 
applications of ER for representing and managing uncertainty (Yen, 1990; De Korvin & 
Shipley, 1993; Sönmez et al., 2001; Yang et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2005; XU et al., 
2006a; XU et al., 2006b; and Riahi et al., 2012). ER developed particularly for MADM 
problems with both qualitative and quantitative criteria under uncertainty utilises an 
individual’s knowledge, expertise, and experience in the forms of belief functions (Riahi, 
2010). Therefore, it, together with other uncertainty modelling methods such as BNs 
and/or fuzzy logic, has shown superiority in tackling the diversity and uncertainty of the 
subjective information in general and effectively handling linguistic evaluations for risk 
analysis in particular. The ER algorithm, which was generated by Yang and Singh (1994) 
and later updated by Yang (2001) and further modified by Yang and Xu (2002b), has 
been applied in various domains. 
Sönmez et al., (2001) presented the process of building a multiple-criteria decision model 
of a hierarchical structure with both quantitative and qualitative criteria to show the 
process of converting lower-level criterion assessments to upper-level criterion. 
Tang et al., (2004) assessed the condition of a transformer by the use of ER and combined 
ER with a diagnosis technique to provide a meaningful and accurate diagnosis. The result 
showed that ER is capable of determining the condition of a transformer. 
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Chin et al., (2009) used the group-based ER approach to develop a risk priority model 
that included the assessment of the risk factors using belief structures. Thereafter, they 
converted the overall belief structures into expected risk scores and then ranked them 
using the mini-max regret approach. ER was used to model the diversity and uncertainty 
of the assessment information. 
Hu et al., (2010) proposed a reliability prediction model based on ER to forecast 
reliability in turbocharger engine systems. The proposed method allows the identification 
of the appropriate internal representation between basic attributes associated with system 
prediction output to define the relationships between past historical data and the 
corresponding targets, which allows future output values to be predicted if the new inputs 
become available. 
Deng et al., (2011) introduced a fuzzy evidential reasoning-based approach for risk 
analysis. It is assumed that the proposed method can efficiently deal with the linguistic 
evaluations of experts and uncertain data or information. Similarity measures between 
linguistic evaluation and a predefined fuzzy scale are used to derive basic probability 
assignments. The system risk score has been obtained using the Dumpster rule of 
combination based on the risk values calculated for each component of the system. 
 With respect to the above literature review, the major benefits of using the ER approach 
are listed as follows (Yang & Xu, 2002a; Riahi, 2010): 
 It is capable of handling incompleteness, uncertainty, and vagueness data, as well 
as complete and precise data in MADA problems. 
 It is able to provide the users with unlimited flexibility by allowing them to ex-
press their judgements both subjectively and quantitatively. 
 It is capable of accommodating or representing the uncertainty and risk inherent 
in decision analysis for multiple-factor analysis. 
 It is able to offer a rational and reformulated methodology to aggregate the data 
assessed based on its hierarchical evaluation process. 
 It transforms mature computing software, and uses the Intelligent Decision Sys-
tem (IDS) to obtain the assessment output, which relieves the users from the 
lengthy and tedious model building and result analysis process using window-
based click and design activity. 
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4.3. Methodology for Modelling CTOS 
The FMEA as a hazard identification and risk analysis methods is widely applied due to 
its visibility and ease (Braglia et al., 2003). The method has incorporated advanced 
uncertainty modelling techniques such as fuzzy Sets, grey theory, BN and ER to facilitate 
its practical applications in maritime and offshore engineering safety (Sii et al., 2001), 
system reliability and failure mode analysis (Braglia et al., 2003), engineering system 
safety (Liu et al., 2005), and maritime port security (Yang et al., 2009). 
The traditional FMEA method has three fundamental attributes, namely failure 
occurrence likelihood (L), consequence severity (C), and probability of failures being 
undetected (P) that are employed to assess the safety level of a failure (Wang et al., 1996). 
Among the quantitative development of FMEA, FRBN approaches using a Bayesian 
Network mechanism to conduct FRB risk inference in order to achieve sensitive failure 
priority values based on domain expert knowledge has been proposed in chapter 3 
(Alyami et al., 2014). 
In Alyami et al., (2014), a new risk-based decision tool for effective seaport HEs risk 
evaluation was developed. The development was on the rational distribution structure on 
DoB with the connections established between the four risk parameters and risk 
evaluation of the identified HEs in a container port operational system (i.e., failure 
occurrence likelihood (L), consequence severity (C), probability of failures being 
undetected (D), and the impact of a failure to the resilience of port operational systems 
(I)) as described in chapter 3. 
The steps that are required for developing FRBN (Alyami et al., 2014) are described in 
Section 3.3. In this study, the risk analysis was only constrained for HEs that are located 
at the bottom level of a hierarchy of a port safety system. It has not really addressed the 
risk and safety analysis from a systematic perspective, revealing a significant research 
gap to fill. 
The ER approach in this chapter is used for aggregating risk estimations of all the HEs 
based on a DoB decision matrix and the evidence combination rule of D-S theory. It uses 
a distributed modelling framework, in which the RE of each HE is accessed using a set 
of collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive assessment grades obtained from a 
FRBN method. 
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The proposed methodology for modelling CTOS using the integrated FRBN and ER 
approaches can not only model the diversity and uncertainty of the assessment 
information in complex FMEA, but also incorporate the relative safety importance of 
HEs into the determination of risk priority values in a precise and logical way by 
conducting a sensitivity analysis. More importantly, by incorporating ER with the FRBN 
analysis, the RE of each HE can be investigated from both local (i.e., its own risk level) 
and global (i.e., its RI to the system safety) perspectives. 
In order to write this chapter, a combination of different decision-making techniques, 
such as FRB and an ER approach (FRBER) was used. FRB technique and its 
mathematical background are presented in chapter 3 Section 3.3.1 while the ER technique 
and its mathematical backgrounds are presented later in this chapter. 
The first part of evaluating the safety performance of CTOS is to prioritise HEs 
individually in a container terminal using the FRBN approach from chapter 3. It provides 
a realistic and flexible way of describing input failure information with easy update of 
RE and facilitates risk evaluation of HEs individually. The second part is to aggregate 
the HEs’ REs collectively by using the ER approach, and then quantifying the HEs for 
risk-based decision support of CTOS as an entity (i.e., as a system). More importantly, a 
new sensitivity analysis method is carried out to analyse the safety importance of each 
HE in a whole port operational safety system. Having carefully analysed the RE of each 
HE locally in a port safety system using the FRBN in chapter 3, this work focuses more 
on the application of ER for risk aggregation and sensitivity analysis for evaluating the 
risk contribution of each HE globally. 
4.3.1. Risk assessment for collective HEs using the ER approach 
The steps for incorporating ER in FMEA in this study are described in a stepwise manner 
as follows. 
I. Develop a hierarchical structure to describe the CTOS safety perfor-
mance. 
II. Use the ER algorithm to synthesise the risk result of each HE for the safety 
estimate of the whole system.  
III. Evaluate the risk impact of each HE on the system by using sensitivity 
analysis. 
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I. Develop the hierarchical structure 
The HEs investigated in this study are those identified through the combination of 
surveys, field investigation, and literature search. In Alyami et al., (2014) the 24 HEs at 
the bottom level were identified, while in this chapter, the hierarchy presenting their 
positions and relations is the focus. It is presented in Figure 4.2. The HEs identified in 
the hierarchical structure are those associated with container terminal operations 
including cargo handling equipment and transport facilities while other risk aspects such 
as managerial, policy implications, environmental and political issues are to be addressed 
in future work. During the investigation, it was found that the risk attributes used to 
evaluate environmental HEs such as sea level rise, flooding, and storm surge are different 
with those relating to operations. For instance, a key risk attribute used to estimate 
environmental HEs is timeframe, which is less relevant in this study. It is noteworthy that 
the main contribution of this research is to continue the FRBN model for the safety 
estimate of a whole container operational system and the risk impact analysis of each HE 
on the whole system. 
 
Figure 4.1: Hierarchy for the risk factors during terminal operations 
II. System safety estimate by synthesising the risk result of all HEs using ER method 
The REs of all the HEs can be presented in both linguistic variables with DoB and 
numerical values based on utility values, as the output of applying the FRBN model in 
Alyami et al., (2014).  The result expressed by linguistics variables will be used as the 
input value in the ER for calculating the RE of CTOS. 
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The ER scheme adapted and applied in this study was first generated from Dempster 
(1967) and subsequently developed by Shafer (1976) to form D–S theory. The 
combination of D-S theory and fuzzy rule bases is an appropriate way to solve MADM 
problems that include fuzzy information from multiple sources. One direction is to extend 
D-S theory to include the feature of fuzzy set theory so that its capability can be enhanced 
to process both crisp and fuzzy information. 
In D-S’s rule of combination, suppose subsets B and C defined on ߠ are associated with 
confidence estimates ݉ଵ and ݉ଶ , respectively, that were obtained from two independent 
sources. The orthogonal sum of ݉ଵ and ݉ଶ is defined as follows: 
ሺ݉ଵ ⊕݉ଶሻሺܣሻ ൌ ∑ ௠భಳ∩಴సಲ ሺ஻ሻൈ௠మሺ஼ሻଵି∑ ௠భಳ∩಴స∅ ሺ஻ሻൈሺ௠మሻሺ஼ሻ                                                             (4.1) 
ER algorithm based on the D-S theory has been developed, improved, and modified 
towards a more rational way by a large community of researchers by continuously 
researching and practicing the processes (Yang & Xu, 2002b). 
The algorithm can be analysed and explained as follows. The 24 HEs identified are going 
to be synthesised in order to obtain the safety estimation of CTOS. Taking two HEs as 
an example, let ܵ represent the set of the three safety expressions (i.e., “High”, “Medium”, 
and “Low”) and be synthesised by two subsets ଵܵ and ܵଶ from different assessors. Thenܵ, 
" ଵܵ and ܵଶ can separately be expressed by: 
ܵ ൌ ሾሺܦ݋ܤ௦	, ܮ݋ݓሻ, ሺܦ݋ܤ௦	,ܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉ሻ, ሺܦ݋ܤ௦	, ܪ݄݅݃ሻሿ                                        (4.2) 
ଵܵ ൌ ൣ൫ܦ݋ܤ௦భ	, ܮ݋ݓ൯, ൫ܦ݋ܤ௦భ	,ܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉൯, ൫ܦ݋ܤ௦భ	, ܪ݄݅݃൯൧																																						(4.3) 
ܵଶ ൌ ൣ൫ܦ݋ܤ௦మ	, ܮ݋ݓ൯, ൫ܦ݋ܤ௦మ	,ܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉൯, ൫ܦ݋ܤ௦మ	, ܪ݄݅݃൯൧																																						(4.4) 
where "	ܮ݋ݓ ", "	ܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉ ", "	ܪ݄݅݃ " are assessed with their corresponding DoB. 
Suppose the normalised relative weights of safety assessors in the safety evaluation 
process are given as ݓଵand ݓଶwhere ሺݓଵ 	൅ ݓଶ 	ൌ 1ሻ and ݓଵ and ݓଶ can be estimated 
by using established methods such as simple rating methods or more elaborate methods 
based on pair-wise comparisons (Yang et al., 2001). However, Alyami et al., (2014) in 
the FRBN approach (chapter 3) considered the equally important weight of the safety 
assessors, and the weights of all HEs identified at the same level in the hierarchy were 
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evenly distributed to minimise the subjective influence on their risk impact on the whole 
system. 
Suppose ܯଵ௠and ܯଶ௠ሺ݉ ൌ 1,2…3ሻ are individual degrees to which the subsets " ଵܵ" and 
"ܵଶ"support the hypothesis that the safety evaluation is confirmed to the four safety 
expressions. Then, ܯଵ௠ and ܯଶ௠ can be obtained as follows (Riahi et al., 2012): 
ܯଵ௠ ൌ ݓଵߚଵ௠																																																																																																																								(4.5) 
ܯଶ௠ ൌ ݓଶߚଶ௠																																																																																																																								(4.6) 
where ሺ݉ ൌ 1,2, … 3ሻ. Therefore,  
ܯଵଵ ൌ ݓଵߚଵଵ																																			ܯଶଵ ൌ ݓଶߚଶଵ																																																																		(4.7) 
ܯଵଶ ൌ ݓଵߚଵଶ																																		ܯଶଶ ൌ ݓଶߚଶ	ଶ 																																																																		(4.8) 
ܯଵଷ ൌ ݓଵߚଵଷ																														ܯଶଷ 		ൌ ݓଶߚଶଷ																																																																												(4.9) 
Suppose ܪଵ and ܪଶ are the individual remaining belief values unassigned for 
ܯଵ௠	and	ܯଶ௠ሺ݉ ൌ 1,2, … 3ሻ. Then, ܪଵ and ܪଶcan be expressed as follows (Yang & Xu, 
2002; Riahi et al., 2012): 
ܪଵ ൌ ܪഥଵ ൅ ܪ෩ଵ																																																																																																																							(4.10) 
ܪଶ ൌ ܪഥଶ ൅ ܪ෩ଶ																																																																																																																						(4.11) 
where ܪഥ௡ሺ݊ ൌ 1	݋ݎ	2ሻ	represents the degree to which the other assessor can play a role 
in the assessment and ܪ෩௡ሺ݊ ൌ 1	݋ݎ	2ሻ caused by the possible incompleteness in the 
subsets " ଵܵ"and "ܵଶ", can be described, respectively, as follows (Riahi et al., 2012):  
ܪഥଵ ൌ 1 െ	ݓଵ ൌ ݓଶ																																																																																																															(4.12) 
ܪഥଶ ൌ 1 െ	ݓଶ ൌ ݓଵ																																																																																																															(4.13) 
ܪ෩ଵ ൌ ݓଵሺ1 െ ∑ ߚଵ௠ଷ௠ୀଵ ሻ ൌ ݓଵሾ1 െ ሺߚଵଵ ൅ ߚଵଶ ൅ ߚଵଷሻሿ                                            (4.14) 
ܪ෩ଶ ൌ ݓଶሺ1 െ ∑ ߚଶ௠ଷ௠ୀଵ ሻ ൌ ݓଶሾ1 െ ሺߚଶଵ ൅ ߚଶଶ ൅ ߚଶଷሻሿ																																																		(4.15) 
Suppose ߚ௠ᇲሺ݉ ൌ 1,2…3ሻ represents the non-normalised degree to which the safety 
evaluation is confirmed to the four safety expressions as a result of the synthesis of the 
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judgments produced by assessors 1 and 2. Suppose ܪ௎ᇲ represents the non-normalised 
remaining belief unassigned after the commitment of belief to the four safety expressions 
because of the synthesis of the judgments produced by assessors 1 and 2. 
The ER algorithm can be stated as follows (Yang & Xu, 2002; Riahi et al., 2012): 
ߚ௠ᇲ ൌ ܭሺܯଵ௠ܯଶ௠ ൅ܯଵ௠ܪଶ ൅ ܪଵܯଶ௠ሻ																																																																													(4.16) 
ܪഥ௎ᇲ ൌ ܭሺܪഥଵܪഥଶሻ																																																																																																																				(4.17) 
ܪ෩௎ᇲ ൌ ܭ൫ܪ෩ଵܪ෩ଶ ൅ ܪ෩ଵܪഥଶ ൅ ܪഥଵܪ෩ଶ൯																																																																																				(4.18) 
ܭ ൌ ൤1 െ ∑ ∑ ܯଵ்ଷோୀଵோஷ்
ଷ்ୀଵ ܯଶோ൨
ିଵ
																																																																																						(4.19) 
After the above aggregation, the combined degrees of belief are generated by 
assigning	ܪഥ௎ᇲ  back to the three safety expressions using the following normalisation 
process (Riahi et al., 2012): 
ߚ௠ ൌ ߚ௠ᇲ 1 െ	ܪഥ௎ᇲൗ ሺ݉ ൌ 1,2, 3ሻ																																																																																			(4.20) 
ܪ௎ ൌ ܪ෩௎ᇲ 1 െ	ܪഥ௎ᇲ⁄ 																																																																																																											(4.21) 
where	ܪ௎ refers to the unassigned DoB representing the extent of incompleteness in the 
overall assessment. 
The above is the process of combining two fuzzy sets. If three fuzzy sets are required to 
be combined, the result obtained from the combination of any two sets can be further 
synthesised with the third one using the above algorithm. In a similar way, multiple fuzzy 
sets from the judgements of multiple assessors or the safety evaluations of lower level 
risks in a hierarchy (i.e., components or subsystems) can also be combined (Riahi et al., 
2012). 
The synthesised result will be presented in the form of linguistic terms with their 
associated DoBs for all HEs levels in the CTOS from the bottom level to the highest-
level criterion. Therefore, in order to evaluate the CTOS safety improvement, the 
synthesised result is converted into a single crisp value for CTOS final risk score (i.e., 
highest-level criterion) and can be further used with the sensitivity analysis to verify the 
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safety importance of each HE from a systematic perspective. The utility value can be 
calculated by a utility-based technique as follows: 
∑
3
1
)(


h
RhURhpRI                                                                                                (4.22) 
where p(Rh) is the marginal probability of each grade of “High”, “Medium”, and 
“Low” in RE. Rh= (1,2,3) and UR1 = 1, UR2 = 10 and UR3 = 100 
III. Sensitivity analysis to quantify the impact of HEs on the system 
Sensitivity analysis is required to evaluate the HE’s risk impact by obtaining the risk 
magnitude of each HE on the entire system through sensitivity tests. The sensitivity tests 
carried out in this study have been developed on the analysis process of the proposed 
methodology validation in order to quantify the risk impact of each HE on the system. 
The proposed new sensitivity analysis approach allows us to evaluate the risk impact of 
each HE on the system safety and rank them accordingly by taking into account their 
specific risk estimate (locally) and their RI to a port’s safety system (globally) through 
three steps applied on each HE. First, increase the DoBs associated with linguistic term 
“High” to 100% and obtains the High Risk Inference (HRI). Secondly, increase the DoBs 
associated with linguistic term “Low” to 100% to obtain the Low Risk Inference (LRI). 
Lastly, the average between HRI and HLI (i.e., risk inference values) will show the True 
Risk Influence (TRI) of each HE on the entire system and can be described as follows: 
										ܴܶܫ ൌ 	ୌୖ୍	ା୐ୖ୍ଶ 																																																																																						(4.23) 
In addition, the proposed methodology is validated by another sensitivity test. The 
sensitivity analysis refers to analysing how sensitive the result would be (i.e., outputs) to 
a minor change in the inputs. The change may be a variation of the parameters of the 
model or may be changes of the DoB assigned to the linguistic variables used to describe 
the parameters (Yang et al., 2009). All HEs’ REs assigned to the CTOS in this study were 
obtained by applying FRBN in chapter 3. The rest of this section will analyse the 
variation effect on DoB of the HEs’ risk parameters introduced in FRBN. The variation 
is given to the DoB assigned to the linguistic variables of the HEs’ risk parameters, 
namely Probability of HE/ Likelihood (L), probability of failures being undetected (P), 
Consequences/ Severity (C) and Impact of an HE to the resilience of port operational 
94 
 
systems (I). If the methodology is sound and its inference reasoning is logical, then the 
sensitivity analysis must at least pursue the following two axioms. 
Axiom 1: Given variation to DoB associated with the linguistic variable “High” for a 
particular HE risk parameter, or combined simultaneously with the same variation given 
to the same linguistic variable (i.e., “High”) for other HE risk parameters will certainly 
result in the effect of relative increment/decrement on the RI of the model output (i.e., 
the goal). 
Axiom 2: The total influence magnitudes of x factors (evidence) will always be greater 
than the one from the set of x-y (y ∈ x) factors (sub-evidence) given a variation in the 
HEs’ risk parameters on the RI of CTOS. 
The reason behind the selection of the above-mentioned axioms is to use the sensitivity 
tests to validate the reliability of the developed approach by measuring the effect of one 
criterion over another based on the risk parameters prior probabilities variations. It is 
noteworthy that it is possible to define other axioms for further research. 
The ER model presented can be described as a hierarchical evaluation process in which 
all the decision criteria are aggregated to the highest sole criterion (the goal). Synthesis 
may be achieved through manual calculation (Dempster, 1967; Shafer, 1976; Yang et al., 
2001; Yang & Xu, 2002b; Riahi et al., 2012) or through IDS software that is used in this 
study. The IDS selection is attributable to its accessibility to other industries and 
academia. In addition, it not only has user-friendly interfaces for applying the ER method 
but also knowledge management, report generation, and data presentation functions. 
Therefore, the CTOS model synthesis and aggregation is supported with IDS in this study. 
4.4. Case study of Red sea gateway terminal co. (RSGT) 
The RSGT container terminal in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was selected to 
conduct a case study in order to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed ER method. 
The first part is to locally evaluate the RE for each HE to rank them accordingly by 
applying the FRBN introduced in chapter 3. As a result, the outputs for the 24 HEs were 
obtained as shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Updated risk ranking index values of HEs from chapter 3 
HE # HEs Risk Estimation Ranking Index Low Medium High 
1.  Collision between Terminal Tractor (TT) and trailer. 8.5 25 66.5 69.1 
2.  Collision between Rubber-Tired Gantry (RTG) crane and 
trailer. 
17.75 25.25 57 59.7 
3.  Collision between TT and RTG. 19.56 18.12 62.32 64.3 
4.  Collision between quay crane and ship. 13.25 13.25 73.5 75 
5.  Collision between two quay cranes. 18.75 8.5 72.75 73.8 
6.  Crane breakdown due to human error. 23.5 5.5 71 71.8 
7.  Moving the crane without raising the Boom of the gantry 
crane. 
24.75 9.75 65.5 66.7 
8.  Leakage/ emission of dangerous goods from a container. 41 11.25 47.75 49.3 
9.  Ignition sources from equipment near dangerous goods 
premises. 
35 27.5 37.5 40.6 
10.  Person falls from height due to being too near to unprotected 
edges. 
25.5 22.75 51.75 54.3 
11.  Person falls from height due to non-provision / maintenance of 
safe access between adjacent cargo bays. 
19 21 60 62.3 
12.  Working on surfaces that are not even. 23 18.5 58.5 60.6 
13.  Person slips, trips, and falls whilst working on surfaces with 
presence of leaking cargo. 
22 11.25 66.75 68.1 
14.  Person slips, trips, and falls whilst working on surfaces with 
presence of water/ ice. 
25 15.25 59.75 61.5 
15.  Person slips and falls whilst working on surfaces with 
presence of oils. 
23.25 8.5 68.25 69.3 
16.  Person struck by falling object. 28.5 22.5 49 51.5 
17.  Person handling dangerous goods in container that has not 
been declared. 
43.5 12.5 44 45.7 
18.  Person struck by quay crane. 44.5 7.75 47.75 49 
19.  Person struck by TT. 45.24 16 38.75 40.8 
20.  Person struck by RTG. 43.5 15.75 40.75 49 
21.  Person struck by trucks. 38.5 22 39.5 42 
22.  Person crushed against a fixed object and ship / terminal 
structure. 
41 16.25 42.75 44.8 
23.  Person crushed against a fixed object and stacked containers. 37.75 23.25 39 41.7 
24.  Person crushed by closing the twin lift container spreaders. 53 16.25 30.75 32.9 
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The HEs associated with container terminal operations may vary, depending on the 
unique safety characteristics of an individual container terminal. For the investigated 
container terminal, the FRBN deliveries the results for all HEs’ REs locally and Table 
4.1 indicates that HE4 is the most significant event followed by HE5, HE6, HE15, and 
HE1, respectively. 
Once the REs for individual HEs have been obtained, the second part is assigning the RE 
of each HE in the hierarchical structure to evaluate their RI to a port’s safety system 
globally. They can be synthesised and aggregated collectively by using the ER algorithm. 
The IDS is a general-purpose multi-criteria decision analysis tool implementing the ER 
approach. As a result, the RI for CTOS can be described in a form of linguistic grades 
with DoB values of 60.37 High, 10.56 Medium, and 28.89 Low, as shown in Figure 4.3, 
and the utility value is calculated using Equation 4.22 as 0.6172, which indicates that the 
RI of the investigated CTOS is high. 
 
Figure 4.2: Risk Index of container terminal operation’s system (IDS) software 
The next step is to quantify the most significant HEs that influence the risk to a port’s 
safety system globally by verifying the safety importance of each HE from a systematic 
perspective using the sensitivity analysis methods in Section 4.4. 
The RI of the HEs globally on a port’s safety system in the terminal operations is 
inevitable. Therefore, as explained in Section 4.4, this step develops a new sensitivity 
analysis approach through changing the DoBs of the risk parameters of each HE that 
allows us to measure the TRI of each HE risk inference on the container operational 
system and rank them accordingly. For instance, to evaluate the RI of HE.1, the DoB 
belonging to the linguistic variable “High” is increased to 100%, which leads to the 
increase of the utility value of the goal from 0.6172 to 0.6237 (i.e., HRI of 0.0065= 
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0.6237 - 0.6172). Then, the DoB belonging to the linguistic variable “Low” is increased 
to 100% which results in the goal utility value decreasing from 0.6172 to 0.5972 (i.e., 
LRI of 0.02= 0.6172 - 0.5972). Next, Equation 4.23 is used to calculate the TRI value of 
HE.1 as 0.01325ቀൌ 	଴.଴଴଺ହା	଴.଴ଶଶ ቁ. Similarly, the TRI values for the 24 HEs are obtained 
and presented in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: TRI for HEs on the CTOS 
HE
# 
                                   Utility 
Value 
 
HEs 
100% 
HIG
H 
100%  
LOW 
High 
Risk 
Inferenc
e 
Low 
Risk 
Inferen
ce 
TRI  
1.  Collision between Terminal Tractor (TT) and trailer. 0.6237 0.5972 0.0065 0.02 0.01325 
2.  Collision between Rubber-Tired 
Gantry (RTG) crane and trailer. 
0.6258 0.6002 0.0086 0.017 0.0128 
3.  Collision between TT and RTG. 0.625 0.5992 0.0078 0.018 0.0129 
4.  Collision between quay crane and 
ship. 
0.6228 0.5962 0.0056 0.021 0.01333 
5.  Collision between two quay cranes. 0.6232 0.5969 0.006 0.0203 0.0132 
6.  Crane break down due to human 
error. 
0.6477 0.5213 0.0305 0.096 0.0624 
7.  Moving the crane without raising 
the boom of the gantry crane. 
0.6521 0.5274 0.0349 0.0898 0.06215 
8.  Leakage/ emission of dangerous 
goods from a container. 
0.7044 0.5143 0.0872 0.1029 0.0951 
9.  Ignition sources from equipment 
near dangerous goods premises. 
0.7147 0.5252 0.0975 0.092 0.0948 
10.  
Person falls from height due to 
being too near to unprotected 
edges. 
0.6392 0.5813 0.022 0.0359 0.0289 
11.  
Person falls from height due to 
non-provision / maintenance of 
safe access between adjacent cargo 
bays. 
0.6357 0.5766 0.0185 0.0406 0.0296 
12.  Working on surfaces that are not 
even. 
0.6353 0.5773 0.0181 0.0399 0.029 
13.  
Person slips, trips, and falls whilst 
working on surfaces with presence 
of leaking cargo. 
0.6228 0.6013 0.0056 0.016 0.01055 
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Accordingly, based on the results obtained in Table 4.2 the HEs can be prioritised in order 
of the important events in terms of risk impact on CTOS as shown in Figure 4.3 and the 
most important events can be listed as follows. 
HE.8 Leakage/ emission of dangerous goods from a container. 
HE.9 Ignition sources from equipment near dangerous goods premises. 
HE.6 Crane break down due to human error. 
HE.7 Moving the crane without raising the boom (lifting arm) of the gantry crane. 
HE.16 Person struck by falling object/s. 
HE.17 Person handling dangerous goods in containers that have not been declared. 
In Figure 4.4, the risk magnitude of each HE is reflected by their associated TRIs through 
calculating the average of HRIs and LRIs. 
In addition, another sensitivity test in the remainder of this section has been carried out 
to validate the reliability of the developed approach by investigating the RI magnitudes 
of the minor variation given to the DoB of the four risk parameters of HEs. The logicality 
14.  
Person slips, trips, and falls whilst 
working on surfaces with presence 
of water/ ice. 
0.6238 0.6028 0.0066 0.0144 0.0105 
15.  
Person slips and falls whilst 
working on surfaces with presence 
of oils. 
0.6227 0.6012 0.0055 0.016 0.01055 
16.  Person struck by falling object/s. 0.6606 0.5598 0.0434 0.0574 0.0504 
17.  
Person handling dangerous goods 
in container that has not been 
declared. 
0.6669 0.5684 0.0497 0.0488 0.04925 
18.  Person struck by quay crane. 0.6472 0.5867 0.03 0.0305 0.03025 
19.  Person struck by TT. 0.6512 0.5907 0.034 0.0265 0.03025 
20.  Person struck by RTG. 0.6501 0.5896 0.0329 0.0276 0.03025 
21.  Person struck by trucks. 0.6498 0.5892 0.0326 0.028 0.0303 
22.  Person crushed against a fixed 
object and ship / terminal structure. 
0.6591 0.5795 0.0419 0.0377 0.0398 
23.  Person crushed against a fixed 
object and stacked containers. 
0.6605 0.5808 0.0433 0.0364 0.0399 
24.  Person crushed by closing the twin 
lift container spreaders. 
0.6679 0.5888 0.0507 0.0284 0.0396 
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and soundness of the results delivered in the proposed model are validated by the two 
axioms introduced in Section 4.4.1.  
The HE of the most importance in terms of risk impact on CTOS (i.e., HE8 Leakage/ 
emission of dangerous goods from a container) is selected for the tests. The DoB 
associated with the linguistic term “High” is increased by 10% and simultaneously the 
DoB associated with the linguistic term “Low” decreased by 10% for the risk parameter 
L (i.e. the risk parameters L, P, C and I have been described in Section 3.3.1) the impact 
on the safety level of the CTOS will increase the RI from 0.6172 to 0.6223. 
 
Figure 4.3: The most important HEs for CTOS 
If the same DoB change (i.e., 10% increment in “High” and 10% decrement in “Low”) 
is applied to the other risk parameters such as P, C and I will certainly increase the RI of 
the CTOS. For instance, the impact of such changes on L and P combined is updated and 
the CTOS’s RI increases from 0.6172 to 0.6263. The sensitivity tests continue in the 
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same manner. When the risk parameter C is combined with L and P, its impact to the 
CTOS’ RI further increases from 0.6172 to 0.6312. When I is combined with L, P and C, 
the RI further increases from 0.66172 to 0.6361. The changes on the DoB of the risk 
parameters L, P, C and I are described in Table 4.3 for HE8, HE9 and HE6.  
A similar sensitivity analysis was carried out to test “HE.9” and “HE.6” in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.3: The DoB variation of the HEs 
HE 
Prior Probability 
+10% “High” 
 
Probability of 
HE/ Likelihood 
L 
 
Probability of 
HE being 
undetected 
P 
 
Consequences  
Severity 
C 
Impact of an 
HE to the resili-
ence of port op-
erational sys-
tems 
I 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
HE8 
Leakage/ 
emission of 
dangerous 
goods from 
a container 
Original 0.14 0.24 0.62 0.91 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.094 0.84 0.11 0.05
L 0.24 0.24 0.52 0.91 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.094 0.84 0.11 0.05
L & D 0.24 0.24 0.52 1 0 0 0.02 0.04 0.094 0.84 0.11 0.05
L & D & C 0.24 0.24 0.52 1 0 0 0.12 0.04 0.84 0.84 0.11 0.05
L & D & C & I 0.24 0.24 0.52 1 0 0 0.12 0.04 0.84 0.94 0.06 0
HE9 
Ignition 
sources 
from equip-
ment near 
dangerous 
goods prem-
ises 
Original 0.24 0.28 0.48 0.74 0.24 0.02 0.2 0.27 0.53 0.32 0.31 0.37
L 0.34 0.28 0.38 0.74 0.24 0.02 0.2 0.27 0.53 0.32 0.31 0.37
L & D 0.34 0.28 0.38 0.84 0.16 0 0.2 0.27 0.53 0.32 0.31 0.37
L & D & C 0.34 0.28 0.38 0.84 0.16 0 0.3 0.27 0.43 0.32 0.31 0.37
L & D & C & I 0.34 0.28 0.38 0.84 0.16 0 0.3 0.27 0.43 0.42 0.31 0.27 
HE6 
A Crane 
breaks 
down due to 
human error 
Original 0.82 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.91 0.82 0.14 0.04 0.93 0.06 0.01
L 0.92 0.08 0 0.05 0.04 0.91 0.82 0.14 0.04 0.93 0.06 0.01
L & D 0.92 0.08 0 0.15 0.04 0.81 0.82 0.14 0.04 0.93 0.06 0.01
L & D & C 0.92 0.08 0 0.15 0.04 0.81 0.92 0.08 0 0.93 0.06 0.01
L & D & C & I 0.92 0.08 0 0.15 0.04 0.81 0.92 0.08 0 1 0 0
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The combined variation given to the DoB associated with the linguistic term “High” (i.e., 
10% increment) for the risk parameters of “HE9”, “HE8”, and “HE6” has resulted in 125 
RI values for CTOS as shown in Table 4.4. For instance, row#1, shows the values of 
HE6, HE8 and HE9 without any changes in the risk parameters (i.e. L, C, P and I), while 
in row#2, the variation is given to the DoB associated with the linguistic term “High” 
(i.e., 10% increment) for the risk parameter (L) of “HE9” only which resulted in an 
increment from 0.6172 to 0.6223. Next, in row#3, the variation is given to the DoB 
associated with the linguistic term “High” (i.e., 10% increment) for the risk parameter (P) 
of “HE9” with the given variation to (L) resulted in an increment from 0.6172 to0.6263. 
The sensitivity tests continue in the same manner to all DoB associated with the linguistic 
term “High” for all risk parameters (L) of “HE6, HE8 and HE9”. 
Table 4.4: RI for CTOS and the variation on the HE risk parameters prior probabilities 
# HE6 8HE  9HE  ICTOS RI 
1.  0 0 0 0.6172 
2.  0 0 L 0.6223 
3.  0 0 LP 0.6263 
4.  0 0 LPC 0.6312 
5.  0 0 LPCI 0.6361 
6.  0 L 0 0.622 
7.  0 L L 0.627 
8.  0 L LP 0.631 
9.  0 L LPC 0.6359 
10.  0 L LPCI 0.6407 
11.  0 LD 0 0.6257 
12.  0 LD L 0.6306 
13.  0 LD LP 0.6346 
14.  0 LD LPC 0.6395 
15.  0 LD LPCI 0.6443 
16.  0 LDC 0 0.6303 
17.  0 LDC L 0.6353 
18.  0 LDC LP 0.6392 
19.  0 LDC LPC 0.644 
20.  0 LDC LPCI 0.6487 
21.  0 LDCI 0 0.6345 
22.  0 LDCI L 0.6394 
23.  0 LDCI LP 0.6433 
24.  0 LDCI LPC 0.6481 
25.  0 LDCI LPCI 0.6528 
26.  L 0 0 0.6196 
27.  L 0 L 0.6246 
28.  L 0 LP 0.6287 
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# HE6 8HE  9HE  ICTOS RI 
29.  L 0 LPC 0.6336 
30.  L 0 LPCI 0.6384 
31.  L L 0 0.6244 
32.  L L L 0.6293 
33.  L L LP 0.6333 
34.  L L LPC 0.6382 
35.  L L LPCI 0.643 
36.  L LD 0 0.628 
37.  L LD L 0.633 
38.  L LD LP 0.637 
39.  L LD LPC 0.6418 
40.  L LD LPCI 0.6466 
41.  L LDC 0 0.6327 
42.  L LDC L 0.6376 
43.  L LDC LP 0.6415 
44.  L LDC LPC 0.6463 
45.  L LDC LPCI 0.651 
46.  L LDCI 0 0.6369 
47.  L LDCI L 0.6417 
48.  L LDCI LP 0.6456 
49.  L LDCI LPC 0.6504 
50.  L LDCI LPCI 0.655 
51.  LD 0 0 0.6225 
52.  LD 0 L 0.6275 
53.  LD 0 LP 0.6315 
54.  LD 0 LPC 0.6364 
55.  LD 0 LPCI 0.6412 
56.  LD L 0 0.6272 
57.  LD L L 0.6322 
58.  LD L LP 0.6361 
59.  LD L LPC 0.641 
60.  LD L LPCI 0.6458 
61.  LD LD 0 0.6309 
62.  LD LD L 0.6358 
63.  LD LD LP 0.6398 
64.  LD LD LPC 0.6446 
65.  LD LD LPCI 0.6493 
66.  LD LDC 0 0.6355 
67.  LD LDC L 0.6404 
68.  LD LDC LP 0.6443 
69.  LD LDC LPC 0.6491 
70.  LD LDC LPCI 0.6538 
71.  LD LDCI 0 0.6397 
72.  LD LDCI L 0.6445 
73.  LD LDCI LP 0.6484 
74.  LD LDCI LPC 0.6531 
75.  LD LDCI LPCI 0.6577 
76.  LDC 0 0 0.6238 
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# HE6 8HE  9HE  ICTOS RI 
77.  LDC 0 L 0.6287 
78.  LDC 0 LP 0.6327 
79.  LDC 0 LPC 0.6376 
80.  LDC 0 LPCI 0.6425 
81.  LDC L 0 0.6285 
82.  LDC L L 0.6334 
83.  LDC L LP 0.6374 
84.  LDC L LPC 0.6422 
85.  LDC L LPCI 0.647 
86.  LDC LD 0 0.6321 
87.  LDC LD L 0.6371 
88.  LDC LD LP 0.641 
89.  LDC LD LPC 0.6458 
90.  LDC LD LPCI 0.6505 
91.  LDC LDC 0 0.6368 
92.  LDC LDC L 0.6416 
93.  LDC LDC LP 0.6455 
94.  LDC LDC LPC 0.6503 
95.  LDC LDC LPCI 0.655 
96.  LDC LDCI 0 0.6409 
97.  LDC LDCI L 0.6457 
98.  LDC LDCI LP 0.6496 
99.  LDC LDCI LPC 0.6543 
100. LDC LDCI LPCI 0.6589 
101. LDCI 0 0 0.6254 
102. LDCI 0 L 0.6304 
103. LDCI 0 LP 0.6344 
104. LDCI 0 LPC 0.6393 
105. LDCI 0 LPCI 0.6441 
106. LDCI L 0 0.6302 
107. LDCI L L 0.6351 
108. LDCI L LP 0.639 
109. LDCI L LPC 0.6486 
110. LDCI L LPCI 0.6556 
111. LDCI LD 0 0.6338 
112. LDCI LD L 0.6387 
113. LDCI LD LP 0.6426 
114. LDCI LD LPC 0.6474 
115. LDCI LD LPCI 0.6522 
116. LDCI LDC 0 0.6384 
117. LDCI LDC L 0.6433 
118. LDCI LDC LP 0.6472 
119. LDCI LDC LPC 0.6519 
120. LDCI LDC LPCI 0.6566 
121. LDCI LDCI 0 0.6425 
122. LDCI LDCI L 0.6474 
123. LDCI LDCI LP 0.6512 
124. LDCI LDCI LPC 0.6559 
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# HE6 8HE  9HE  ICTOS RI 
125. LDCI LDCI LPCI 0.6605 
 
The first row in Table 4.4 shows the neutral RI for CTOS, and the rest of the table shows 
the updated RI by the given variation to the DoB associated with linguistic variable “High” 
for HE6, HE8, and HE.9 risk parameters locally and globally. Comparing any updated 
RI with the neutral RI can be concluded that the model is validated to be in line with 
Axiom 1. 
According to Axiom 2, if the model reflects logical reasoning then the RI for CTOS 
associated with x factors (evidence) will always be greater than the one from x-y (y ∈ 
x) factors (sub-evidence). This can be examined by comparing the RIs of the HEs with 
the reassigned DoB associated with linguistic variable “High” in each HE risk parameter 
prior probabilities, which can be specifically appointed by following the relationship 
between the evidence and sub-evidence. 
The neutral RI for CTOS is chosen as the sub-evidence to investigate the accuracy of the 
model. All other RIs affected by the variation (i.e., increment) given to the DoB 
associated with linguistic variable “High” for HE8, HE9, and HE6 can be identified as 
evidence. Comparing the evidence and sub-evidence (i.e., the values in the first five rows 
in Table 4.4 are gradually increasing), it can be concluded that the model is validated to 
and in line with Axiom 2. 
4.5. Results and Discussion 
In accordance with the results obtained in Table 4.2 and the graph in Figure 4.3, the most 
significant HEs are those having a great risk impact on the CTOS listed as follows. 
 Ignition sources from equipment near dangerous goods premises (HE9). 
 Leakage/ emission of dangerous goods from a container (HE8). 
 Crane break down due to human error (HE6). 
 Moving the crane without raising the boom (lifting arm) of the gantry crane (HE7). 
 Person struck by falling object/s (HE16). 
 Person handling dangerous goods in containers that have not been declared (HE17). 
The HEs investigated have been examined and validated for the sensitivity analysis in 
this study. Using the FRBN technique, each HE was assessed locally based on unique 
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rational distribution of DoBs with linguistic terms and then ranked accordingly to 
evaluate the risk preference of the CTOS. While using the ER technique, other aspects 
are involved such as the TRI of each HE taking into account their specific risk estimations 
locally and their RI to a port’s safety system globally, to facilitate the subjective safety 
based decision-making modelling for container terminal risk evaluation. The variations 
of TRI of the whole system due to the reallocation of DoB of any investigated HE to a 
level of 100% “High” (Max) and of 100% “Low” (Min) are averaged to calculate the 
aggregated effect of each HE to the safety performance of the whole system. The case 
study results confirm that the proposed method is capable of presenting sensitive and 
flexible risk results in real situations by simplifying the description of failure information, 
improving both the accuracy and visibility of FMEA, and providing a powerful risk 
evaluation tool for port safety management. ER provides a powerful tool for aggregation 
calculations, and is used to examine the identified HEs synthesis for the container 
terminal safety preferences ranking.  
4.6. Conclusion 
System safety analysis often requires the use of domain experts’ knowledge when risk 
records are incomplete. The FRBN rationalises the DoB distribution of FRB by 
employing the same set of linguistic grades in both IF and THEN parts and applying that 
set to evaluate the HEs of a container terminal. The FRBN simplifies the communication 
between risk input and output based on DoBs and facilitates its implementation in CTOS 
in practice. The FRBN is integrated with the ER approach that has the ability of providing 
a powerful tool for aggregation calculations to synthesise the identified HEs for CTOS 
risk ranking. The FRBN technique is used to assess each HE locally while the ER 
approach is employed to take into account the risk impact of each HE to the safety of the 
investigated port system when evaluating their TRI globally. As a result, the integration 
of FRBN and ER provides an effective tool to incorporate subjective judgements for 
characterising a criticality analysis on prioritising failures in FMEA under uncertainty as 
well as the functional nonlinear relationship between outputs and inputs in the 
hierarchical evaluation process. 
The HEs investigated in this study have been examined with new sensitivity analysis 
developed in two different approaches. Consequently, the ER technique determines the 
analysis of risk impact of each HE on the whole system. The case study results confirm 
that the proposed method is capable of presenting sensitive and flexible risk results in 
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real situations by simplifying the description of failure information, improving both the 
accuracy and visibility of FMEA, and providing a powerful risk evaluation tool for port 
safety management. In addition, the proposed method highlights its potential in 
facilitating risk analysis of system design and operations in a wide context when the 
method is appropriately applied to study other seaports. 
Sea ports and maritime terminals (i.e., infrastructures) are facing risk challenges from 
various perspectives including economic, operational, technical and environmental. This 
study mainly focused on the operational aspects including technical and personnel factors, 
leaving the other risk aspects to be addressed in future work. Other risk concerns 
influencing port safety, such as managerial, policy implications, natural, and political 
issues also need be investigated in order to provide a panoramic view of terminal risk 
analysis. Moreover, high quality representative computational modelling tools are 
required, not only to provide a user-friendly solution in the risk evaluation process that 
helps to predict the risk magnitude, explain the real safety performance, and develop a 
continuous risk management strategy for complex systems, but also to simplify the 
complex risk inference processes involved in the two steps in the developed methods. 
ANNs seem to be a promising solution to addressing this research problem. In addition, 
a risk-control option model can be developed to eliminate and/or mitigate the HEs in 
CTOS and to enhance the system operational efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107 
 
Chapter 5 ― Integrated container port system risk analysis and probabilistic 
safety assessment simulations using ANNs 
 Summary 
This study proposes a novel, modified FMEA approach using Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANNs) to predict container terminal operation risks, which can complement the two 
models—Fuzzy Bayesian and Bayesian ER—discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
This study proposes three new models based on ANNs to enhance the performance of 
FMEA by overcoming its incapability in tackling uncertainty in data and at the same time 
ease the evaluation process on the stakeholders from handling a complex large amount 
of data to measure, predict, and improve their system safety and reliability performance. 
It simplifies the complex risk inference processes involved in the two developed methods. 
The first is Bayesian Network ANN (BNANN) that incorporates BNs with ANNs to 
facilitate risk prediction of each HE identified in Chapter 3. The second model is 
Evidential Reasoning ANN (EvRANN), which uses ANNs to simulate the FRBER method 
from Chapter 4 to ease the aggregation of all 24 HEs. The final model is Artificial Neural 
Networks-Bayesian Network-Evidential Reasoning (AnBnEvR) integrates the two ANN 
models into a single model; it simplifies risk prediction, analyses processes, and realises 
real-time risk prediction of ports at HE or whole system levels. The proposed ANN based 
models produced smaller deviations that exhibited superior predictive accuracy with 
satisfactory determination coefficients (i.e., the Regression) (R2) of 0.999 with the 
corresponding Minimum Mean Squared Errors (MSE) of 0.000001334 for simulating 
BNANNs and R2 of 0.997, with the corresponding MSE of 0.0001344 for simulating 
EvRANNs and forecasting container terminal operation risk evaluation. The proposed 
ANN-based approach provides an excellent evaluation and prediction tool for complex 
systems, such as container terminal operation activities that could be easily modelled in 
a feasible, versatile, and accurate manner. 
5.1. Introduction 
Technological effort, risk management development, and HE-driven risk mitigation have 
resulted in strengthened safety standards, as evidenced by practical applications and 
research over the years. New concepts involving efficient operation and design should be 
developed and implemented in order to achieve optimum evaluation, control, and safety 
management performance in maritime port operation. High quality models of accuracy 
and reliability assurance can help risk evaluation predict risk magnitude, explain real 
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safety performance, and develop a continuous risk management strategy for complex 
systems. Many types of technologies can develop such models, but numerous Artificial 
Neural Networks (ANNs) applications have been successfully applied for real-time risk 
prediction in various sectors over the past decade, due to their reliable, robust, and salient 
capturing of non-linear relationships between complex system variables (i.e., multi-
input/output). On the other hand, FMEA is one of the most widely applied hazard 
identification and risk analysis methods, due to its visibility and ease. ANNs, a method 
based on uncertainty treatment theory, can enhance FMEA performance by overcoming 
its incapability of tackling data uncertainty; at the same time, it can ease stakeholders’ 
burden of handling a complex large amount of data to measure, predict, and improve 
system safety and reliability performance. ANNs are computational modelling tools that 
many disciplines use to model complex problems. Research has shown that ANNs have 
powerful pattern classification and recognition capabilities. Inspired by biological 
systems, particularly research into the human brain as a large-scale nonlinear drive system, 
ANNs offer a computational paradigm that learns and generalises from experience. It also 
has many egregious functions, such as adaptive learning, real time operation, self-
organisation, thinking and reasoning, judging and memory, and fault tolerance (Widrow 
et al., 1994; Kumar and Ravi, 2007). Since the 1980s, research on ANNs has made 
remarkable developments, and has been successfully applied for many different tasks in 
a wide variety of domains, such as science, industry, business—including accounting and 
finance, marketing, engineering, and manufacturing—and health and medicine to model 
complex real-world problems, as evidenced by literature. 
In the last decade, however, a few studies examined risk assessment using ANNs, 
including medical (Sadatsafavi et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2011; Tsujita et al., 2014), 
financial (Lacerda et al., 2005; LIN, 2009; Wang et al., 2011; De Andres et al., 2011; 
Oreski et al., 2012; Henry et al., 2013), and civil engineering studies (Gómez & Kavzoglu, 
2005; Brack et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Moseley et al., 2007; Ying et al., 2008; 
Schuhmacher et al., 2009). However, very few studies use ANN in risk analysis for 
maritime-related systems. Ung et al., (2006) applied ANNs to predict the risk level of sea-
lane navigation within port areas by incorporating fuzzy set theory and ANNs. Although, 
showing a unique conception in the idea essence of applying ANNs in the maritime port 
industry, however, the approach has only considered the fuzziness, incapable of 
modelling the other types of uncertainties in data, which releases a significant research 
gap. In addition, since then the development on ANNs and its application capability in 
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various fields of study is remarkable, in which allow providing a mature risk assessment-
modelling scheme for maritime port industry with high accuracy.  
This chapter aims to develop an integrated container port system risk analysis and 
probabilistic safety assessment simulations, using ANNs that predict and evaluate the 
criticality of hazardous events in a container terminal. The ANN approach is used to 
model two methodologies introduced in previous chapters: the FRBN technique from 
Chapter 3 and FRBER in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the ANN approach implements 
Experimental Data (ED) that is used to train ANNs in rational structure and develops an 
applicable, new risk-based decision support tool for effective seaport risk prediction. 
The two models simulated in this chapter have proven their ability to evaluate risk in 
container terminals. However, the complexity of handling a large amount of data dealing 
with two different software methodologies could burden stakeholders who must navigate 
non-user-friendly processes to measure, predict, and improve system safety and reliability 
performance, motions, and action planning. It is noteworthy to mention that, due to 
optimisation required for the five risk assessment attributes with their fuzzy parameters 
introduced in Chapters 3 and 4 (i.e., the inputs and outputs) with evaluations tasks applied 
cause the amount of calculation to be tremendous in the FRBN and FRBER interface, 
however, it can be overcome by applying the ANN approach. 
In order to clearly map and explain the proposed models, this study is divided into three 
parts that develop a safety analysis approach using a hybrid of fuzzy, BN, ER, and ANNs. 
The first part simulates FRBN, evaluating the criticality of each HE for the identified 24 
HEs locally in a container terminal (see Chapter 3). The second part simulates FRBER, 
evaluating the criticality of risk associated with the most significant HEs of the identified 
24 global HEs for a container terminal (see Chapter 4). The final part presents the 
integrated AnBnEvR model, which predicts the risk index for each HE and provides a 
risk management system on OSP in a container terminal system. 
This chapter begins with a broad overview of the history and definition of ANNs history, 
particularly concerning their principals, characteristics, and general application as carried 
out in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes the methodology of a novel ANN framework, 
capable of simulating two different models to evaluate the risk associated with the 24 
global and local HEs in container terminals. Section 5.4 examines the development of 
ANN modelling in maritime ports. Section 5.5 describes the construction of BNANN 
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models to simulate FRBN for individual HE risk evaluations. Section 5.6 describes the 
construction of model ERANN that simulate FRBER for aggregated HEs. Section 5.7 
presents the integrated AnBnEvR, and Section 5.8 concludes the chapter.  
5.2. Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) Overview 
5.2.1. ANN history 
In 1942, McCulloch and Pitts proposed modelling neural nets as a single neuron form in 
terms of the computational “nervous activity” model; this model describes the neuron as 
a linear threshold-computing unit with multiple inputs and a single output to solve 
character recognition problems (Basheer & Hajmeer, 2000). In 1949, Hebb built the 
missing link between single neurons and network in his classic book The Organization of 
Behaviour. Rosenblatt developed a network in 1958 using McCulloch and Pitts’ model, 
based on a unit called the “perceptron” (Lippmann, 1987). 
Widrow and Hoff (1960), Rosenblatt (1962), and others explored and developed many 
types of perceptron-based ANNs in the 1960s. The topic rapidly faded in the 1970s, 
however, because of two main problems: firstly, the practical difficulties of solving many 
real-world problems; and secondly, the results of Minsky and Papert’s 1969 study, which 
identified serious limitations among perceptrons and could not be solved by simply 
adding neuron layers. It was also determined that the perceptron was incapable of 
representing simple, linearly inseparable functions, as in the famous “exclusive or” (XOR) 
problem (Minsky & Papert, 1987; Marini et al., 2008). However, the primary problem 
was the absence of any learning algorithm to train such networks.  
Hence, the era of the artificial neural network seemed to come to an end. However, 
Hopfield (1982) poured new life into this field by introducing two key concepts that 
overcame all of Minsky and Papert’s identified limitations: first, the nonlinearity between 
total input received by a neuron and its produced output; second, the possibility of 
feedback coupling outputs with inputs (Marini et al., 2008). 
Since then, ANNs have seen an explosion of interest, together with a paradigm change in 
recent years. They were intensively and extensively used as problem solving algorithms 
for application development, rather than accurate representations of the human nervous 
system (Liao & Wen, 2007; Marini et al., 2008). They are successfully applied across an 
extraordinary range of domains, in areas as diverse as finance, medicine, engineering, 
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chemistry, geology, and physics. More information about the history of ANNs 
development can be found in several existing studies (Anderson & Rosenfeld, 1988; 
Pollack, 1989; Nelson & Illingworth, 1990; Eberhart & Dobbins, 1990; Priddy & Keller, 
2005; Yegnanarayana, 2009). 
5.2.2. ANN concept 
ANNs are computational modelling tools with flexible structures that capture and 
simulate complex input/output relationships. They are comprised of densely 
interconnected adaptive and simple processing elements, capable of performing massive 
parallel computations for data processing and knowledge representation (Dawes, 1991; 
Schalkoff, 1997; Liao & Wen, 2007). The ANN terminology has been developed from a 
biological model that uses artificial neurons to imitate the learning process of the human 
brain (i.e., natural neurons) to a system that processes nonlinear and complex data, even 
when the data are imprecise and noisy. However, solving complex problems requires 
knowledge of biological network functionality rather than a replication of biological 
system operation (Basheer & Hajmeer, 2000; Liao & Wen, 2007). 
The human nervous system consists of billions of neurons of various types and lengths 
relevant to their location in the body (Schalkoff, 1997). Figure 5.1 shows a schematic of 
simplified biological neurons with three major functional units: dendrites, cell bodies, and 
axons. The cell body has a nucleus that contains information about hereditary traits, as 
well as plasma that holds the molecular equipment used for producing material needed 
by the neuron (Jain et al., 1996). The dendrites receive signals from other neurons and 
pass them to the cell body. The axon, which branches into collaterals, receives signals 
from the cell body and carries them through synapses to the neighbouring neurons’ 
dendrites (Zupan & Gasteiger, 1993). 
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Figure 5.1: Natural neurons  
An impulse, in the form of an electric signal, travels within the dendrites and through the 
cell body towards the synapse’s synaptic membrane. Next, if the signals received are 
strong enough (surpassing a certain threshold), the neuron activates and emits a signal 
through the axon that might be sent to another synapse or activate other neurons 
(Grossberg, 1982; Rosenzweig et al., 1999). A schematic illustration of the signal transfer 
between two neurons through the synapse is shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Natural neurons signal transfer  
5.2.3. ANN principles 
The complexity of real neurons is highly abstracted when modelling artificial neurons. 
ANNs consist of inputs (synapses), which are multiplied by weights (strength of 
respective signals), and then computed by a mathematical function, which determines the 
activation of the neuron; then another function (possibly identity) computes the artificial 
neuron’s output. As a result, ANNs’ mechanisms combine all artificial neurons to process 
information. 
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The greater an artificial neuron’s weight, the stronger its input. A neuron’s computation 
depends on weights and differs if the weight changes, because weight is multiplied by 
input. By adjusting an artificial neuron’s weights, the output can be obtained as desired 
for specific inputs. However, when an ANN consists of hundreds or thousands of neurons, 
manually finding all the necessary weights is complicated; algorithm weights can find 
and adjust ANN weights in order to obtain desired network output. This process of weight 
adjustment is called learning or training (Haykin, 1999). 
A complex system may be deconstructed into simpler elements in order to understand and 
handle it. Simple elements may be gathered to produce a complex system; networks are 
one approach for achieving this (Bar, 2003). 
There are many network types, but they all contain the following components:  
 A set of nodes: nodes can be seen as computational units. They receive and 
process inputs to obtain an output. This processing may be very simple (sum-
ming the puts) or quite complex (a node might contain another network).  
 Connections between nodes: connections determine information flow between 
nodes and can be unidirectional, when information flows only in one sense, 
and bidirectional, when information flows in either sense. 
Node interactions through connections lead to a network’s global behaviour, which 
cannot be observed through the network’s elements. This global behaviour is described 
as "emergent," meaning that the networks abilities supersede those of its elements, 
making networks a very powerful tool (Haykin, 1999). 
A neuron is a real function of the input vector൫ݔଵ …ݔ௝൯. The output y is obtained as 
݂൫ݕ௝൯ ൌ ݂ ቆߙ ൅෍ ݓ௞௝ݔ௝
௞
௜ୀଵ
ቇ																																																																					ሺ5.1ሻ 
where f is a function (functions will be explained in detail in Section 5.3.1),  
x1, x2, x3, ..... xj are the input signals, 
wk1, wk2, wk3, ...wkj are the synaptic weights of neuron k , and 
 ߙ is the bias 
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A graphical presentation of a neuron is given in Figure 5.3. Mathematically, a Multi-
Layer Perceptron network is a function consisting of compositions of functions’ weighted 
sums corresponding to neurons (Haykin, 1999). 
 
Figure 5.3: A single neuron  
ANNs as a data processing system consist of a large number of simple, highly 
interconnected processing elements in an architecture inspired by the brain’s cerebral 
cortex structure, and there are several architecture ANN types. Simpson (1990) lists 26 
different types of ANNs, Maren (1991) lists 48, and Pham (1994) estimates more than 50. 
Some networks are more proficient in solving perceptual problems, while others are more 
suitable for data modelling and functional approximation, but feed forward networks (i.e., 
Back-Propagation network (BP) and recurrent networks are the most widely used 
(Basheer & Hajmeer, 2000). 
In Figure 5.4, the BP information flows in one direction along connecting pathways, from 
the input layer via the hidden layers to the final output layer. There is no feedback (i.e., 
all links are unidirectional and there are no same layer neuron-to-neuron connections), 
and the output of any layer does not affect that same or preceding layer. These networks 
are the most widely used types and are considered the workhorse of ANNs because of 
their flexibility and adaptability in modelling a wide spectrum of problems in many 
application areas (Widrow et al., 1994). 
The recurrent network in Figure 5.5 differs from feed forward network architectures in 
that there is at least one feedback loop. Thus, these networks have one layer with feedback 
connections; they may also have neurons with self-feedback links (i.e., a neuron’s output 
is fed back into itself as input). 
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Figure 5.4: Feed forward network  
 
Figure 5.5: Recurrent network 
This study uses BP because of three main factors: its ability to learn mapping from one 
data space to another using examples; high accuracy in capturing data’s nonlinearity in 
(i.e., the relationship between inputs and outputs); and the simplicity in searching, 
accelerating, and stabilising the training process. BP is detailed in the next to expand the 
understanding of ANNs, identifying these systems and how to design them. 
5.2.4. Characteristics of ANNs 
ANNs are very sophisticated, nonlinear computational tools, capable of modelling 
extremely complex functions. Specifically, any given functional relation between a set of 
inputs and corresponding set of outputs can be represented by an opportunely chosen 
ANN architecture (Marini et al., 2008). ANNs have a remarkable result whenever there 
are problems of prediction, classification, or control. This sweeping success can be 
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attributed to a few key factors listed as follows (Siegel et al., 1998; Haykin, 1999; 
Etheridge et al., 2000; Taha, 2012): 
1. ANNs exhibit can map input patterns to their associated output patterns.  
2. ANNs learn by example. Thus, ANN architectures can be “trained” with known ex-
amples of a problem before they are tested for their inference capability on unknown 
instances of the problem, and can therefore identify new objects.  
3. ANNs possess the capability to generalize. Generalisation refers to the ANNs produc-
ing reasonable outputs for inputs not encountered during training (i.e., learning). Thus, 
they can predict new outcomes from past trends.  
4. ANNs have flexibility and maintenance ease, as they adapt to environmental changes; 
they can also learn by experience and realise the relationship between variables to 
improve performance. 
5. ANNs are robust, fault tolerant systems. Therefore, they can recall full patterns from 
incomplete, partial, and/or noisy patterns.  
6. ANNs can solve new kinds of difficult problems. This has opened new fields for de-
cision support applications that were difficult or impossible to be programmed in 
computers. 
7. ANNs can deal with incomplete, confused, or not well-determined data, and can deal 
with unexpected conditions (much like the human brain). They can also deal with a 
large amount of data to create models in case there are no certain, known rules, and 
they provide accurate results when accurately built. 
8. ANNs can process information in parallel and distributed manners at high speed, as 
they consist of a large number of processing elements that communicate with each 
other. 
9. ANNs do not sufficiently test research hypotheses and give no important input varia-
bles. This makes it difficult to interpret results, and needs a long time to be learned. 
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10. ANNs use past data patterns for future predictions, meaning that they assume the fu-
ture will be as the past. When change occurs in an environment or surrounding cir-
cumstances, network patterns are not better predictors than are statistical conventional 
patterns, unless they are reconstructed. 
5.2.5. ANNs Applications 
The types and uses of ANNs are very diverse; since McCulloch and Pitts’ (1943) first 
neural model, hundreds of different ANN models have been developed. They differ in 
function, accepted values, topology, and/or learning algorithms (Haykin, 1999). 
A review by Liao and Wen (2007), based 10,120 articles about ANN methodologies and 
application developments from 1995 to 2005, uses data mining to disclose the wide range 
of ANN applications in many fields of study. Other researchers have explored the use of 
hybrid ANNs with deferent methods, such as neuro-fuzzy for time series modelling 
(Nayak et al., 2004), neuro-fuzzy rule-based for stock market decision support modelling 
(Kuo et al., 2001), Bayesian neural networks for medicine (Caballero & Fernandez, 2008), 
and Dempster-Shafer neural network for navigation technology (Aggarwal et al., 2013). 
In addition, ANNs have been used for a wide variety of applications where statistical 
methods or Expert Systems (ES) are traditionally employed. They have been used in 
classification problems—such as identifying underwater sonar currents—recognising 
speech, and predicting the secondary structure of globular proteins. In time-series 
applications, ANNs have been used to predict stock market performance, discriminate 
analysis, logistic regression, Bayes analysis, multiple regression, and Autoregressive 
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) time-series models. It is, therefore, time to 
recognise neural networks as a powerful tool for data analysis (Turban et al., 2011). 
ANNs’ success increases as a problem’s dimensionality and/or increases, because 
traditional regression statistical methods often fail to produce accurate approximations. 
Accordingly, ANNs may be employed for modelling with low data dimensionality or for 
approximating simple functions when higher accuracy is desired. Moreover, ES is a 
computer program that mimics the human reasoning process, which relies on logic, belief, 
rules of thumb, opinion, and experience. However, unlike ANNs, ES suffer from major 
limitations, mainly their hypersensitivity to incomplete and/or noisy data (i.e., 
uncertainty), and some human knowledge cannot be expressed explicitly by rules (Fu, 
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1995). As a result, ANNs are more robust and often outperform other computational tools 
in solving a variety of problems. 
Literature contains many examples of ANNs models, demonstrating that ANNs have a 
broad field of successful applications in mapping, regression, modelling, clustering, and 
classification. They are flexible, which makes them adaptable to different kinds of 
problems and customizable for nearly any data representation design. 
5.2.6. ANN software 
ANNs’ software is used for different kinds of problems, and software choice depends on 
the problem’s classification and features, the type of learning algorithm, and affordability. 
the software’s can be described as follows.  
5.2.6.1. Commercial software 
Multiple types of neural network software have been developed, and are not limited to 
commercial software: Environment for Computer Aided Neural Software Engineering 
(ECANSE) (Blaško, 2000); Matlab: Neural Network Toolbar (MATLAB, 2013); 
Neuroshell 1 and 2 (WSG, 2007); and Statistica Neural Network (Statistica NN, 1998). 
5.2.6.2. Freeware software 
Other examples but not limited to the freeware software including: Net II, Spider Nets 
Neural Network Library, NeuDC, Binary Hopfield Net with free Java source, Neural shell, 
PlaNet, Valentino Computational Neuroscience Work bench, Neural Simulation 
language version-NSL, and Brain neural network Simulator. 
Among ANN software, Matlab is a high-level language and interactive environment for 
numerical computation, visualisation, and programming that allows for analysing data, 
developing algorithms, and creating models and applications. Matlab computer language, 
tools, and built-in math functions can explore multiple approaches and reach a solution 
faster than with spreadsheets or traditional programming languages. It also has the 
functions to integrate based algorithms with external applications and other programming 
languages. 
The proposed Failure Modes and Effects Analysis ANNs (FMEANNs) approach 
constructs two multilayer perceptron neural network models, namely BNANNs and 
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EvRANNs, which are independently designed then integrated into the AnBnEvR model. 
In order to achieve the goal and based on the aforementioned, the Neural Network 
Toolbox Version 7.8 of MATLAB® mathematical software predicts risk evaluation for a 
container terminal. 
5.3. Methodology 
The FRBN and FRBER methods were developed and tested using the 24 HEs identified 
in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. However, their complex inference process has been 
criticised in practical applications. The proposed models using ANNs are constructed to 
ease the risk inference analysis of ports in both HE and system levels. As a result, it was 
found that HE6, HE7, and HE16 greatly influence the risk index on a container terminal, 
both locally and globally. 
A multilayer perceptron neural network model design is mostly composed of an ED set 
collection used for model training and testing, followed by network creation and 
configuration based on pre-processing and analysis of the data set. Next comes network 
training and validation, and finally, simulations and predictions (Eren et al., 2012). 
The three parts for developing novel FMEANNs and modelling FRBN and FRBER using 
the ANN approach are outlined as follows. 
1. Design the BNANNs model to simulate the FRBN method in chapter 3 (Alyami 
et al., 2014). FRBN has 12 inputs based on the four risk parameters and the lin-
guistic terms for each risk parameter (i.e., each risk parameter; L, C, P, and I, 
have three inputs of High, Medium, and Low). The risk evaluation output for each 
HE identified has three linguistic terms (i.e. High, Medium and Low). 
2. Design the EvRANNs model to simulate the FRBER method, which has nine 
inputs based on three HE risk evaluations resulting from BNANNs (i.e., in each 
BNANNs output, each HE has three outputs of High, Medium, and Low), with 
only one output processed in FRBER. 
3. Construct the AnBnEvR model by integrating the above models, creating a risk 
prediction tool that provides a panoramic view of the safety management system 
of a container terminal’s operation performance. 
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5.3.1. Methodology algorithms 
5.3.1.1. Algorithms of modelling performance criteria 
In a typical ANN, the input layer is composed of the ED (Xi), which is associated with 
the input layer’s neurons (1, 2…, i,… m). The input signals are fed into the input layer, 
then transferred to the hidden layers’ neurons (1, 2…, j,… n), where processing takes 
place by multiplying connection weights (wij) between two neurons and using the 
summation function to deliver output signals to the  output layers  (1, 2…, k,… p) (Bilgili 
et al., 2007).  
Each layer’s input data is processed to outputs using an activation (i.e., transfer) function, 
a nonlinear mathematical function known as a “transfer function.” The most widely used 
transfer functions are tansig, logarithmic sigmoid (logsig), and purelin, described 
respectively below and illustrated in Figure 5.6. The tansig activation function offers 
slightly better predictions than the others and most commonly used in the hidden layer 
with purelin activation function in the output layer (Kaveh et al., 2008; Magharei et al., 
2012; Mashhadi et al., 2013). 
                               (5.2) 
 
                               (5.3) 
 
                                          (5.4) 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Graphical representation for activation (transfer) functions 
The data flow process for a single neuron in the network starts with each input streaming 
multiplied by a weight (w) and summed using the summation function. Then, this single 
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value is processed through a transfer function to produce the output value of a neuron, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.7 (Kaveh et al., 2008). 
 
Figure 5.7: Data flow process in a neuron 
Selecting a training algorithm and activation function is of crucial importance for robust 
ANN model performance. In general, linear functions are used for input and output layers, 
and nonlinear transfer functions for hidden layers (Yetilmezsoy & Demirel, 2008). 
Levenberg Marquardt Back Propagation (LMBP) is the most widely used optimisation 
algorithm for a variety of ANN problems. It is preferred for its speed and stability in 
training the ANN models. Literature discloses that LMBP is the best algorithm, producing 
minimum errors between predicted outputs and corresponding targets, and it is associated 
with the highest regression (i.e., the relationship between ED and model predictions in 
the testing phase) compared to other BP algorithms in several domains (Yetilmezsoy & 
Demirel, 2008; Elmolla et al., 2010; Eren et al., 2012; Süt and Çelik, 2012; Reynaldi et 
al., 2012; Jeffrey et al., 2014; Abushammala et al., 2014). The LMBP network training 
function (trainlm) updates weight and bias values according to LMBP algorithm 
optimisation and is often the fastest BP algorithm in the MATLAB toolbox; it is highly 
recommended as a first choice supervised algorithm, although it requires more memory 
than other algorithms (MATLAB, 2013). 
The LMBPA optimisation is a standard technique for nonlinear, least square problems, 
and was applied in this study to simulate actual risk estimation values for constructing a 
risk prediction system. It was independently developed by Kenneth Levenberg and 
Donald Marquardt and modified with the Gauss Newton method it is the steepest 
descendent method for providing a numerical solution to a problem of minimising a 
nonlinear function, and has stable convergence (Haykin, 1999). The LMBPA data 
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training algorithm procedure is as follows (Najjar et al., 1997; Basheer & Hajmeer, 2000; 
Jeffrey et al., 2014): 
1. Initialise the weights and thresholds in the hidden and output layer, often in the 
range of [−1, 1]. 
2. Calculate the hidden layer y value: 
                                      (5.5) 
where tansig is the transfer function  
n is the number of neurons in the hidden layer,  
 xi is the number of inputs,  
wij  is the weights, and 
θ is the threshold value. 
3. Calculate the output layer y value: 
                                    (5.6) 
where m is the number of neurons in the hidden layer and θ is the threshold value. 
4. Calculate the output layer error: 
                                                (5.7) 
                                                           (5.8) 
5. Correct the output layer weight w: 
                                                            (5.9) 
                                                  (5.10) 
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6. Calculate the hidden layer error δ: 
                                      (5.11) 
7. Correct the hidden weight w: 
                                                             (5.12) 
                                                    (5.13) 
The steepest descendent method has a very fast convergence speed; however, when the 
optimal point is reached due to a decreasing gradient, the convergence speed slows. 
Therefore, the Newton method is integrated with the steepest descendent method to obtain 
excellent convergence effects when approaching the optimal point (Jeffrey et al., 2014). 
Accordingly, the performance function has the form of a square sum and represents the 
Hessian matrix, which is as follows: 
      (5.14) 
         (5.15) 
where J is the Jacobian matrix, containing the first order differentiation of the network 
error against weight and partial weight, and 
e is the network error vector and g is the gradient. 
The basic principles of the Newton Method are:  
    (5.16) 
where Ak is the Hessian matrix, namely, the second order differentiation of the 
performance function in the weights and partial weights. 
 
         (5.17) 
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The LMBP Algorithm uses the Hessian matrix the value to correct the Newton method: 
         (5.19) 
where parameter μ ensures that matrix inversion will always produce a result, and this 
parameter will depend on evaluation of sum of squared errors.  
The LMBP algorithm has characteristics of the steepest descendent method; consequently, 
it has a positive relationship with value, so if the error is large, the value will be also in 
order to increase convergence speed, and vice versa (Jeffrey et al., 2014). The complete 
derivation of the algorithm can be found elsewhere (Zupan and Gasteiger, 1993; Haykin, 
1999; Jeffrey et al., 2014), and a clear systematic derivation is given by Najjar et al., 
(1997). 
5.3.1.2. Algorithms of modelling assessment criteria 
Output values (Y1,…Yk,…Yp) are compared with target values (Z1,…Zk,…Zp) (i.e., 
experimental results) to assess model predictions. The differences between predicted 
values and target values are evaluated against the modelling performance criteria 
established within the ANN algorithm. Hence, it is necessary to reprocess output values 
if modelling performance criteria are not met (Bilgili et al., 2007; Kaveh et al., 2008). 
The MSE and the R2 value are the most common performance criteria for the ANN model 
performance evaluation (Erena et al., 2012). 
The optimum number of neurons was determined by the minimum MSE value from the 
training and prediction dataset. The MSE represents the difference between an 
approximating function F(w,xi) of the adjustable weight (w) for the predicted values and 
target values (i.e., the error) with a range from 0 to 1 where the lower values of MSE are 
preferable (Kaveh et al., 2008; Elmolla et al., 2010; Sütand Çelik, 2012). It is computed 
as follows. 
                                          (5.20) 
where n is the number of target values and yobs,i and ymodel,i are target values and their 
corresponding predicted value, respectively. 
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R2 shows the percentage of variability between ED and predicted data. R2 values range 
between zero and one, in which  means a greater correlation and stronger 
relationship between predicted and actual values (Kaveh et al., 2008). It can be computed 
as: 
   (5.21) 
The MSE and R2 values provide information on general error ranges between predicted 
and target values. 
The above criteria are commonly used for validating models and their predictions. 
Notably, however, the ED quality is an essential requirement for modelling work; 
otherwise, the results of statistical tests and model predictions will be inaccurate (Erena, 
2012; Hezave et al., 2012). 
5.4. Development of ANN Modelling in Maritime Ports 
The FRBN introduced in chapter 3 individually evaluates the criticality of the 24 HEs in 
a container terminal, using four risk parameters: HE occurrence probability (L), HE 
consequences/severity (C), HE impact on the resilience of port operational systems (I), 
and the probability of HE being undetected (P). The four risk parameters are constructed 
to form the IF part, while the RE of failures is presented in the THEN part associated with 
three linguistic grades. DoB of High (H), Medium (M), and Low (L) are employed to 
describe L, C, P, I, and R. The degrees of the parameters, calculated by the Bayesian 
networks method for each HE, are based on knowledge accumulated from past events, 
taking into account domain experts’ judgements. The process is illustrated in Figure 5.8. 
   
Figure 5.8: FRBN process 
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where (X=1,2...24) is the HE number. 
FRBEvR uses the results from FRBN and the evidential reasoning method to aggregate 
the 24 HEs and evaluate their collective criticality in a container terminal. The Risk level 
of the System (RoS) is a single value for a container terminal, shown in Figure 5.9. 
 
Figure 5.9: FRBEvR process with ANNs 
 
Two three-layers ANN models were developed to predict risk evaluation of a container 
terminal operation for each HE individually and aggregated collectively. The ANN 
architecture simulates the FRBN and FRBER methods. They consist of an input layer, 
hidden layer, and output layer. Optimal network architecture was determined as one 
hidden layer with 40 neurons using the LMBP algorithm, with transfer function tansig at 
the hidden layer and transfer function purelin at the output layer. 
Although the two models have the same features, they differ in trajectories concerning 
input and the output structures. The number of neurons in the input layer is twelve and 
nine, while the number of neurons in the output layer is three and one for BNANNs and 
EvRANNs respectively. As a result, the network architecture for BNANNs and 
EvRANNs is constructed as (12 - 40 - 3) and (9 - 40 - 1) respectively. It is noteworthy 
that there are no clear guidelines for choosing an appropriate number of neurons in the 
hidden layer; this is generally optimised by trial and error (Bilgili et al., 2007; Dogan et 
al., 2008; Yetilmezsoy and Demirel, 2008; Kaveh et al., 2008; Turp et al., 2011; Süt and 
Yahya, 2012; Eren et al., 2012; Hezave et al., 2012; Magharei et al., 2012; Sudhakaran et 
al., 2013; Mashhadi et al., 2013). 
AnBnEvR is an integration of BNANNs and EvRANNs, and it completes the prediction 
of a container terminal operation’s risk evaluation in a panoramic safety performance 
view. 
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5.4.1. Experimental data processing 
The EDs in this study are partially obtained (i.e., actual data for testing) from previous 
chapters (i.e., Chapters 3 and 4). As aforementioned, the relationship between the FRBBN 
and FRBEvR is that the outputs of the former are used as inputs for the latter. 
The total dataset used in this research consists of 24 HEs, although, it was attempt to use 
the same dataset in this study. However, as aforementioned, ANNs are constructed based 
on risk inference analysis of the FRBBN and FRBER HEs which disclosed that HE6, 
HE7, and HE16 have a great influence on a container terminal’s risk index from both 
perspectives, individually and aggregated collectively among other HEs. It is noteworthy 
that BNANNs can process each HE, since the evaluation is individually conducted, while 
EvRANNs cannot because the HEs have to be processed collectively due to the ER 
technique’s aggregation feature. Therefore, HE6, HE7, and HE16 are used for the 
EvRANNs’ model architecture. 
The previous chapters’ EDs are relatively inadequate for training the ANN model, since 
the FRBN method’s actual data is classified as 12 inputs, with three outputs for each HE. 
The FRBER method is classified as 72 inputs with one output as one set for the aggregated 
HEs, which is modified based on the above conditions to be nine inputs with one output; 
this is mainly because the ED generated for ANN architecture and training should cover 
the region of predicted results. 
The ED has to be large, although its size creates a greater computational burden; on the 
other hand, it eliminates the ANN model’s propensity for over fitting (Yetilmezsoy & 
Demirel, 2008; Dhar et al., 2013). The simulated processes cannot be outside the input 
variables’ domain, as ANN modelling is not comprehensive; this is an important aspect 
for providing a viable predicting tool (Abushammala et al., 2014). 
As ED has a great influence on ANN modelling performance’s accuracy, a generation of 
a suitable EDs was conducted for modelling FRBN and FRBER methods. Although it 
was challenging to obtain the required EDs for training ANNs due to lack of objective 
failure data in container terminals, EDs were created and obtained using the Python 
program (Lutz, 1996; Ong et al., 2013). The generated EDs’ objective is to make the 
relationship between inputs and outputs maximally informative, while ensuring that the 
EDs adequately cover the region between zero and one with plausible inference intervals 
and maintaining each model’s characteristics. Above all, the constructed models based 
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on generated EDs makes them applicable for any other maritime container terminal for 
risk evaluation and prediction. More details on generating EDs, BNANs, and EvRANNs 
are in Sections 5.5.1 and 5.6.1. 
5.5. Bayesian Network ANNs (BNANNs) Model Design 
The BNANN model consists of 12 inputs representing the four risk parameters—L, C, P, 
and I—and three outputs representing the RE in FRBN (i.e., ANN target). The simulation 
of FRBN using ANNs uses the following steps.  
1. ED analysis 
2. BNANNs model optimisation 
3. Results validation 
5.5.1. Experimental data analysis 
As mentioned in Section 5.4, The four risk parameters are constructed to form the IF part, 
while the RE of failures is presented in the THEN part associated with three linguistic 
grades. DoB of High (H), Medium (M), and Low (L) are employed to describe L, C, P, I, 
and R. Therefore, it can be classified as 12 inputs with 3 outputs for each HE in FRBN. 
The actual data obtained from chapter 3, Section 3.4.3.4 for the 24 HEs cannot adequately 
train the ANN model as previously concluded in Section 5.4.1, mainly because the ED 
set amount is insufficient. As a result, ED needs to be generated. 
For the generated ED to train and test the ANN model with the best prediction results, the 
simulated processes (i.e., predicted input and output values) should be inside the variables’ 
domain, meaning that every possible risk parameter assessment should be included. In 
other words, if the predicted input and output values are not inside the trained ANN 
variables domain, the predicted results will be inaccurate or incorrect. 
A 0.2 inference interval is applied among DoB in each risk grade for each risk parameter 
and the reason behind that is to cover the region between zero and one (i.e. 0-1); this not 
only narrows the range of deviation between input and consequently output values, but 
also adequately increases the training dataset. 
The number of ED sets depends on the number of risk parameters. Transferring the 
inference interval of 0.2 from zero to one resulted in 21 possible combinations between 
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the four risk parameters with the associated grades and DoB. Accordingly, the sum of all 
possible combinations is calculated as (21×21×21×21= 194481). 
As a result, the ED containing 194,481 sets, with 12 inputs and three outputs in each set, 
is obtained and partially shown in Table 5-1. 
Table 5.1: BNANNs experimental datasets generated 
 
5.5.2. BNANN model optimisation 
After selecting trainlm as the best training algorithm for the BNANN model and having 
analysed the ED set, the optimal BNANN model architecture and its parameter variation 
is determined; this is accomplished by selecting the optimum number of neurons in the 
hidden layer based on the minimum MSE value and the observed and predicted training 
and testing set values. 
There is no specific rule regarding the amount or percentage of data for training or testing 
and validation. The general guideline is that training data should be more than the testing 
and validation data (Kaveh et al., 2008; Sudhakaran et al., 2013).  
Hence, out of the total ED set (i.e., 194,481) that was randomly divided by trainlm, 70% 
(i.e., 136,137) was used for training, 15% (i.e., 291,72) for testing, and 15% (i.e., 291,72) 
for validation. In optimising the network, 15 neurons were used in the hidden layer as an 
 BNANNs Model Inputs ANNs Model Outputs 
Risk 
Parameters L C P I RE 
      Risk Grades
No. 
H M L H M L H M L H M L H M L 
1  1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
2  1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0.95 0.05 0 
3  1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.8 0 0.2 0.95 0 0.05 
4  1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.6 0.4 0 0.9 0.1 0 
… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 
194478 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.6 0.4 0 0.15 0.85 
194479 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.4 0.6 0 0.1 0.9 
194480 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.2 0.8 0 0.05 0.95 
194481 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
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initial guess, then the number of neurons was changed by increasing 10 neurons in each 
trial. 
The preliminary trials indicated that the learning and prediction ability of 25 neurons in 
the hidden layer networks was better than that of 15 neurons. This was realised after 
several attempts to gradually increase the number of neurons and observe their effect on 
the predicted value; the training data error decreased, while that of validation data 
increased. Six local minimum MSE values were observed at neuron numbers of 15, 25, 
35, 38, 40, and 45.  
However, the neural network architecture with 40 hidden neurons reached the minimum 
MSE when training, validating, and testing the BNANN model. Thus, 40 neurons were 
chosen as the optimum number for the hidden layer. The network structure was 12-40-3 
(12 neurons in the input layer, 40 in the hidden layer, and three in the output layer). 
The optimal BNANNs, together with a flowchart of the LMBP algorithm, are shown in 
Figure 5.10, a three-layer ANNs of 12 neurons at input layer with tansig transfer function 
at hidden layer with 40 neurons and a purelin transfer function at output layer. 
The training ended after 1,000 iterations (trainlm, Epoch 1000) for the LMBP, because 
the differences between training and validation errors started to increase. 
 
Figure 5.10: Optimal BNANN structure with a flowchart of the LMBP 
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5.5.3. Results validation 
The network’s MSE was very high, with 15 hidden neurons (MSE 0.0524618), and it 
decreased significantly to (MSE 0.0017914) with 25 hidden neurons. The number of 
neurons then increased from 25 to 35, and a gradual decrease was observed in the (MSE 
0.00002151). Next, the 35 hidden neurons slightly increased to 45 among the (MSE 
0.001394). Then, 40 neurons were tested, and the MSE reached its minimum value of 
0.000001334. The neural network containing 40 hidden neurons (MSE 0.000001334) was 
chosen as the best case. When the number of neurons was less than 40, the MSE showed 
a slight increase from 0.000001334 to 0.000002164 at 38 neurons, as depicted in Figure 
5.11. This increment can be attributed to the characteristics of this study’s MSE 
performance index and input vector, and it shows the dependence between MSE and 
number of hidden layer neurons for the LMBP. 
 
Figure 5.11: MSE for BNANN tuning 
The training, validation, and test’s mean squared errors for the BNANNs using the LMBP 
algorithm are illustrated in Figure 5.12; it shows that, with 40 neurons, the effect on 
training data error decreased while that on validation data increased. 
 
Figure 5.12: Training, validation, and test’s mean squared errors for BNANNs 
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The regression analysis of the network response between BNANN outputs and the 
corresponding targets was performed. The graphical output of the plotted network outputs 
versus the targets as open circles is illustrated in Figure 5.13. Taking into account the 
data’s non-linear dependence, linear regression shows a perfect agreement between 
BNANN outputs (predicted data) and the corresponding targets (i.e., ED). The solid red, 
blue, green, and black lines—which respectively represent test, training, validation, and 
combination of all three— indicate the perfect linear fit that R2≈ 1. 
 
Figure 5.13: BNANN regressions 
The previous statistical analysis shows that BNANN model predictions are very close to 
the ED. In addition, to confirm the developed model’s robustness and predictive 
capability, the optimal BNANN model’s performance was evaluated using another data 
set consisting of the actual data obtained in chapter 3, which was not used in the training 
stage. Consequently, a simulink model of the BNANNs was constructed, as shown in 
Figure 5.14. Table 5.2 shows that the results, along with the correlation coefficient 
between the actual and predicted datasets, provide a high accuracy and a perfect match. 
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Figure 5.14: The simulink model of the BNANNs 
 
Table 5.2: BNANN correlation coefficient 
No. FRBN output 
 
BNANNs output 
High Medium Low High Medium Low 
1  0.665 0.25 0.085 0.667 0.249 0.084 
2  0.57 0.2525 0.1775 0.57 0.2519 0.1769 
3  0.5875 0.1625 0.25 0.588 0.1617 0.25 
4  0.735 0.1325 0.1325 0.7363 0.132 0.132 
5  0.7275 0.085 0.1875 0.728 0.085 0.187 
6  0.71 0.055 0.235 0.7099 0.056 0.235 
7  0.655 0.0975 0.2475 0.655 0.0977 0.2477 
8  0.5975 0.1125 0.29 0.5966 0.1134 0.289 
9  0.375 0.275 0.35 0.375 0.275 0.35 
10  0.5175 0.2275 0.255 0.5172 0.2275 0.2551 
11  0.6 0.21 0.19 0.5997 0.2103 0.1898 
12  0.585 0.185 0.23 0.5845 0.1854 0.2299 
13  0.6675 0.1125 0.22 0.666 0.1137 0.22 
14  0.5975 0.1525 0.25 0.5972 0.1527 0.25 
15  0.6825 0.085 0.2325 0.6816 0.0855 0.2328 
16  0.49 0.225 0.285 0.4896 0.2248 0.2853 
17  0.44 0.125 0.435 0.44 0.1248 0.4344 
18  0.4775 0.0775 0.445 0.4788 0.07729 0.4448 
19  0.3875 0.16 0.4524 0.388 0.16 0.4521 
20  0.4075 0.1575 0.435 0.4079 0.1575 0.4349 
21  0.395 0.22 0.385 0.3947 0.22 0.3848 
22  0.4275 0.1625 0.41 0.4276 0.1628 0.4098 
23  0.39 0.2325 0.3775 0.39 0.2321 0.3775 
24  0.3075 0.1625 0.53 0.308 0.1623 0.5298 
Correlation   0.999983 0.999961 0.999995
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5.6. Evidential Reasoning ANNs (EvRANNs) Model Design 
As aforementioned, FRBEvR model inputs are taken directly from the FRBN model. The 
previous section’s BNANN model describes the simulation of the FRBBN model. 
Therefore, the EvRANNs model is based on results directly taken from the BNANNs 
model. Only taking the top three HEs that influencing the risk index individually and 
aggregated collectively on a container terminal. Accordingly, the EvRANNs model 
consists of nine inputs representing the risk evaluation R (i.e., BNANN results) for HE6, 
HE7, and HE16, and one output representing the risk evaluation of a container terminal’s 
entire system. The ER simulation using ANNs is described as follows: 
1. Experimental data analysis 
2. EvRANN model optimisation 
3. Results validation 
5.6.1. Experimental data analysis 
The reason for having an insufficient ED set in designing BNANNs applies here; 
therefore, the exact criteria and logic for inference intervals were used for generating ED 
sets to train and test the EvRANN model as previously conducted in Section 5.5.1. 
However, it is three risk parameters instead of four and the sum of all possible 
combinations between the three HEs with the associated grades and DoB is calculated as 
(21×21×21= 9261). Therefore, the EDs contained 9261 sets with nine inputs and one 
output in each set. This is obtained and partially shown in Table 5-3. 
Table 5. 3: EvRANN experimental datasets generated 
No. 
EvRANNs Model Inputs ANNs Model 
OutputsHE 1 HE 2 HE 3 
High Medium Low High Medium Low High Medium Low RI 
1  1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2  1 0 0 1 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0.9778 
3  1 0 0 1 0 0 0.8 0 0.2 0.9556 
4  1 0 0 1 0 0 0.6 0.4 0 0.9529 
... .... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... .....
9258 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.6 0.4 0.075
9259 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.4 0.6 0.0471
9260 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.2 0.8 0.0222
9261 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
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5.6.2. EvRANNs model optimisation 
The same training algorithm used for the BNANN model was also used with EvRANNs 
(i.e., trainlm), including the same performance and assessment criteria with typical 
process and sequence of neurons number trails selection, which started with 15 neurons. 
During several preliminary trial attempts to gradually increase the number of neurons and 
observe their effect on the predicted value, the training data error decreased and validation 
data error increased; this indicated that the learning and prediction ability of 25 neurons 
in the hidden layer networks was better than that of 15 neurons.  Six local minimum MSE 
values were observed at neuron numbers of 15, 25, 35, 38, 40, and 45. However, the 
neural network architecture with 40 hidden neurons reached the minimum MSE when 
training, validation, and testing the EvRANN model. Consequently, 40 neurons were 
chosen as the optimum number for the hidden layer. Finally, the structure of the network 
was 9-40-1 (nine neurons in the input layer, 40 in the hidden layer, and one in the output 
layer). 
The optimal EvRANNs, together with a flowchart of the LMBP algorithm, is shown in 
Figure 5.15. It shows a three-layer ANN of nine neurons at the input layer with a tansig 
transfer function at hidden layer, and 40 neurons and a purelin transfer function at output 
layer. 
 
Figure 5.15: Optimal EvRANN structure, with a flowchart of the LMBP 
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The LMBP training ended after 51 iterations (trainlm, Epoch 51) because the differences 
between training and validation error started to increase. 
As previously stated, there is no specific rule regarding the amount/percentage of data for 
training or testing and validation. The general guideline is that training data should be 
more than testing and validation data. Hence, out of the total dataset (i.e., ED, 9,261) that 
was randomly divided by trainlm, 70% (i.e., 6,483) was used for training, 15% (i.e., 1,389) 
for testing, and 15% (i.e., 1,389) for validation.  
5.6.3. Results validation 
The network’s MSE was very high for the 15 hidden neurons (MSE 0.556) and decreased 
significantly from 25 to (MSE 0.0000679). Then, as the number of neurons increased 
from 25 to 35, the (MSE 0.0000617) decreased. Next, the (MSE .516) increased from 35 
hidden neurons to 45. Therefore, 40 neurons were tested, and the MSE reached its 
minimum value of 0.00001344. Therefore, the neural network containing 40 hidden 
neurons (MSE 0.00001344) was chosen as the best case. When the number of neurons 
was less than 40, MSE slightly increased from 0.000001334 to 0.000019 with 38 neurons, 
as depicted in Figure 5.16. This increment can be attributed to the characteristics of this 
study’s MSE performance index and input vector, and it shows the dependence between 
MSE and number of hidden layer LMBP neurons. 
 
Figure 5.16: MSE for EvRANN optimisation 
The BNANN training, validation, and test’s mean squared errors for using the LMBP 
algorithm are illustrated in Figure 5.17. It clearly shows that, with 40 neurons, the effect 
on training data error’s effect decreased, while that of validation data increased. 
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Figure 5.17: Training, validation, and test mean’s squared errors for the EvRANNs 
The regression analysis of the network response between EvRANN outputs and 
corresponding targets was performed. The graphical output of the plotted network outputs 
versus the targets as open circles is illustrated in Figure 5.18. Taking into account the 
data’s non-linear dependence, linear regression shows a perfect agreement between 
EvRANNs outputs (i.e., predicted data) and corresponding targets (i.e., ED). The solid 
red, blue, green, and black lines—which respectively represent the test, training, 
validation, and combination of all three—indicate the perfect linear fit that R2 ≈1. 
 
Figure 5.18: EvRANN regressions 
The previous statistical analysis shows that the EvRANN model predictions are very close 
to the ED. In addition, to confirm the developed model’s robustness and predictive 
capability, the performance of the optimal EvRANN model was evaluated using another 
data set consisting of the actual data obtained in chapter 4, which was not used in the 
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training stage. Consequently, a simulink model of the EvRANN network was constructed, 
as shown in Figure 5.19, and the results—along with the correlation coefficient between 
actual and predicted datasets respectively—provided a very high accuracy and perfect 
match, as presented in Table 5-4. 
 
Figure 5.19: simulink model of the EvRANN network 
 
Table 5.4: EvRANN correlation coefficient 
 
FRBER 
outputs  
EvRANNs 
output 
  0.7668   0.7651 
  0.8102   0.8126 
  0.6002   0.6024 
  0.7011   0.702 
  0.7443   0.7469 
  0.55   0.5511 
  0.4834   0.4837 
  0.4613   0.4608 
Correlation 0.999941 
5.7. Integrated ANNs Bayesian Networks Evidential Reasoning (AnBnEvR) 
The previous sections described the BNANN and EvRANN models, which can be 
integrated to predict risk evaluation of a container terminal operation and provide a 
panoramic view on risk inference, either individually or collectively aggregated. The 
integration of the simulated Bayesian Networks and Evidential Reasoning using Artificial 
Neural Networks was created within dynamic system simulation for MATLAB. 
Consequently, the simulink model of the AnBnEvR network was constructed as 
illustrated in Figure 5.20. 
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Figure 5.20: Simulink model of the AnBnEvR network 
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5.8. Conclusion 
This study develops a novel FMEANN approach for evaluating and predicting the 
criticality of HEs in a container terminal system; at the same time, it provides a panoramic 
view on maritime container terminal safety performances. This study applied an ANN to 
container terminal systems to investigate the applicability of ANN as a tool for predicting 
risk inference of complex container terminal operation activity systems.  
Two three-layer BP neural networks were optimised to evaluate and predict the maritime 
container terminals’ operation safety. The configuration of the BP neural network that 
giving the smallest MSE is constructed using LMBP training algorithm of tansig transfer 
function at hidden layer with 40 neurons and a purelin transfer function at output layer. 
The optimal architecture for BNANN and EvRANN models were optimised as twelve 
and nine neurons in the input layers with three and one in the output layers. The two three-
layer ANN-based models showed precise and effective predictions with very satisfactory 
determination coefficients for testing sets R2 of about 0.999 and 0.997, with 
corresponding MSE of 0.000001334 and 0.0001344 respectively for simulating BNANs 
and EvRANNs. The simulation of FRBN and FRBEvR using ANNs, with the presented 
results, showed that neural network modelling can effectively simulate and predict 
container terminal operation safety. 
The integration of the two models (i.e., AnBnEvR network) provides an excellent 
evaluation and prediction tool for complex systems, such as container terminal operation 
activities, in which BNANNs evaluate and predict individual HEs within the system while 
EvRANNs deal with HEs aggregated collectively. Based on these findings, this study 
concludes that a highly complex and dynamic system, such as a maritime container 
terminal, could be easily modelled in a feasible, versatile, and accurate manner using the 
proposed ANN-based approach. Considering the advantages of artificial intelligence 
methodology, the present modelling strategy will be expanded to full scale to evaluate 
real-time operation activities and control risk in a cost-effective manner from the 
viewpoint of safety and security. However, the model cannot be used with different input 
values outside the range of trained data. 
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Chapter 6 ― Decision Support System for Optimal Container Port Safety Perfor-
mance Plan Selection 
Summary 
This chapter aims to present a fuzzy decision-making approach to tackle the selection of 
Risk Control Options (RCOs) and operational safety strategies under uncertainty in 
container terminals. The selection of an appropriate strategy to ensure the OSP in 
container terminals is a crucial decision for many stakeholders including terminal 
managers, ship-owners, surveyors, and safety engineers.  In such a process of complex 
group MCDM, ambiguous and incomplete data are usually presented in different 
quantitative and qualitative forms. AHP and the FTOPSIS have been merged to formulate 
a hybrid approach to assess the costs and benefits associated with operational safety 
strategies. In order to evaluate the benefits, such as risk reduction, this chapter also 
introduces a novel port operational risk analysis technique incorporating Bayesian 
Evidential Reasoning (BER). The contributory findings through the application of the 
approach in the real world are twofold.  First, the newly proposed approach can deliver 
results similar to the ones obtained using the existing safety control decision-making 
methods when the input data is completed.  The new approach can also provide solutions, 
while the traditional ones cannot when the uncertainty in decision input data is high. 
Secondly, the most preferred safety control measures are those capable of addressing 
both operational efficiency and risk reduction in container terminals, such as automation 
solutions. 
6.1. Introduction 
For many decades, containerised trade has been the fastest growing market segment. The 
total volume of containers handled per year has steeply increased and is expected to 
continue increasing in the future (UNCTAD, 2013). As a result, container terminals are 
continuously challenged to increase their throughput capacity, introducing innovations 
regarding its design, material handling equipment, and safety research applications on 
container terminal safety operations. 
Most of the Decision Making Problems (DMP) in container terminal operation are dealing 
with optimisation in transport operations: comparing vehicle types; determining the 
number of vehicles; routing; dispatching; collision and deadlock avoidance (Héctor et al., 
2014); terminal operation including deriving and comparing dispatching policies 
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(Stahlbock & Voß, 2008; Steenken et al., 2004); port efficiency (Gonzalez & Trujillo, 
2009; Panayides et al., 2009); operations management (Meredith et al., 1989); logistics 
(Mentzer & Kahn, 1995); and supply chain management research (Sachan & Datta, 2005; 
Burgess et al., 2006). Hardly any papers focus on OSP within container terminals. This 
chapter presents a new classification scheme using FTOPSIS to ensure the optimal OSP 
strategy with respect to the following decision problems criteria: (1) Risk reduction; (2) 
Actual benefits in term of operational efficiency; (3) Cost; and (4) Technical difficulties 
on OSP strategy application, while the weights of all the criteria is obtained by using AHP. 
The ratings of various alternatives versus various aforementioned subjective and 
objective criteria and the weights of all criteria are assessed in linguistic variables 
represented by fuzzy numbers to resolve the ambiguity of concepts that are associated 
with human being’s judgments using the application of AHP and FTOPSIS to provide 
solutions for effective risk control and safety management in container ports in real-world 
practice. 
This research aims to ensure that the OSP in maritime container terminals maximise the 
safety measures by offering the best risk-control options and strategies through 
developing a number of integrated models under high uncertainty. To achieve this aim, 
this chapter is organised as follows. A brief review of the AHP technique is provided in 
Section 6.2. An analytical overview of TOPSIS and an extended TOPSIS using FL in 
several domains is carried out in Section 6.3. The procedures required for developing 
these integrated models with various types of information at various stages through 
conducting an appropriate literature review, and human knowledge base and expertise 
have been explained in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 describes the methodology of MCDM to 
cope with the container terminal OSP decision problem and strategies selection using 
AHP-FTOPSIS that can define the positive and negative ideal solutions.  Moreover, a 
brief introduction of a hybrid BER approach to conduct risk analysis of operations in 
container terminals has been provided. A particular test case regarding container terminal 
safety performance evaluation is investigated to demonstrate the feasibility of the new 
methodology in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 develops a discussion based on the results 
obtained. Section 6.8 concludes the chapter. The new approach can provide solutions to 
rational selection of risk control measures in situations where the relevant data is 
incomplete. 
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6.2. Research Background 
6.2.1. A brief review on MCDM 
The MCDM provides a systematic structured approach for a decision-making process 
that involves a decision problem with six elements, to the achievement or best 
performance of each decision alternative on criteria defined, which is described by 
Malczewski (1999) as follows. 
1. Value is something a person cares deeply about. 
2. Goal is the formulation of values in a given problem context.  
3. Objective is the specification of a goal in terms of the desired property of the 
problem solution. 
4. Decision Maker is a single person or a group of people, or the whole organisation, 
responsible for making decisions. 
5. Decision Alternatives are the feasible solutions to a decision problem.  
6. Criteria are the basis for evaluating decision alternatives. It has two types: attrib-
utes that measure the performance of an objective/s, and an objective that is a 
statement for the desired level of goal achievement.  
There are two basic techniques to MCDM approach: MADM and Multiple Objective 
Decision Making (MODM). 
The MADM technique provides a selection to be made among decision alternatives 
described by their attributes. It assumes that the problem has a predetermined number of 
decision alternatives based on its attributes, while in the MODM technique the decision 
alternatives are not given. Instead, MODM provides a mathematical framework for 
designing a set of decision alternatives and once the decision alternatives are identified, 
each alternative is judged by how suitable it is in satisfying the objective (Malczewski, 
1999). 
There are three generic types of MCDM problem as follows: 
 Selection is finding a set of decision alternatives to be chosen from. 
 Sorting is assigning each alternative to one of the predefined criteria based on 
relative differences of decision alternatives along a criterion. 
 Ranking is establishing a prioritised list of alternatives.  
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It is noteworthy to mention that MADM problems require sorting and ranking, while 
MODM problems only require selection. 
The process of MCDM begins with identifying the problem and then recognising the 
decision problem through a series of steps (Malczewski, 1999) as follows and presented 
in Figure 6.1. 
 Set of criteria/attributes is the evaluation criteria that represent the measures for 
achieving those criteria. 
 Set of alternatives is the nature of decision alternatives to choose from, whether 
these potential alternatives are feasible or not. 
 Criterion scores represent the achievement of decision alternatives on evaluation 
criteria. 
 Decision table represents the collection of criterion scores and thus provides the 
basis for the comparison of decision alternatives. 
 Decision maker preferences are expressed in term of weights that express relative 
importance of the evaluation criteria under consideration. 
 Aggregation functions are the decision rule. They compute an overall assessment 
measure of each decision alternative by integrating the decision maker’s prefer-
ences with criterion scores. 
 Sensitivity analysis tests the stability of an assessment measure of each decision 
alternative when weights and criterion scores are varied. If small changes in the 
weights or criterion scores produce significant changes in the order of ranked de-
cision alternatives, then the ranking of decision alternatives is sensitive. 
 Final recommendation is the choice of the most appropriate decision alternatives 
In respect to the model presented in this chapter, it has been decided to follow the MADM 
technique in MCDM approach because the scope of this research is to select from a 
predetermined number of decision alternatives on a set of attributes for a defined 
objective. 
There are some commonly known methods which use the MCDM approach to make 
decisions, which are briefly described in the following subsections. 
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Figure 6.1: The process of Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) 
6.3. Development of the MADM model 
Yoon and Gyutal (1989) defined MADM as “technical decision aids for evaluating 
alternatives which are characterised by multiple attributes”. Most critical situations that 
use MADM problems in engineering practice are characterised by both quantitative and 
qualitative attributes with various types of uncertainties. In many circumstances, the 
attributes, especially in qualitative forms, may only be properly assessed by human 
judgment, which is subjective in nature and is inevitably associated with uncertainties. It 
is mainly caused by two occurrences; first is a human’s inability to provide complete 
judgments, or the lack of information that is referred to as “ignorance” (incompleteness); 
second, the vagueness of meanings about attributes and their assessments that is referred 
to as “fuzziness” (vagueness) (Guo et al., 2009). 
For decades, many MADM methods have been developed due to the two aforementioned 
phenomena, AHP (Saaty, 1980) and MAUT (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993; Belton & Stewart, 
2002) and others mentioned in the previous sections as well as their extensions (Moore, 
1979) especially in the weight evaluation process (Arbel &Vargas, 1992; Islam et al., 
1997). In those methods, MADA problems are modelled using decision matrices, in 
which an alternative is assessed on each attribute by either a single real number or an 
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interval value. However, in many decision situations using a single number or interval to 
represent a judgment proves to be difficult and may be unacceptable. This is because the 
information may be lost or distorted in the process of pre-aggregating different types of 
information, such as a subjective judgment, a probability distribution, or an incomplete 
piece of information (Guo et al., 2009). 
Fuzziness or vagueness can be well treated using the fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1975; 
Carlsson & Fuller, 1996). Regarding the fuzziness of MADA problems, a large 
community of researchers have proposed fuzzy MADA methods in the literature, such as 
fuzzy hierarchical aggregation methods, conjunction implication methods (Laarhoven & 
Pedrycz, 1983; Bellman & Zadeh, 1970; Yager, 1981) weighted average aggregation 
methods (Baas & Kwakernaak, 1977; Tseng & Klein, 1992) and weighted average 
aggregation with criteria-assessment methods (Yager, 1988). Ultimately, these pure 
fuzzy MADA approaches are mostly based on traditional evaluation methods and are 
unable to handle probabilistic uncertainties such as ignorance (Guo et al., 2009). 
6.3.1. A Brief Review of Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
Conventional techniques such as FTA, ETA, Failure Mode, FMECA and Bow-Tie have 
been widely used in reliability analysis of critical systems and have vastly enrich the risk 
analysis literature. However, most of the aforementioned approaches have prescribed 
setbacks which affect their application for quantitative risk analysis and management due 
to their inability to account for uncertainties associated with the system operation. As a 
result, methods such as the fuzzy set theory, the AHP and other preliminary assessment 
methods are nowadays widely used in many industrial sectors to overcome the previously 
drawbacks mentioned (John et al., 2014).  
In addition, he AHP technique is suitable for dealing with complex systems that require 
making a choice from among several criteria, which provides a comparison of the 
considered options, first developed by Saaty (1980). The AHP is based on the subdivision 
of the problem in a hierarchical structure and helps to organise the rational analysis of the 
problem by dividing it into its smaller constituent parts. The analysis then supplies an aid 
to the decision makers, who call for simple pair-wise comparison judgements to develop 
priorities and who can appreciate the influence of the considered elements in the 
hierarchical structure (Saaty & Vargas, 2012). The AHP is a tool that can give a 
preference list of the considered alternative solutions and can be used for analysing 
 147 
 
different kinds of social, political, economic, and technological problems using both 
qualitative and quantitative variables (Chang & Chen, 2011). 
The fundamental principle of the analysis is the possibility of connecting information 
based on knowledge to make decisions or previsions. The different contexts in which the 
AHP can be applied include the creation of a list of priorities, the process of choosing the 
best policy, the optimal allocation of resources, the prevision of results and temporal 
dependencies, the assessment of risks, and planning (Nezarat et al., 2015). 
Fundamentally, the AHP works by developing priorities for alternatives and/or the criteria 
used to judge the alternatives. First, priorities are derived for the criteria in terms of their 
importance to achieve the goal, then priorities are derived for the performance of the 
alternatives on each criterion. These priorities are derived based on pair-wise assessments 
using judgments, or ratios of measurements from a scale if one exists. Finally, a weighting 
and adding process is used to obtain overall priorities for the alternatives as to how they 
contribute to the goal. Therefore, this chapter proposes the use of AHP for determining 
the weights of the main criteria. 
The AHP is used to obtain the various weights of the multi-criterion of the model. The 
AHP method is implemented, as it is a comprehensive framework to cope with intuitive, 
rational, and irrational data when dealing with multi-objective, multi-criterion and multi-
actor decisions with and without certainty for any number of criteria and/or alternatives. 
The FTOPSIS method is used to find the optimal alternative, which is the closest to the 
ideal solution and farthest away from the negative ideal solution with a description of 
accurate Euclidean distance. Therefore, the combination of the AHP and FTOPSIS 
methods provides more informative results in the reliability analysis and decision making 
to ensure the optimal OSP strategy. 
6.3.2. The Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution  
DMP is the process of finding the best option from all of the feasible alternatives. In day-
to-day life many decisions are being made based on various criteria by providing weight 
to each criterion and all the weights are obtained from human judgments. There are not 
only very complex issues involving multiple criteria, but there is also the need for all of 
the alternatives to have common criteria that clearly lead to more acquainted and better 
decisions, in order to get the optimal solution (Aruldoss et al., 2013). The problem 
becomes more complex when many criteria are involved for the alternatives. Therefore, 
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the MCDM approach pertains to structure and planning problems involving multiple 
criteria to solve real world decision problems. 
MCDM is a full-grown branch of operation research related to mathematical design and 
computational tools, which supports the subjective evaluation of decision alternatives 
under a number of performance criteria by a group or a single decision maker (Lootsma, 
1999). MCDM uses knowledge from many fields, including mathematics, behavioural 
decision theory, economics, computer technology, software engineering, and information 
systems. Since the 1960s, MCDM has been an active research area and has produced 
many theoretical and applied papers and books (Roy, 2005). MCDM methods have been 
designed to designate a preferred alternative, classify alternatives in a small number of 
categories, and/or rank alternatives in a subjective preference order. Among numerous 
MCDM methods developed to solve real-world complex issues involving multiple criteria 
decision problems, TOPSIS continues to work satisfactorily in diverse application areas 
(Behzadian et al., 2012).  It was originally proposed by Hwang and Yoon (1981) to help 
select the best alternative with a finite number of criteria as a simple ranking method in 
conception and application. As a remarkable classical MCDM method, the review of 
literature revealed that TOPSIS has received a strong interest from researchers and 
practitioners and the global interest in the TOPSIS application has grown exponentially 
(Shiha et al., 2007; Boran et al., 2009; Behzadian et al., 2012; Aruldoss et al., 2013). 
TOPSIS makes full use of attribute information, provides a cardinal ranking of 
alternatives, and does not require attribute preferences to be independent (Chen & Hwang, 
1992; Yoon & Hwang, 1995). The standard TOPSIS method attempts to choose 
alternatives that simultaneously have the shortest distance from the positive ideal solution 
and the farthest distance from the negative ideal solution. While the positive ideal solution 
maximises the benefit criteria and minimises the cost criteria, the negative ideal solution 
maximises the cost criteria and minimises the benefit criteria. 
A survey on MCDM methods and its applications conducted by Aruldoss et al., (2013) 
indicated that the TOPSIS technique is applied mostly in many applications among other 
MCDM methods, such as Elimination EtChoix Traduisant la REalite (ELECTRE), AHP, 
Grey Theory and VIKOR. In addition, a literature survey on TOPSIS applications and 
methodologies is published by Behzadian et al., (2012) and includes 266 papers published 
in 103 scholarly journals since 2000, and discloses that the TOPSIS methodology has 
been successfully applied to a wide range of application areas and industrial sectors with 
 149 
 
varying terms and subjects, and intensively applied in the following fields: Supply Chain 
Management and Logistics; Design, Engineering and Manufacturing Systems; Business 
and Marketing Management; Health, Safety and Environment Management; Human 
Resources Management; Energy Management; Chemical Engineering; Water Resources 
Management; Medicine; Agriculture; Education; Design; Government; and Sports. The 
top two categories are Supply Chain Management and Logistics, and Design, Engineering 
and Manufacturing Systems, containing with over 50% of the total published applications, 
while few applications have been devoted to Chemical Engineering or Water Resources 
Management. However, MCDM requires a broader emphasis on interdisciplinary and 
social decision problems.  
6.3.3. A brief review of extended TOPSIS using fuzzy logic 
The conventional TOPSIS method applies the criteria weights and the alternatives ratings 
as crisp values. However, in practical situations it is often difficult and very challenging 
for decision makers to evaluate the precise weights of criteria and the ratings of 
alternatives under investigation. Therefore, an extended FTOPSIS approach was 
developed, which incorporated FL that uses linguistic variables represented by fuzzy 
numbers to address the imprecision that is inherent with the evaluation problems of 
complex and interdependent systems (Kuo et al., 2006; Yang & Hung, 2007; Chen & 
Tsao, 2008; Ashtiani et al., 2009; Ebrahimnejad et al., 2009; Roghanian et al., 2010; 
Aydogan, 2011; Jolai et al., 2011; Awasthi et al., 2011; and Yang et al., 2011). 
Mentes and Helvacioglu (2012) proposed a fuzzy multiple-attribute decision support 
model for the selection of the most appropriate spread mooring system.  The model was 
developed using fuzzy AHP and FTOPSIS methods for selecting the spread mooring 
system of gas companies situated near Yarimca on the Eastern Marmara Sea Region of 
Turkey. Lavasani et al., (2012) developed a fuzzy multi-attribute decision making 
(FMADM) method for ranking offshore well barriers’ systems. The research uses fuzzy 
AHP and FTOPSIS for treating the well barriers as group decision-making problems in a 
fuzzy environment. 
Singh and Benyoucef (2011) proposed a FTOPSIS technique with a mechanism for 
determination of fuzzy linguistic value attributes using an entropy method to enumerate 
the weights of various attributes without involvement of decision makers, while Liao and 
Kao (2011) proposed an integrated FTOPSIS and Multi-Choice Goal Programming 
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(MCGP) approach to solve the supplier selection problem. Torlak et al., (2011) used a 
FTOPSIS multi-methodological approach in the Turkish domestic airline industry to 
facilitate the selection/evaluation problem. 
Many researchers with numerous studies attempting to handle this impression and 
subjectivity have been carried out by means of FTOPSIS (Chen, 2000; Jahanshahloo, 
Lotfi, & Izadikhah, 2006; Wang & Lee, 2007; Yang et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2011). This 
is mainly because fuzzy logic provides the flexibility needed to represent the ambiguous 
information resulting from the lack of data or knowledge, whereas TOPSIS can 
reasonably deal with the multiplicity of criteria. Chen (2000) used extreme fuzzy numbers 
(1, 1, 1) and (0, 0, 0) as basic elements of defining the Fuzzy Positive Ideal Solutions 
(FPIS) and Fuzzy Negative Ideal Solutions (FNIS) in FTOPSIS. The advantages of 
Chen’s (2000) approach can be listed as follows: 
i. The logic is rational and understandable.  
ii. The computation processes are straightforward. 
iii. The synthesis of multiple expert assessments is taken into account. 
iv. The concept of newly defined positive and negative ideal solutions based on (1, 
1, 1) and (0, 0, 0) permits the pursuit of the best alternatives for each criterion 
depicted in a simple mathematical form.  
v. The importance weights of criteria are incorporated into the decision procedures.  
However, the method has potential problems, including the following (Deng et al., 
2000; Kuo et al., 2006; Lin & Chang, 2008; Wang & Lee, 2007; Yang et al., 2011):  
i. Fuzzy ratings of cost criteria must not include zero values. 
ii. Single linguistic variable assessment constrains the flexibility of using expert 
knowledge. 
iii. Both quantitative and qualitative data requires to be expressed using the pre-de-
fined fuzzy ratings and consequently, information may be lost in the transfor-
mation process. 
iv. Evaluation results may be affected by the inter-dependency of criteria and incon-
sistency of subjective weights. 
v. Multiplication between fuzzy ratings and weights will produce approximate (in-
stead of precise) triangular fuzzy numbers. 
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vi. A crisp relative closeness for each alternative provides only one possible solu-
tion to a fuzzy MCDM problem, but cannot reflect the whole picture and all of 
its possible solutions. 
A wide range of studies managing incomplete information and linguistic modelling have 
been proposed in the literature to deal with the above drawbacks, such as Alonso et al., 
(2009), Cabrerizo et al., (2010), and Xu (2007). Although showing much attractiveness 
by providing better solutions to dealing with imprecise and incomplete information for 
MCDM, the previous research involved complex algorithms that might mathematically 
burden the users in real-world applications. 
Yang et al., (2011) proposed an approximate FTOPSIS to facilitate the development of a 
reliable vessel selection model under a fuzzy environment. The research uses the concept 
of belief degrees to increase the flexibility and confidence of experts in evaluating the 
performance of each alternative to model the system and overcome some of the 
aforementioned drawbacks when using classical FTOPSIS methods. Furthermore, 
objective quantitative data is directly used as input via a linear normalisation programme 
to avoid information loss in the inference process and different positive and negative ideal 
solutions for benefit and cost criteria will also be defined to eliminate the influence of 
zero values associated with cost criteria and to avoid the necessity of normalising the 
decision matrix. 
6.4. Development for Modelling OSP in Container Terminals  
Integrating safety performance into the design and operation of container terminals 
systems can be potentially costly (Mansouri et al., 2009). However, experience has shown 
that severe disruptions driven by HEs occurrence could lead to a long term consequence 
and subsequently losing the entire service delivery. Therefore, decision makers encounter 
a high level of strategic decisions that involve uncertainty and major resource 
implications regarding investment in appropriate OSP strategies that aim at bolstering the 
effectiveness of their operations. 
The evaluation of cost-effectiveness in this respect requires systematic and efficient cost-
benefit analysis based on the utilisation of a risk management algorithm which takes into 
account the complex and operational uncertainty of the system (Wang & Trbojevic, 2007). 
More importantly, the decision processes are challenging due to the fact that numerous 
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events need to be considered and a major source of decision complexity is the inter-
relationship among choices. 
Strategic decisions’ selection involves different levels of granularity and conditions for 
achieving an optimum level of strategic decisions on capital systems, such as container 
terminals, through an understanding of the system and the attributes influencing their 
performance (Mostashari et al., 2011).  
Consequently, exploring different decision-making processes for structuring a robust and 
flexible decision making approach based on a wide range of elements related to 
infrastructural design, planning, and management helps to optimise the operational 
efficiency of the systems (Omer et al., 2012; Rao & Davin, 2008). 
Since the main objective of any collaborative decision-making process is to obtain the 
optimum combination of criteria for rational decision making, effort needs to be tailored 
towards identifying, developing, and structuring those criteria that influence alternatives 
selection in an effective manner. The selection of the best alternatives enhances the 
container port OSP under high uncertainty.  
6.4.1. Data collection methods 
This research aims to obtain the optimal container port safety performance plan selection 
through developing a number of integrated models under high uncertainty. It classifies 
the goals and scope of the problem, and obtains relevant information through a robust 
literature review and brainstorming session with the various experts involved in container 
terminals operation. Different data are needed for identifying, analysing and developing 
such models, so as to integrate them into one strategic safety performance approach. The 
selection of Risk Reduction (RR) criterion that was obtained by incorporating BER 
approach results from chapter 3 and 4 is one of the benefits criteria. 
The data collection method in this study, adopting both qualitative and quantitative data 
sets, namely experts' judgements, in which different survey questionnaires (in the form 
of a comparison matrix) were given to experts to ascertain their expert judgments. These 
questionnaires use qualitative linguistics variables to help experts to express their 
judgements easily under uncertain environments. Then, the obtained linguistics variables 
were transformed into quantitative data in the form of triangular fuzzy numbers to be used 
in the implementation procedures. Some other criteria use quantitative data sets that were 
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obtained by examining the investigated container terminal records, such as cost and RR 
that are normalised and assigned directly to the model. 
With respect to cost, the investigated terminal offered their financial records related to 
some alternatives that had already been implemented, which were used to rate the 
alternatives with respect to the quantitative cost criteria in this study. The needed data for 
other alternatives that was introduced by this research, namely the automation solutions, 
are collected by a careful literature review carried out and presented in a brainstorming 
session with a group of domain experts and by survey questionnaires.  
6.4.2. Experts selection  
The preliminary study of determining the criteria and alternatives took place in July 2015 
in the United Kingdom, with seven safety/security officers, port managers and scholars. 
Moreover, in September 2015, another meeting took place in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia with four safety/security officers and port managers to further study the 
investigated data set. The experts selected, based on their experience which is shown in 
Section 3.3.2, Table 3.3. 
6.5. Methodology for Modelling OSP Strategies in Container Terminals 
The main procedure for the AHP-FTOPSIS method can be described in a stepwise manner 
as follows. 
1) Estimate RR criterion using the BER approach. 
2) Identify the alternatives and other criteria. 
3) Evaluate the ratings of alternatives with respect to each criterion. 
4) Normalise the ratings of alternatives with respect to the quantitative criteria. 
5) Calculate the weights of all criteria using an AHP approach. 
6) Define FPIS and FNIS with respect to benefit and cost criteria.  
7) Calculate the distance Closeness Coefficients (CCs) of all alternatives.   
8) Determine the weighted distance CCs of all alternatives.   
9) Calculate the CCs of all alternatives.   
10) Model validation. 
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6.5.1. Estimate the RR criterion using BER approach 
Port operational risk analysis models incorporating BER produced for collaborative 
modelling in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis can be used as a transitional object or 
complement object (i.e., criteria used to provide cognitive decision support such as risk 
reduction and overall system risk assessment) for this analysis. This allows decision 
makers to integrate their previous risk assessment of the system elements and share their 
strategic concerns, increase their understanding of the system, and appreciate the potential 
impact of different alternatives before subsequently arriving at a decision for OSP 
improvement and management of the system. 
The identification of the DMP is based on the 24 HEs investigated in chapter 3 of this 
research, in which the significant HEs were identified through a careful literature review, 
and human knowledge base and expertise with reference to Section 3.3.2. All 24 HEs 
were evaluated on two stages; in the first stage, the specific risk estimations for each HE 
were evaluated locally by using the FRBN method introduced in chapter 3 (Alyami et al., 
2014), while in the second stage, by assigning the results obtained from BN, they were 
evaluated globally by calculate their risk influence to a port’s safety system using FRBER 
introduced in chapter 4 (Alyami et al., 2016). The risk evaluation for HEs using BER 
provided a panoramic view of container operation risk management by assessing the HEs 
risk and ranking them accordingly, and estimating the RR that allows decision makers to 
enhance their OSP by implementing the best RCOs for each DMP. 
6.5.2. Identify the alternatives and criteria 
The first step is setting up a decision-making matrix format by assigning the relevant 
alternatives and criteria associated with a decision scenario that are appropriately 
identified and expressed. The alternatives are a set of actions that are required in order to 
achieve the decision objective. The set of criteria are used as functions that distinguish 
the alternatives. The decision-making target is to prioritise all alternatives by assessing 
them using input data with respect to each criterion.  
The decision processes often require both qualitative (i.e., vague information based on 
subjective judgments) and quantitative (i.e., databases or objective calculations) data and, 
in order to avoid the loss of information in the transformation between data with different 
natures, it is beneficial to develop a framework that is capable of accommodating both 
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data sets. Therefore, the established decision-making matrix format D can be expressed 
as follows: 
                                                            ଵܺ 			⋯					 ௝ܺ 				⋯			ܺ௡	 
D= 	
	ܣଵ	⋮
	ܣ௜⋮
	ܣ௠	
	
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ	 ଵܺଵ 				⋯				 ଵܺ௝ 			⋯				 ଵܺ௡	⋮								⋮							⋮								⋮									⋮
	 ௜ܺଵ 				⋯				 ௜ܺ௝ 				⋯				 ௜ܺ௡	
⋮									⋮							⋮							⋮									⋮	
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ې
          (6.1) 
where ܣ௜, i = 1, 2, . . ., m represents the alternatives considered; ௝ܺ, ݆= 1, 2, . . ., ݊ 
means the qualitative or quantitative criteria used to determine the performance of 
alternatives; ௜ܺ௝	 indicates alternative ratings, which can be described by either a 
triangular fuzzy number 	 పܺఫ෪= 	൫ܽ௜௝, ܾ௜௝, ܿ௜௝൯ or a real number పܺఫ෪ . 
6.5.3. Evaluate the ratings of alternatives with respect to each criterion 
It is beneficial to collect raw data as precisely as possible, therefore, the ratings of 
alternatives can be evaluated by different sets of linguistic variables used to describe the 
individual criteria, when the relevant objective data is unavailable. Fuzzy set theory is 
well-suited to model such subjective linguistic variables and deal with the discrete 
problem. Decision makers use the predefined linguistic rating variables in Table 6.2 to 
evaluate the alternatives with respect to each criterion (Chen, 2000; Chang et al., 2012). 
The sets of questionnaires presented in Appendix II-2 were prepared and implemented.  
Table 6.1: FTOPSIS Linguistic variables and their TFN Values 
 Linguistic Terms TFN 
Very High (VH) (0.75, 1.0, 1.0) 
HIGH (H) (0.5, 0.75, 1.0) 
MEDIUM (M) (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) 
LOW (L) (0.0, 0.25, 0.5) 
Very LOW (VL) (0.0, 0.0, 0.25) 
Once fuzzy alternative ratings are obtained, they require to be transformed into the form 
of Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFN) for further analysis in the FTOPSIS framework. 
Both the performance score ሺݔሻ and the membership degree ሺߤ௫ሻ are in the range of 0 
and 1 as presented in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Membership degree for Linguistic Rating 
 
Triangular fuzzy numbers are usually used to describe the linguistic variables based on a 
common interval [0, 1] due to their easiness (Yang et al., 2011). Various evaluations 
based on triangular fuzzy numbers can be appropriately modelled, transformed and 
expressed by the predefined linguistic variables using a Max–Min fuzzy similarity 
function (Liu et al., 2005). In this process, a linear utility function (Yang et al., 2009) is 
often used to transform the fuzzy number definitions of different sets of linguistic 
variables based on various universes onto the common space [0, 1] to convert linguistic 
evaluations into TFN and aggregate the fuzzy ratings and weights from multiple decision 
makers. Assume that K experts are involved into the MCDM analysis. Then the 
importance of the criteria and the rating of the alternatives with respect to each criterion 
can be calculated as follows. 
෨ܺ௜௝ ൌ ଵ௄ ൣ ෨ܺ௜௝ଵ ሺ൅ሻ… ሺ൅ሻ ෨ܺ௜௝ଵ ሺ൅ሻ… ሺ൅ሻ ෨ܺ௜௝௄൧      (6.2) 
where ෨ܺூ௃ଵ  is the ith alternative rating with respect to the jth criterion and the importance 
weight of the jth criterion is estimated by the lth	ሺ1 ∈ ܭሻ	from Equation 6.1. 
6.5.4. Normalise the ratings of alternatives with respect to the quantitative 
criteria 
The linear scale function is used to transform the quantitative criteria scales into a 
comparable scale to avoid the complicated normalisation formula used in classical 
TOPSIS. The feasibility of the linear function is evidenced and supported by the fact that 
all the criteria in TOPSIS are categorised into either the benefit or cost group having a 
single direction distribution feature (Yang et al., 2011). Therefore, the normalised 
decision matrix denoted by R can be obtained as follows: 
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ܴ ൌ ൣݎ௜௝൧௠ൈ௡         (6.3) 
where ݎ௜௝ can be any of ݎపఫഥ , representing the normalised ratings of the alternatives with 
respect to quantitative criteria. The quantitative ratings can be computed as 
̅ݎ௜௝೎೚ೞ೟ ൌ
௏ഥ಻ష
௑෨೔ೕ           (6.4) 
̅ݎ௜௝ా౛౤౛౜౟౪ ൌ
௏ഥ಻∗
௑෨೔ೕ          (6.5) 
where തܸ௃∗ and തܸ௃ି  are the highest and lowest values obtained of the jth quantitative 
criterion.  
It is noteworthy that fuzzy alternative ratings do not require further normalisation given 
that they have been defined on a common interval [0, 1] by normalising their original 
universes and the averaged ratings matrixes of alternatives with respect to the criteria that 
can be obtained. That is, ̃ݎ௜௝ ൌ ෨ܺ௜௝, where ̃ݎ௜௝ means the normalised fuzzy rating of the ith 
alternative evaluation with respect to the jth criterion (Yang et al., 2011). 
6.5.5. Calculate the weights of all criteria using an AHP approach 
The classical FTOPSIS technique takes into account the importance weights of criteria, 
however, it does not provide the assurance of the assessment consistency between 
decision criteria (Nezarat et al., 2015). An AHP approach (Saaty, 1980) is well suited to 
measuring the relative weights between the criteria and increasing the reliability of 
expert’s assessment through the investigation of the consistency ratio of all pair-wise 
weight comparisons. 
The AHP procedure to calculate the relative weights of criteria can be described in a series 
of steps as follows (Lee et al., 2008):  
I. Pair-wise comparison.  
II. Estimate the relative weights.  
III. Check the consistency.  
IV. Obtain the overall rating. 
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I. Pair-wise comparison  
It first requires the pair-wise weight assessments matrices between the criteria at the same 
level of a decision hierarchy as follows: 
A= 
ۏێ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ	1							
௪భ
௪మ 					⋯				
௪భ
௪೙
	௪మ௪భ 							1					 ⋯				
௪మ
௪೙⋮											⋮										⋮								⋮௪೙
௪భ 	
௪೙
௪మ 					⋯ 				1 ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ې
                                    (6.6) 
where A = comparison pair-wise matrix,  
w1 = weight of element 1,  
w2 = weight of element 2, and  
wn = weight of element n.  
In order to determine the relative preferences for two elements of the hierarchy in matrix 
A, an underlying semantical scale is employed with values from 1 to 9, as shown in Table 
6.3. 
Table 6.2: The Relational Scale for Pair-wise Comparisons 
Scale of importance Preferences expressed in linguistic variables 
1 Equally important 
3 A little important 
5 Important 
7 Very important 
9 Extremely important 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values of important 
 
II. Estimate the relative weights  
Let ܫ௝௞,ூ be the relative importance judgement on the pair of the same level criteria ܥ௝  and 
ܥ௞ by the Ith expert. Then the synthesised pair-wise weight comparison between ܥ௝and 
ܥ௞from k experts can be calculated as: 
ܫ௝௞ ൌ ଵ௞ ൣܫ௝௞,ଵሺ൅ሻ… ሺ൅ሻܫ௝௞,ூሺ൅ሻ… ሺ൅ሻܫ௝௞,௞൧      (6.7) 
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Next, an approximation of the jth criterion weight can be computed as follows (Pillay & 
Wang, 2003): 
ݓ௝ ൌ ଵ௡∑
ூೕೖ
∑ ூೕೖ೙ೕసభ
௡௞ୀଵ                       (6.8) 
III. Check the consistency  
The AHP method provides a measure of the consistency for pair-wise comparisons by 
introducing a Consistency Ratio (CR) (Nobre et al., 1999). In this step, the consistency 
of matrices is checked to ensure that the judgments of decision makers are consistent and 
some pre-parameter is needed. First, the Consistency Index (ܥܫ) is calculated as: 
ܥܫ ൌ
∑
∑ ೢೕ಺ೖೕ೙ೕసభ
ೢೖ
೙ೕసభ
೙ 		ି	௡
୬ିଵ                      (6.9) 
The ܥܫ of a randomly generated reciprocal matrix shall be called to the Random Index 
(RIx) provided by Saaty (1980) shown in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.3: Random inconsistency indices (Saaty, 1980) 
 
 
 
 
The last ratio that has to be calculated is the CR. Generally, if the CR is less than 0.1, the 
judgments are consistent, so the derived weights can be used (Yang et al., 2011). The 
formulation of CR is as follows: 
ܥܴ ൌ ஼ூோூ௫                          (6.10) 
IV. Obtain the overall rating  
In the last step, the relative weights of decision elements are aggregated to obtain an 
overall rating for the alternatives as follows (Vahidnia et al., 2008): 
௜ܹ௦ ൌ ∑ ݓ௜௝௦ 	ݓ௝௔											݅ ൌ 1,… , ݊௝ୀ௠௝ୀଵ                      (6.11) 
where ௜ܹ௦= total weight of site i, 
 ݓ௜௝௦ = weight of alternative (site) i associated to attribute (map layer) j,  
Matrix Size (n) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RIx 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 
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ݓ௝௔= weight of attribute j, 
m = number of attribute, and 
n= number of site. 
6.5.6. Define FPIS and FNIS with respect to benefit and cost criteria  
FPIS is defined as the vector involving the best normalised scores for each criterion and 
FNIS is defined as the vector involving the worst normalised scores for each criterion. In 
this study, FPIS and FNIS are defined as follows: 
A* = ݎଵ∗, ݎ௝∗, … , ݎ௡∗ 
ܣି= ݎଵି , ݎ௝ି , … , ݎ௡ି  
where if B and C indicate the sets of Benefit and Cost criteria respectively, then 
ݎ௝∗= (1,1,1) , ݎ௝∗= (0,0,0)   ( ݆ ∈ ܤ)  and 
ݎ௝∗= 0,0,0) ,ݎ௝∗= (1,1,1)       (݆ ∈ ܥ)             (6.12) 
6.5.7. Calculate the distance CCs of all alternatives 
Since the FPIS is (1,1,1) and FNIS is (0,0,0) the calculation of the distance CCs of all 
alternatives can be calculated by deducting the FPIS from averaged ratings matrixes of 
alternatives with respect to the criteria for B category criteria and deducting the averaged 
ratings matrixes of alternatives with respect to the criteria from FNIS. 
6.5.8. Obtain the weighted distance CCs of all alternatives   
This is achieved by multiplying the distance CCs of all alternatives by the weights of the 
criteria obtained in step IV.  
6.5.9. Calculating the CCs of all alternatives   
In order to rank all the alternatives, the alternative with the highest CCi is the best 
alternative (shortest distance to the best condition and longest distance to the worst 
condition): 
CCi = ௗ೔షௗ೔∗ାௗ೔ష                i= 1,2,…,m       (6.13) 
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6.5.10. Model validation  
The soundness of the model is validated through a sensitivity analysis test to ensure its 
applicability and reliability for OSP in container terminal applications. Sensitivity 
analysis refers to analysing how sensitive the result would be (i.e., outputs) to minor 
change in inputs. Sensitivity analysis is conducted by increasing the weight of each 
criterion individually according to the results obtained from AHP implementation, then 
FTOPSIS steps are performed and the new results are observed for decision-making 
processes (Chang et al., 2007; Buyukozkan & Cifci, 2012). 
The final output results are dependent on the subjective judgements of the decision 
makers, and sensitivity analysis is an essential aspect that would reflect different views 
on the relative importance of the best solution for specific HE that provide managerial 
focus during container operation on safety and system performance. A slight 
increment/decrement in the weight associated with criterion will certainly result in the 
effect of a relative increment/ decrement in the CCs of the criterion variable and the 
alternatives ranking output accordingly, therefore, a careful review of the weights is 
recommended, if the ranking order is highly sensitive to small changes in the criteria 
weights. 
In order to determine the sensitivity, the weight associated with one criterion is increased 
separately by 10%, 20% and 30%, respectively. It is noteworthy to mention that for 
increasing the criterion weight by “m”, simultaneously the weights associated with other 
criteria are decreased by “m” to compensate the increment percentage on the increased 
criterion. However, if the weight is becoming less than “m”, then the remaining weight 
can be divided on the remaining criteria and this process continues until "m" is consumed.  
6.6. A real case study on container port operational safety performance (OSP) 
The procedure shown in Section 6.5 was applied on an anonymous container terminal in 
the real world that was selected to conduct a case study to demonstrate the feasibility of 
the proposed AHP-FTOPSIS method.  
6.6.1. Estimate RR criterion using BER approach 
The HEs associated with container terminal operations may vary, depending on the 
unique safety characteristics of an individual container terminal. For the investigated 
container terminal, the specific RE for each HE was evaluated locally by applying the 
162 
 
FRBN method introduced in chapter 3 (Alyami et al., 2014) and the results are shown in 
Table 6.5 indicating that HE.4 is the most significant event followed by HE.5, HE.6, 
HE.15, and HE.1 respectively. 
Table 6.4: Risk ranking index values of hazardous events (HEs) 
(Alyami et al., 2014) 
HE# HEs 
Risk Estimation  
Low Medium High 
Ranking
Index 
1.  Collision between Terminal Tractor 
(TT) and trailer 
8.5 25 66.5 69.1 
2.  Collision between Rubber-Tired 
Gantry (RTG) crane and trailer. 
17.75 25.25 57 59.7 
3.  Collision between TT and RTG. 19.56 18.12 62.32 64.3 
4.  Collision between quay crane and 
ship. 
13.25 13.25 73.5 75 
5.  Collision between two quay cranes. 18.75 8.5 72.75 73.8 
6.  Crane breakdown due to human 
error. 
23.5 5.5 71 71.8 
7.  Moving the crane without raising the 
boom of the gantry crane. 
24.75 9.75 65.5 66.7 
8.  Leakage/ emission of dangerous 
goods from a container. 
41 11.25 47.75 49.3 
9.  Ignition sources from equipment 
near dangerous goods premises. 
35 27.5 37.5 40.6 
10.  Person falls from height due to being 
too near to unprotected edges. 
25.5 22.75 51.75 54.3 
11.  
Person falls from height due to non-
provision / maintenance of safe 
access between adjacent cargo bays. 
19 21 60 62.3 
12.  Working on surfaces that are not 
even. 
23 18.5 58.5 60.6 
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Next, assign the RE results of each HE obtained from the FRBN method into the 
hierarchical structure depicted in Figure 4.2 to evaluate their RI to a port’s safety system 
globally. As a result, by applying FRBER in chapter 4, the RI can be described in a form 
of linguistic grades with DoB values of 60.37 High, 10.56 Medium, and 28.89 Low, and 
can be transformed to a utility value as 0.6172, which indicates that the RI for the 
investigated container terminal is consider to be high and would jeopardise the terminal 
operations. A series of unique sensitivity analysis tests in chapter 4 (Alyami et al., 2016) 
reveals the HEs that have greater risk influence than others do, and that HE.9 is the most 
significant event followed by HE8, HE6, HE7, HE16 and HE17. 
13.  
Person slips, trips, and falls whilst 
working on surfaces with presence of 
leaking cargo. 
22 11.25 66.75 68.1 
14.  
Person slips, trips, and falls whilst 
working on surfaces with presence of 
water/ ice. 
25 15.25 59.75 61.5 
15.  Person slips and falls whilst working 
on surfaces with presence of oils. 
23.25 8.5 68.25 69.3 
16.  Person struck by falling object/s. 28.5 22.5 49 51.5 
17.  Person handling dangerous goods in 
container that has not been declared. 
43.5 12.5 44 45.7 
18.  Person struck by quay crane. 44.5 7.75 47.75 49 
19.  Person struck by TT. 45.24 16 38.75 40.8 
20.  Person struck by RTG. 43.5 15.75 40.75 49 
21.  Person struck by trucks. 38.5 22 39.5 42 
22.  Person crushed against a fixed object 
and ship / terminal structure. 
41 16.25 42.75 44.8 
23.  Person crushed against a fixed object 
and stacked containers. 
37.75 23.25 39 41.7 
24.  Person crushed by closing the twin 
lift container spreaders. 
53 16.25 30.75 32.9 
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Based on the results obtained from applying the BER method in Alyami et al., (2014; 
2016) it is obvious that HE.6 has a great risk influence on the port OSP in both locally 
and globally risk management perspective (i.e. it is ranked as the second most significant 
HE in FRBN and as third most significant HE in FRBER. Therefore, HE.6 was assigned 
as the DMP in this study that needs to be addressed. 
The RR criterion needs to be estimated using the BER approach before the AHP-
FTOPSIS process. Therefore, the DMP (i.e., “HE6 Crane break down due to human error”) 
is re-evaluated after implementing the alternatives by using the BN approach in order to 
obtain the updated RE. Next, the RR can be calculated by subtracting the updated RE 
from the original RE obtained in chapter 3. The second stage commences by assigning 
the new RE for DMP in a form of linguistic grades with DoB to re-estimate the RI globally 
by using the FRBER approach in chapter 4 (Alyami et al., 2016). Consequently, the RI 
values for DMP after implementing the alternatives are obtained and RR is calculated.  
Taking the RR for A1 as an example, First, with reference to FRBN in chapter 3, Section 
3.4.3.1, Section 3.4.3.2 and Section 3.4.3.3, the experts are asked to express their 
judgment and reassess DMP (i.e.HE6) after implementing A1, the feedback received from 
the experts is first combined (by conducting an average calculation) to produce DMP 
input values in terms of the four risk parameters. Next, Given the Equation 3.4, the prior 
probabilities of the four nodes can be obtained and converted to obtain p (Rh|Li, Cj, Pk, 
Il) then the RE (i.e. Risk Evaluation) of DMP can be calculated using Equation 3.5 as p 
(Rh) = {(93.89% Low, 0.94% Medium, 5.17% High)}. Equation 3.6 is used to calculate 
the risk ranking index value of DMP as 6.2 (= 93.89% × 1 + 0.94% × 10 + 5.17% × 100). 
The calculation can be computerised using the Hugin software. It can be noticed that the 
local risk of HE6 as is reduced from 71.8 to 6.2 after applying A1 as shown in Table 6.6.  
Table 6.5: RR on DMP by implementing A1 
ALTERNATIVE Experts 
Probability 
of failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected  
Consequences
/severity 
Impact of 
the HE on 
the 
resilience 
of port 
operational 
systems 
New 
RE 
Original 
risk from 
BN 
71.8 
 
Risk 
Reduction H M L H M L H M L H M L 
 
6.2 
Hiring highly 
qualified crane 
driver 
A 20 25 55 10 25 65 35 0 65 15 25 60 
B 20 25 55 15 25 60 20 20 60 20 20 60 
 C 25 15 60 25 25 50 30 5 65 25 25 50 
D 30 15 55 20 15 65 20 10 70 30 0 70 
Prior 
Probability 20 25 55 10 25 65 35 0 65 15 25 60 65.6 
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It is clearly observed that the risk inference decreased dramatically after implementing 
A1, from 71.8 to 6.20, and the RR can be calculated as 65.6. Similarly, the new RE and 
RR for DMP after implementing the other alternatives are presented in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.6: RR on DMP by implementing the alternatives 
A# Alternatives Implemented New Risk Evaluation 
Risk 
Reduction 
A1  Hiring highly qualified crane driver 6.20 65.6 
A2  Hiring qualified crane driver 23.47 48.33 
A3  Requiring situation awareness training 
programme for quay crane drivers 24.82 46.98 
A4  Requiring situation awareness training 
programme for yard crane drivers 28.7 43.1 
A5  Requiring situation awareness training 
programme for transportation drivers 19.59 52.21 
A6  Requiring intensive safety and security checks 22.09 49.71 
A7  Requiring intensive crane maintenance 
programme 15.23  56.57 
A8  Appling automated crane operations on quay area 9.18 62.62 
A9  Appling automated crane operations on yard area 7.19 64.61 
A10 Appling automated crane operations on 
transportation area 9.04 62.76 
A11 Appling fully automated crane operations 3.81 67.99 
Second, with reference to CTOS model using ER in chapter 4, Section 4.4, the new RE 
for HE6 is updated in Table 4.1. Next, assigning the RE of all other HEs in the hierarchical 
structure to be synthesised and aggregated collectively by using the ER algorithm. The 
IDS is a general-purpose multi-criteria decision analysis tool implementing the ER 
approach. As a result, the RI (i.e. Risk Index) for CTOS can be described in a form of 
linguistic grades with DoB values of 51.49 High, 10.66 Medium, and 37.85 Low and the 
utility value is calculated using Equation 4.22 as 0.5682. it can be noticed that the global 
risk inference of HE6 among other HEs is reduced from 0.6172 to 0.5682 after applying 
A1 as a risk control option. Finally, the RR can be calculated as 0.049 (= 0.6172 – 0.5682). 
Having obtained the RR for HE6 after applying the alternatives, it is normalised using 
Equation 6.5 as shown in Table 6.8.  
Table 6.7: RR on DMP by implementing A1 
A# DMP RI RR Normalised RR 
A1  0.5777 0.0490 0.9533 
A2  0.6 0.0172 0.3346 
A3  0.6378 0.0195 0.2860 
A4  0.6369 0.0069 0.1342 
A5  0.5905 0.0267 0.5195 
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A6  0.5989 0.0183 0.3560 
A7  0.6204 0.0220 0.6128 
A8  0.576 0.0412 0.8016 
A9  0.5771 0.0401 0.8132 
A10  0.5751 0.0421 0.8191 
A11  0.5658 0.0514 1 
6.6.2. Identify the alternatives and other criteria  
In order to derive the other criteria and their assessment grades, this step of the analysis 
involves a structured interview that has been conducted and presented to the 
safety/security officers and port managers, previously introduced in Section 6.5.2. A 
careful literature review is carried out and presented in a brainstorming session with the 
same group of experts to identify the most suitable criteria and the most preferred safety 
control measures capable of addressing both operational efficiency and risk reduction in 
container terminals such as automation solutions alternatives. 
As a result, the hierarchy is constructed in Figure 6.3 with four levels of criteria and 
eleven alternatives. The RR criterion estimated in the previous step from incorporating 
results obtained with BER approach, is included as one of the benefits criteria.  
The eleven alternatives can be listed as follow:  
A1 Hiring highly qualified crane driver 
A2 Hiring qualified crane driver 
A3 Requiring situation awareness training programme for quay crane drivers 
A4 Requiring situation awareness training programme for yard crane drivers 
A5 Requiring situation awareness training programme for transportation drivers 
A6 Requiring intensive safety and security checks 
A7 Requiring intensive crane maintenance programme 
A8 Appling automated crane operations on quay area 
A9 Appling automated crane operations on yard area 
A10 Appling automated crane operations on transportation area 
A11 Appling fully automated crane operations 
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Figure 6.3: Hierarchical structure of container port operational safety performance 
The criteria and alternatives that are critical to enhancing the container port OSP are 
assigned based on expert opinions and/or through a careful literature review as described 
in Table 6.9. 
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Table 6.8: Referencing alternatives and criteria 
The criteria used for the selection procedure are divided into two main categories: cost 
(C) (the lower the value, the more effective the alternative) and benefit (B) (the higher 
the value, the more resilient or effective the alternative) as described in Table 6.10. 
 
  Type of Reference Reference 
Criteria 
Risk Reduction Experts  Actual Benefits in term of 
Operational efficiency Experts 
Cost (£) Literature and Experts 
Mansouri et al., 2010; 
Vugrin et al., 2011 
Technical Implementation 
Difficulties Experts  
Alternatives 
Hiring Highly Qualified 
Crane Driver 
Literature and 
Experts ILO, 1977; HSE, 2014 
Hiring Qualified Crane 
Driver 
Literature and 
Experts ILO, 1977; HSE, 2014 
Regulating Situation 
Awareness Training 
program for Quay crane 
drivers 
Literature and 
Experts 
Hetherington et al., 
2006 
Regulating Situation 
Awareness Training 
program for yard crane 
drivers 
Literature and 
Experts 
Regulating Situation 
Awareness Training 
program for transportation 
drivers 
Literature and 
Experts 
Regulating Intensive Safety 
and Security Checks Experts  Regulating Intensive Crane 
Maintenance program Experts 
Applying Automated Crane 
operations on quay area Literature 
Hoshino and Ota, 
2007 
Applying Automated Crane 
operations on yard area Literature 
Applying Automated Crane 
operations on transportation 
area 
Literature 
Applying fully Automated 
Crane operations  Literature 
 169 
 
Table 6.9: The Criteria for container port operational safety performance 
Criteria Description of criteria Type of 
Assessment
Definition Category
C1 Risk Reduction Real Data 
Enhance the safety by 
evaluating HEs and estimate 
the risk inference. 
B 
C2 Actual Benefits in term of Operational efficiency 
Linguistic 
Assessment 
Improvement on operational 
efficiency (i.e., TEU 
movements, crane turning 
journey, etc.) 
B 
C3 Cost (£) Real Data Capital required to apply the alternative. C 
C4 
Technical 
Implementation 
Difficulties 
Linguistic 
Assessment 
The ability of applying the 
required alternative 
accurately and dependably. 
C 
6.6.3. Evaluate the ratings of alternatives with respect to each criterion 
In order to effectively evaluate the alternatives, the criteria assessment grades (i.e., 
linguistic variables or numerical grades) have been obtained in the interview process. 
They have been set in a way that the experts can feel confident in using their domain 
knowledge as previously discussed in Section 6.5.3. Each subjective criterion is assessed 
with respect to each alternative by a group of four experts in leading port in KSA (i.e., 
experts number 7, 8, 9, and 12 in Section 6.4.1) using the linguistic terms in Table 6.2. 
while the RR criteria (i.e. C1) is obtained from Section 6.6.1. The assessments of all 
alternatives with respect to both qualitative and quantitative criteria are presented in Table 
6.11. 
Table 6.10: Assessments of alternatives with respect to criteria 
Alternatives Experts C1 C2 C3 C4 
A1 
Exp1 
0.0490 
VH 
27000 
L 
Exp2 H VL 
Exp3 VH L 
Exp4 VH L 
A2 
Exp1 
0.0172 
VH 
20000 
VL 
Exp2 H L 
Exp3 VH L 
Exp4 H L 
A3 
Exp1 
0.0147 
H 
20000 
L 
Exp2 VH VL 
Exp3 VH L 
Exp4 VH L 
A4 
Exp1 
0.0069 
VH 
15000 
VL 
Exp2 VH L 
Exp3 H L 
Exp4 VH L 
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A5 
Exp1 
0.0267 
VH 
30000 
L 
Exp2 H L 
Exp3 H L 
Exp4 VH VL 
A6 
Exp1 
0.0183 
VH 
25000 
VL 
Exp2 H L 
Exp3 VH L 
Exp4 VH L 
A7 
Exp1 
0.0315 
VH 
95000 
M 
Exp2 VH L 
Exp3 VH M 
Exp4 VH M 
A8 
Exp1 
0.0412 
VH 
300000000 
H 
Exp2 VH VH 
Exp3 VH H 
Exp4 VH H 
A9 
Exp1 
0.0418 
VH 
300,000,000 
H 
Exp2 VH VH 
Exp3 VH H 
Exp4 VH H 
A10 
Exp1 
0.0421 
 
VH 
200,000,000 
H 
Exp2 VH VH 
Exp3 VH H 
Exp4 VH H 
A11 
Exp1 
0.0514 
VH 
500,000,000 
H 
Exp2 VH VH 
Exp3 VH H 
Exp4 VH H 
6.6.4. Normalise the ratings of alternatives with respect to the quantitative 
criteria 
There are two criteria that need to be normalised then transformed to TFN, namely, cost 
and RR. As previously mentioned in Section 6.5.4, some ratings of alternatives with 
respect to the cost quantitative criteria were used and need to be normalised. Therefore, 
all objective cost criteria were normalised by using Equation 6.4, where, the objective 
criteria (i.e., RR) were normalised by using Equation 6.5.  
With respect to the cost criterion, all values obtained are British Pound Sterling (BRP £) 
units in one year. The values of cost and RR criteria with the normalised values are 
presented in Table 6.12. 
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Table 6.11: Normalised values for cost and RR criterion 
Cost per year £ Normalised Cost RR Normalised RR
27000 0.56 0.0490 0.95 
20000 0.75 0.0172 0.33 
20000 0.75 0.0147 0.38 
15000 1 0.0069 0.13 
30000 0.5 0.0267 0.52 
25000 0.6 0.0183 0.36 
95000 0.1579 0.0315 0.43 
300000000 0.00005 0.0412 0.80 
300000000 0.00005 0.0418 0.81 
200000000 0.000075 0.0421 0.82 
500000000 0.00003 0.0514 1.00 
After normalising the objective criteria, other subjective criteria are directly transformed 
to TFN and all the matrixes are averaged. Taking A1 for example, Table 6.13 shows the 
normalised objective criteria and the transformed criteria in the form of TFN.  
Table 6.12: Normalised ratings of alternatives with respect to the criteria 
Next, Table 6.14 shows the averaged ratings matrixes of alternatives with respect to the 
criteria. 
Table 6.13: Averaged ratings of alternatives with respect to the criteria 
6.6.5. Calculate the weights of all criteria using an AHP approach 
AHP has been used to estimate the weights of all the criteria in Figure 6.3. Taking Expert 
(A) as an example, the steps to obtain the weight for all criteria are as follows: 
i. Pair-wise comparison  
The pair-wise importance comparison between criteria Risk Reduction, Actual Benefits 
in terms of Operational Efficiency, Cost and Technical Implementation Difficulties is 
carried out by the four experts using Equation 6.6.  
 
Alternatives Experts C1 C2 C3 C4
A1 
Exp1 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.75 1.00 1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0 0.25 0.50
Exp2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.50 0.75 1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0 0.00 0.25
Exp3 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.75 1.00 1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0 0.25 0.50
Exp4 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.75 1.00 1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0 0.25 0.50
Alternatives C1 C2 C3 C4
A1 0.830 0.953 0.953 0.688 0.938 1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0 0.188 0.438
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ii. Estimate the relative weights  
The weighting vectors representing the priority of the four criteria in the pair-wise 
comparison matrix is obtained by using Equation 6.8 as (0.6025, 0.2305, 0.0768, and 
0.0901). 
iii. Check the consistency  
The consistency of matrices is checked to ensure that the judgments of decision makers 
are consistent. The CI is calculated using Equation 6.9 and the RI is obtained from Table 
6.4. As a result, the consistency of the judgements has been verified by calculating CR = 
0.0161 (<0.1) using Equations 6.10 and 6.11. The results are shown in Table 6.15. 
Table 6.14: Expert A weights pair-wise comparison for all criteria 
Risk 
Reduction
Actual Benefits 
in term of 
Operational 
efficiency 
Cost Technical Difficulties Weight CI CR 
1 3 9 5 0.6025 
0.0145 0.01610.3333 1 3 3 0.2305 0.1111 0.3333 1 1 0.0768 
0.2 0.3333 1 1 0.0901 
iv. Obtain the overall rating  
Similarly, the weights of the other criteria in the hierarchy shown in Figure 6.3 can be 
computed and the average weight for all experts’ ratings with respect to all criteria can be 
obtained as shown in Table 6.16. Such weights only present relative importance between 
the criteria. 
Table 6.15: Expert A weights pair-wise comparison for all criteria 
CRITERIA WEIGHT
C1 0.648 
C2 0.195 
C3 0.075 
C4 0.082 
6.6.6. Define FPIS and FNIS with respect to benefit and cost criteria 
Having identified the nature of the criteria in Table 5.6, the FPIS and FNIS can be 
defined using Equation 6.12 as follows: 
ܣ∗ ൌ ሾݎଵ∗= (1,1,1), ݎଶ∗= (1,1,1), ݎଷ∗= (0,0,0),	ݎସ∗= (0,0,0)] 
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ܣି ൌ ሾݎଵି = (0,0,0), ݎଶି = (0,0,0), ݎଷି = (1,1,1),	ݎସି = (1,1,1)] 
6.6.7. Calculate the distance CCs of all alternatives   
Since the FPIS is (1,1,1) and FNIS is (0,0,0) the calculation of the distance CCs of all 
alternatives are presented in Table 6.17. 
Table 6.16: The distance CCs of all alternatives   
 Alternatives   C1 C2 C3 C4 
1 d* 0.170 0.313 0.400 1.000 
  d- 0.953 1.000 0.600 0.438 
2 d* 0.665 0.250 0.250 1.000 
  d- 0.335 1.000 0.750 0.438 
3 d* 0.714 0.250 0.250 1.000 
  d- 0.286 1.000 0.750 0.438 
4 d* 0.866 0.500 0.000 1.000 
  d- 0.134 1.000 1.000 0.438 
5 d* 0.481 0.500 0.500 1.000 
  d- 0.519 0.750 0.500 0.438 
6 d* 0.644 0.375 0.444 1.000 
  d- 0.356 1.000 0.556 0.438 
7 d* 0.387 0.250 0.842 0.813 
  d- 0.613 1.000 0.158 0.688 
8 d* 0.198 0.250 1.000 0.250 
  d- 0.802 1.000 0.000 1.000 
9 d* 0.187 0.250 1.000 0.250 
  d- 0.813 1.000 0.000 1.000 
10 d* 0.181 0.250 1.000 0.250 
  d- 0.819 1.000 0.000 1.000 
11 d* 0.000 0.250 1.000 0.250 
  d- 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
6.6.8. Obtain the weighted distance CCs of all alternatives   
This is achieved by multiplying the distance CCs of all alternatives by the weights of the 
criteria obtained in step IV. The weighted distance CCs of all alternatives are presented 
in Table 6.18. 
Table 6.17: The weighted distance CCs of all alternatives 
WEIGHTE
D   C1 C2 C3 C4 SUM
1 d^* 0.1105 0.0611 0.0298 0.0820 0.2833 d^- 0.6179 0.1954 0.0447 0.0359 0.8938 
2  d^* 0.4313 0.0488 0.0186 0.0820 0.5807 d^- 0.2169 0.1954 0.0559 0.0359 0.5040 
3  d^* 0.4628 0.0488 0.0186 0.0820 0.6122 
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d^- 0.1854 0.1954 0.0559 0.0359 0.4725 
4  d^* 0.5611 0.0977 0.0000 0.0820 0.7408 d^- 0.0870 0.1954 0.0745 0.0359 0.3927 
5  d^* 0.3115 0.0977 0.0373 0.0820 0.5284 d^- 0.3367 0.1465 0.0373 0.0359 0.5563 
6  d^* 0.4174 0.0733 0.0331 0.0820 0.6057 d^- 0.2308 0.1954 0.0414 0.0359 0.5034 
7  d^* 0.2509 0.0488 0.0627 0.0666 0.4291 d^- 0.3972 0.1954 0.0118 0.0563 0.6607 
8  d^* 0.1286 0.0488 0.0745 0.0205 0.2724 d^- 0.5195 0.1954 0.0000 0.0820 0.7969 
9  d^* 0.1211 0.0488 0.0745 0.0205 0.2649 d^- 0.5271 0.1954 0.0000 0.0820 0.8044 
10  d^* 0.1173 0.0488 0.0745 0.0205 0.2611 d^- 0.5309 0.1954 0.0000 0.0820 0.8082 
11  d^* 0.0000 0.0488 0.0745 0.0205 0.1438 d^- 0.6482 0.1954 0.0000 0.0820 0.9255 
6.6.9. Calculating the CCs of all alternatives   
The distance closeness coefficient ሺܥܥ௜ሻ of all alternatives can be calculated by using 
Equation 6.13. Taking A1 as an example, ܥܥ஺ଵ can be calculated as follows.  
ܥܥ஺భ ൌ
0.8938
0.8938 ൅ 0.2833 ൌ 0.7439 
The ܥܥ௜ of the other alternatives can be computed and ranked accordingly in a similar 
way and their results are shown in Table 6.19. 
Table 6.18: CC results and ranking order of container port safety performance plan selection 
Alternatives d^* d^- CC Rank 
A1  0.3077 0.8938 0.7439 5 
A2  0.5807 0.5040 0.4647 8 
A3  0.6122 0.4725 0.4356 10 
A4  0.7408 0.3927 0.3465 11 
A5  0.5284 0.5563 0.5129 7 
A6  0.6057 0.5034 0.4539 9 
A7  0.4291 0.6607 0.6063 6 
A8  0.2724 0.7969 0.7452 4 
A9  0.2649 0.8044 0.7523 3 
A10 0.2611 0.8082 0.7558 2 
A11 0.1438 0.9255 0.8655 1 
Based on the results shown in Table 6.19, the most suitable solutions for the investigated 
container port that provides the optimum safety performance plans with respect to HE.6 
(Crane break down due to human error) are those implementing automated operation. 
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The best is A11 (Appling fully automated crane operations) followed by A10 (Appling 
automated crane operations on transportation areas), A8. (Appling automated crane 
operations on quay area), A9 (Appling automated crane operations on yard area), and A1 
(Hiring highly qualified crane driver) as depicted in Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4: Ranking order for container port operational safety performance plan 
6.6.10. Model validation process 
The logicality and soundness of the results delivered in the proposed model is tested by 
the sensitive analysis. As described in Section 6.5.10, the weight associated with one 
criterion is increased separately by 10%, 20% and 30%, while simultaneously the weights 
associated with other criteria are decreased by compensating the increment percentage 
on the increased criterion, and the final ranking of the alternatives are observed. The 
sensitivity of the alternatives has been analysed when cost is increased separately by 10% 
first, then 20%, and finally 30%. The result obtained is presented in Figure 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.5: Cost weight increments analysis 
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6.7. Results and Discussion 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted to analyse the effect in the output data given a slight 
change in the cost weight. Based on Figure 6.5, it can be seen that automation operation 
installation provides the optimum solution for DMP. Furthermore, the analysis revealed 
that the cost weight increment by 10%, 20% and 30% has not affected the final ranking 
of the best alternatives for the investigated container port OSP. The slight change on the  
ܥܥ  of A11, A10, A8, A9 and A1 can be observed clearly in Table 6.20. 
Table 6.19: Cost weight increment effect on the alternatives 
A# Alternatives Original Cost Weights 10%+ 20%+ 30%+ 
A11 Appling fully Automated 
Crane operations 0.8655 0.78421 0.70033 0.61372 
A10 Appling Automated Crane 
operations on transportation 
areas 
0.7558 0.67854 0.59879 0.51645 
A9  Appling Automated Crane 
operations on yard area 0.7523 0.67513 0.59551 0.51331 
A8  Appling Automated Crane 
operations on quay area 0.7452 0.66831 0.58896 0.50703 
A1  Hiring Highly Qualified 
Crane Driver 0.7439 0.74824 0.75281 0.75767 
 
Based on the result obtained from this analysis, the investigated container port OSP can 
be improved by automation operation installation. However, since the investigated 
container port has future plan for automation operation installation which has not been 
implemented yet, it is beneficial to implement A1, hiring a highly qualified crane driver, 
as the best solution for DMP. 
6.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a collaborative modelling and strategic fuzzy decision-making 
approach that can be implemented for the selection of appropriate operational safety 
strategies by tackling the selection of RCOs under uncertainty in container terminals. The 
proposed approach can be applied to situations where qualitative and quantitative data 
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have to be integrated and synthesised for evaluation processes during complex decision-
making processes involving container port OSP.  
The proposed AHP-FTOPSIS formulates a hybrid approach to assess the costs and 
benefits associated with operational safety strategies. The BER approach developed an 
integrated container port system risk analysis in order to evaluate the RR as a benefits 
criterion, such as risk reduction and probabilistic safety assessment simulations using 
ANNs that predict and evaluate the criticality of the hazardous events in a container 
terminal. 
The new approach provides solutions and the most preferred safety control measures that 
are capable of addressing both operational efficiency and risk reduction in container 
terminals, such as automation solutions for the DMP. The proposed method can be 
tailored to other DMP (i.e., HEs) to ensure OSP. 
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Chapter 7 ― Conclusion and Future Research Suggestions 
Summary  
This chapter briefly recaps all the developed models and techniques for the adequacy of 
operational safety performance (OSP) in container terminals and maritime ports. The 
developed models and techniques provide an effective risk management framework and 
an efficient safety prediction tool that can help maritime terminals’ and ports’ 
stakeholders, including risk managers, human resource managers, site control managers, 
safety officers, and port facility security to improve the safety and increase the reliability 
of their operations. Nevertheless, there are other risk concerns influencing container 
terminals and maritime ports safety that require further research, and these are outlined 
in this chapter. 
7.1.  Research contributions  
Operational safety of container terminals and maritime ports is an essential link in 
ensuring supply chain resilience and sustainability that can affect the cost structures, 
industrial competitiveness, and living standards in any coastal state. Maritime container 
transportation occupies an increasingly important position in world trade, and is the 
fastest growing sector of the international shipping industry. The analysis of 
containerisation growth and optimum terminal operations are interrelated, in such that 
both concepts are developed side-by-side regarding operational complexity, 
transportation modes, terminal type and capacity, trade lanes and destinations, and 
technological aids including handling equipment, optimisations, and communications 
(See chapter 2, Sections 2.1 and 2.3). 
There is an imperative need to establish a coherent risk-based methodology addressing 
the OSP in container terminals and maritime ports. The lack of an appropriate risk 
management framework and research upon which to base an effective safety measure for 
maritime terminals’ and ports’ complex operational activities that approximates the risk 
realities and solves the confusions over uncertainty terminology illustrates the necessity 
of conducting this study (see chapter 2, Sections 2.4 and 2.5). 
As a result, an advanced risk management framework for the OSP in container terminals 
and maritime ports has been described through the development of several novel risk-
based models in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. This includes the identification of the most 
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significant HEs in maritime container terminals operation, risk assessment, risk models 
simulation, and decision making under uncertainty in which both qualitative and 
quantitative data can be used. The framework has been developed in a generic way that 
can be tailored for wider applications in other engineering and management systems, 
especially when instant risk ranking is required by the stakeholders to measure, predict, 
and improve their system safety and reliability performance. 
The most significant HEs were identified through conducting an appropriate literature 
review, knowledge based on human expertise and case studies application for major risks 
that affect the container operation safety as the first phase of the Risk Assessment section. 
In the second phase, the proportion method is used to rationalise the DoB distribution in 
FMEA risk analysis that describes the relationship between risk parameters in the IF part 
and risk levels in the THEN part, taking into account the new risk parameter in the IF part, 
namely, the Impact (I) of a failure to the resilience of port operational systems introduced 
in this study. Consequently, a unique FRB was developed in order to assess the most 
significant HEs identified. The development of a generic risk-based model FRBN 
incorporating FRB and BN using Hugin software can help container terminals and 
maritime ports stakeholders to maintain efficient and safe operations and management by 
evaluating each HE individually and prioritising their specific risk estimations locally 
with a case study (see chapter 3). 
The last phase in the Risk Assessment section is the development of a generic risk-based 
model incorporating FRB and Evidential Reasoning (FRBER) using the IDS software to 
evaluate all HEs aggregated collectively for their Risk Influence (RI) globally using a 
case study. Moreover, a new sensitivity analysis method is developed to rank the HEs 
taking into account their specific risk estimations locally and their RI globally (see chapter 
4). 
The Risk Assessment section provides an effective tool by developing two advanced risk 
assessment based models under high uncertainties for the OSP in container terminals and 
maritime ports using both quantitative and qualitative data. The first model (i.e., FRBN) 
evaluates each HE individually and prioritises their specific risk estimations locally, while 
the second model (i.e., FRBER) evaluates all HEs aggregated collectively for their risk 
influence globally. The risk assessment based methodologies introduced in this section 
enable the stakeholders to evaluate and improve the safety and reliability of the 
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operational performance in their terminals’ system. In addition, it will motivate them to 
take preventive and control measures confidently.  
The Risk Models Simulations section commences with the construction of the BNANNs 
model that simulates the FRBN model in the first phase, followed by the second phase of 
the simulation model ERANNs, whose construction is based on FRBER model using a 
test case. The final phase in this section integrates the BNANNs and ERANNs models to 
develop the AnBnEvR model that is able to predict the risk magnitude for HEs and 
provide a panoramic view on the risk inference in both perspectives, locally and globally 
(see chapter 5).  
The ANNs as a method-based uncertainty treatment theory is used to enhance the 
performance of FMEA by overcoming its incapability in tackling uncertainty in data and 
at the same time ease the evaluation process on the stakeholders from handling a complex 
large amount of data to measure, predict, and improve their system safety and reliability 
performance.  The complexity of handling large amounts of data dealing with two 
different methodologies with reference to its software (i.e., FRBN and FRBER), would 
burden the stakeholders by going through copious nonuser-friendly calculations. It is 
noteworthy to mention that, due to the optimisation required for the five risk assessment 
attributes with their fuzzy parameters introduced in chapter 3 and chapter 4 (i.e., the inputs 
and outputs) with evaluations tasks, causes the amount of calculation to be tremendous 
for the interface of FRBN and FRBER, which can be avoided by applying the ANN 
concept. 
The Risk Control Options section is the last link in the risk management based 
methodology cycle in this study. The Analytical Hierarchal Process (AHP) method was 
used for determining the relative weights of all criteria identified in the first phase. The 
last phase is the development of a risk control options model by incorporating Fuzzy logic 
and the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (FTOPSIS) that 
offers the best risk mitigation strategies with the most preferred safety control measures 
capable of addressing both operational efficiency and risk reduction in container 
terminals, such as automation solutions alternatives (see chapter 6).   
The knowledge contribution of this research provides an effective risk management 
framework for OSP in container terminal and maritime ports by identifying, assessing, 
and controlling the most significant HEs in maritime container terminals operation. In 
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addition, given the dynamic nature of the complex system and operation of maritime 
terminals and maritime ports, it provides an efficient safety prediction tool that can ease 
all the processes in the methods and techniques used with the risk management framework 
by applying ANN concept to simulate the risk models that provide a panoramic view of 
the risk associated with uncertainties from different perspectives, locally and globally. 
All the proposed models have been developed in sequence. They provide an integrated 
approach to increase the safety and reliability of maritime engineering operations. Figure 
7.1 depicts an overall framework diagram with a description illustrating the 
interrelationship of the developed models in a context of a risk management based 
methodology process. 
7.2. Implications for Future Research  
Developing a risk management framework with uncertainty treatment based decision-
making analysis methodology to identify, assess, and mitigate the risk factors affecting 
the OSP in container terminal and maritime ports has achieved the aim of this research. 
Although it is not claimed to be a decisive framework, it provides a comprehensive 
analysis using risk management based methodologies including many approaches and 
techniques to facilitate the quantitative and qualitative data in maritime engineering 
operations. Many important issues in each phase of each section are raised both at the 
beginning and throughout the research process, in which some are analysed, described, 
and consolidated into the study and due to its generality, the framework can be tailored 
for a wide range of applications in different safety and reliability engineering and 
management systems. Others, however, could not be incorporated due to scope, time 
constraints, and because the present research has prominently been exploratory, 
experimental and correlational. In this regard, the aspects that were not covered in detail 
are part of the suggestions that would be desirable for further investigations in future work 
as follows.  
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Figure 7.1: Overall framework diagram with description 
Section 1: Risk Assessment 
Phase 1 
An appropriate literature review and 
brainstorming session  
Phase 2 
 Proportion method for FRB to rational-
ise DoB distribution in IF part (risk pa-
rameters) and THEN part (risk levels) in 
FMEA 
 The new risk parameter in IF part, the 
Impact (I) of a failure to the resilience of 
port operational systems 
Phase 3 
Evaluate each HE individually and 
prioritise their specific risk estimations 
locally using Hugin software 
Phase 4 
Evaluate all HEs aggregated collectively 
for their Risk Influence (RI) 
globally using the IDS software  
Phase 1 
Constructing the BNANNs model 
simulating FRBN model 
Section 2: Risk Models Simulations 
Phase 2 
Constructing the BNANNs model 
simulating FRBN model 
Phase 3 
Constructing the AnBnEvR model by 
integrating BNANNs and ERANNs 
Section 3: Risk Control Options 
Phase 1 
Determining the relative weights of all 
criteria identified using AHP method  
Phase 2 
Risk control options model FTOPSIS 
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Performing more data collection and test cases would be desirable for further validation 
of the developed risk management based methodology for container terminal and 
maritime port risk assessment taking into account the selection of the representative 
number of experts within the maritime industry to reduce the bias involved in the 
subjective judgements.  
The BNANNs model can process and simulates each of the 24 HEs using the ANN 
concept since the evaluation is individually conducted, while the EvRANNs cannot 
because the hierarchical structure of the HEs has to be processed collectively due to the 
aggregation feature in the ER technique that requires a large amount of ED to be 
processed in the simulated model and creates a greater computational burden that is not 
possible to manage with existing technology and software. Therefore, it would be 
desirable to construct a model using an ANN approach simulating FRBER to include all 
HEs identified rather than the significant HEs only. However, it is a matter of advanced 
technology and software availability. In addition, the AnBnEvR model can be developed 
for windows-based software that can help container terminals and maritime ports 
stakeholders to maintain efficient and safe operations and management. 
For extended research, it seems beneficial to include other risk concerns influencing 
container terminal and maritime port safety, such as managerial and policy implications, 
natural disasters, environmental, and political issues. Moreover, in the extended research, 
it would be useful to consider the sequence structure of the approaches and techniques in 
the three sections of the risk management framework with uncertainty treatment in this 
study for risk review, including the unique FRB that provide a rational distribution of the 
DoB as well as transparency and low complexity in the risk parameters.  
The strategic management approach in maritime port industry is advancing towards 
systematic risk-based regulatory scheme to avoid overreaction to risks in regulatory 
systems by describing the tools for choosing the best of risk treatment strategies, 
including tolerating a risk, avoiding a risk, transferring a risk, and mitigating a risk. In 
this respect, container terminal and maritime port safety stakeholders, including risk 
managers, human resource managers, site control managers, safety officers, and port 
facility security officers would have more flexibility to use innovation for the most 
advanced risk management frameworks and MCDM tools. The FRB, BN, ER, AHP, 
FTOPSIS and ANN approaches and techniques used in this research may provide useful 
approaches that may be able to be utilised and implemented to facilitate other risk-based 
184 
 
modelling and MADM systems. Therefore, the practical application of the 
aforementioned tools to the container terminal and maritime port industry can be 
highlighted for best practice and implementation strategies. 
The proposed risk management framework in this study has potential to facilitate risk 
analysis of system design and operations in a wide context. The framework will need to 
be appropriately tailored to study other topics outside the maritime industry to offer 
practical guidance on the steps to be taken in implementing an action plan for best practice 
and in enhancing the risk management efficiency of the system as a whole.   
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Rules 
No 
Four risk parameters in the IF part DoB in the THEN part
Probability 
of failure 
 
 
 
 
(L) 
Consequences/ 
Severity 
 
 
 
 
(C) 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected  
 
 
 
 
(P) 
Impact of a 
failure to the 
resilience of 
port 
operational 
systems 
 
(I) 
Low 
(R1) Medium (R2) High (R3) 
1. Low Low Low Low 1   
2. Low Low Low Medium 0.75 0.25  
3. Low Low Low High 0.75  0.25 
4. Low Medium Low Low 0.75 0.25  
5. Low Medium Low Medium 0.50 0.50  
6. Low Medium Low High 0.50 0.25 0.25 
7. Low High Low Low 0.75  0.25 
8. Low High Low Medium 0.50 0.25 0.25 
9. Low High Low High 0.50  0.50 
10. Low Low Medium Low 0.75 0.25  
11. Low Low Medium Medium 0.50 0.50  
12. Low Low Medium High 0.50 0.25 0.25 
13. Low Medium Medium Low 0.50 0.50  
14. Low Medium Medium Medium 0.25 0.75  
15. Low Medium Medium High 0.25 0.50 0.25 
16. Low High Medium Low 0.50 0.25 0.25 
17. Low High Medium Medium 0.25 0.50 0.25 
18. Low High Medium High 0.25 0.25 0.50 
19. Low Low High Low 0.75  0.25 
20. Low Low High Medium 0.50 0.25 0.25 
21. Low Low High High 0.50  0.50 
22. Low Medium High Low 0.50 0.25 0.25 
23. Low Medium High Medium 0.25 0.50 0.25 
24. Low Medium High High 0.25 0.25 0.50 
25. Low High High Low 0.50  0.50 
26. Low High High Medium 0.25 0.25 0.50 
27. Low High High High 0.25  0.75 
28. Medium Low Low Low 0.75 0.25  
29. Medium Low Low Medium 0.50 0.50  
30. Medium Low Low High 0.50 0.25 0.25 
31. Medium Medium Low Low 0.50 0.50  
32. Medium Medium Low Medium 0.25 0.75  
33. Medium Medium Low High 0.25 0.50 0.25 
34. Medium High Low Low 0.50 0.25 0.25 
35. Medium High Low Medium 0.25 0.50 0.25 
36. Medium High Low High 0.25 0.25 0.50 
37. Medium Low Medium Low 0.50 0.50  
38. Medium Low Medium Medium 0.25 0.75  
39. Medium Low Medium High 0.25 0.50 0.25 
40. Medium Medium Medium Low 0.25 0.75  
41. Medium Medium Medium Medium  1  
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Rules 
No 
Four risk parameters in the IF part DoB in the THEN part
Probability 
of failure 
 
 
 
 
(L) 
Consequences/ 
Severity 
 
 
 
 
(C) 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected  
 
 
 
 
(P) 
Impact of a 
failure to the 
resilience of 
port 
operational 
systems 
 
(I) 
Low 
(R1) Medium (R2) High (R3) 
42. Medium Medium Medium High  0.75 0.25 
43. Medium High Medium Low 0.25 0.50 0.25 
44. Medium High Medium Medium  0.75 0.25 
45. Medium High Medium High  0.50 0.50 
46. Medium Low High Low 0.50 0.25 0.25 
47. Medium Low High Medium 0.25 0.50 0.25 
48. Medium Low High High 0.25 0.25 0.50 
49. Medium Medium High Low 0.25 0.50 0.25 
50. Medium Medium High Medium 0.75  0.25 
51. Medium Medium High High  0.50 0.50 
52. Medium High High Low 0.25 0.25 0.50 
53. Medium High High Medium  0.50 0.50 
54. Medium High High High  0.25 0.75 
55. High Low Low Low 0.75  0.25 
56. High Low Low Medium 0.50 0.25 0.25 
57. High Low Low High 0.50  0.50 
58. High Medium Low Low 0.50 0.25 0.25 
59. High Medium Low Medium 0.25 0.50 0.25 
60. High Medium Low High 0.25 0.25 0.50 
61. High High Low Low 0.50  0.50 
62. High High Low Medium 0.25 0.25 0.50 
63. High High Low High 0.25  0.75 
64. High Low Medium Low 0.50 0.25 0.25 
65. High Low Medium Medium 0.25 0.50 0.25 
66. High Low Medium High 0.25 0.25 0.50 
67. High Medium Medium Low 0.25 0.50 0.25 
68. High Medium Medium Medium  0.75 0.25 
69. High Medium Medium High  0.50 0.50 
70. High High Medium Low 0.25 0.25 0.50 
71. High High Medium Medium  0.50 0.50 
72. High High Medium High  0.25 0.75 
73. High Low High Low 0.50  0.50 
74. High Low High Medium 0.25 0.25 0.50 
75. High Low High High 0.25  0.75 
76. High Medium High Low 0.25 0.25 0.50 
77. High Medium High Medium  0.50 0.50 
78. High Medium High High  0.25 0.75 
79. High High High Low 0.25  0.75 
80. High High High Medium  0.25 0.75 
81. High High High High   1 
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Appendix I-2: The Conditional Probability Table for The Risk Estimate (NR) 
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L L1 
D D1 D2 D3 
C C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 
R 
 
RE 
R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 
RE1 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 
RE2 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.50 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.25 0 0 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.25 0 0.25 0 
RE3 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 
 
 
 
L L2 
D D1 D2 D3 
C C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 
R 
 
RE 
R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 
RE1 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 0 0.25 0 0.75 
RE2 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.75 1 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 
RE3 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 
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L L3 
D D1 D2 D3 
C C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3 
R 
 
RE R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 
RE1 
0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 
RE2 
0 0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.25 0 0.25 0 
RE3 
0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 
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Appendix I-3: Questionnaire Used for HEs Evaluation in Chapter 3 
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11 November 2011 
 
 
To: WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out with 
regard to the container terminal safety and it is specific on the container shipping sector. This 
subject would become a critical topic in the maritime community internationally due to the fast 
expansion in containerisation and the global economic recession over the past decade.  
 
The aim of this study is to investigate and examine the current safety level of container 
terminals operations. Furthermore, evaluate the most significant failure events and its 
consequences on the safety management of a desired container terminal. At the end of this 
research, a conceptual methodology and an advanced model would be generated that can be 
used by container terminal management to investigate and mitigate the risk affecting the 
operations of the terminal and to obtain a cost effective strategy. To achieve the above aim, the 
research objectives are as follows: 
 
1. To investigate the high significant failure events influencing the safety level of the ter-
minal by using a proportion technique. 
 
2. Analyse the uncertain conditions in the terminal industry by using a rule-based tech-
nique. 
 
A number of evaluation criteria have been determined in this research. All the evaluation 
criteria need to be measured by using the two techniques that have been mentioned above. This 
process is required to provide reliable data by identifying an expert opinion of each evaluation 
parameter. A set of questionnaires is compiled in this letter. 
 
I should be most grateful if you could kindly spend your valuable time to complete the 
accompanying questionnaire and email it at the address shown above. Your vital feedback will 
School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Byrom Street 
L3 3AF UK 
Phone : 0044 0151 231 2028 
Fax : 0044 0151 298 2624 
Email : H.M.Al-Yami@2010.ljmu.ac.uk 
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greatly benefit and contribute to the formulation of an industry wide opinion. I can assure you 
that the confidentiality of your response will be honoured and respected.  
 
Yours faithfully,  
 
Hani M.A. Alyami 
PhD researcher, School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute  
Room 2.23, LOOM Research Institute 
 
The procedures and guidelines for answering this set of questionnaires are explained as 
follows: 
 
The linguistic meaning 
To proceed with the proportion technique, an expert has to understand the ratio scale 
measurement used in this study. The table below describe the numerical 
assessment together with the linguistic meaning of each number.  
  
Numerical Assessment Linguistic meaning 
                  0 ൑ ܮ ൑ 100 Low (L) 
0 ൑ ܯ ൑ 100 Medium (M) 
0 ൑ ܪ ൑ 100 High (H) 
 
An expert is required to give a possible judgement to all questions based on his/her expertise 
and experience in the shipping industry. The judgment process has to be focussed on how to 
achieve the goal. The total assessment for each parameter must not be over 100%. For instance, 
you have two types of Roads and two types of cars as shown.  
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The Goal is to evaluate the risk of driving deferent types of cars on deferent types of 
roads with 30 mph speed. 
 
                                                     Attributes 
 
 Failure Event                                 
Probability Risk 
Assessment Scale
Consequences 
Risk Assessment 
Scale 
H M L H M L 
How likely to drive a formula 1 on rugged 
road? 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
How likely to drive a formula 1 on gravel 
road? 90% 10%  0% 95% 5% 0% 
How likely to drive a four-wheel vehicle on 
rugged road? 40% 20% 40% 45% 15% 40% 
How likely to drive a four-wheel vehicle on 
gravel road? 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
 
Explanation of the above example, 
i) The probability of driving a formula 1 on rugged road is 100% High risk because it 
cannot be driven on this type of roads and the consequences of driving it, is 100% High 
risk because it will be instantly severely damaged. That means the risk assessment of 
driving a formula 1 on a rugged road is 100% High risk, and recommended not to drive. 
 
ii) The probability of driving a formula 1 on gravel road is 90% High and 10% Medium 
risks because it can be driven but not for long time and the consequences of driving it, 
is 95% High and 5% Medium risks because the damage will increase as it runs on the 
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road. That means the risk assessment of driving a formula 1 on a gravel road is reason-
ably High risk, and recommended not to drive. 
 
iii) The probability of driving a four-wheel vehicle on rugged road is 40% High, 20% Me-
dium, 40% Low risks, and the consequences of driving it, is 45% High, 15% Medium, 
40% Low risks because the speed limit. That means the risk assessment of driving a 
four-wheel vehicle on rugged road is reasonably Medium risk, and recommended to 
drive with extreme caution. 
 
iv) The probability of driving a four-wheel vehicle on gravel road is 100% Low risk and 
the consequences of driving it, is 100% Low risk. That means the risk assessment of 
driving a four-wheel vehicle on a gravel road is 100% Low risk, and recommended to 
drive. 
 
The Attributes description 
 
L describes the failure occurrence probability. It means the rate of failure occurring in a 
designated period, which directly represents the number of failure frequencies 
during the design life span of a particular system.  
 
C describes the consequences/ severity. It represents the magnitude of possible loss when risk 
happens, which is ranked according to the severity of failure effects. 
 
P defines the probability of failures being undetected (P). It refers to the probability that 
possible failure can be detected before occurrence.  
 
R defines the chance of container terminal operations being disrupted due to a failure. It refers 
to the probability that possible disruption happens given the occurrence of a failure 
event. 
 
RE is the Risk Evaluation. It is the only output used to produce safety evaluation for a 
particular cause to technical failure. 
 
Note: The Probability of the failure mode should be given on an annual basis. 
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Parameters 
The degree of the parameters estimated for each hazard may be based on knowledge of the 
results of similar past events and can be defined as follows.   
 
High (H): loss of ability to accomplish the operations or operation failure; death or 
permanent total disability accident risk; loss of major facility damage; severe 
environmental damage. 
 
Medium (M): degraded operations capability or readiness; minor injury accident risk that 
disrupted operations over 3 hours a day; minor capability to equipment or system, 
facility or the environment; minor damage to facility or environment.   
 
Low (L): little or no adverse impact on operations capability; minor medical treatment in 
accident risk; slight equipment or system damage but fully functional and 
serviceable; little or no facility or environment damage. 
 
                                      Attributes 
 
 Failure Event                                 
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected  
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of 
terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
collision between a rail-
mounted gantry crane 
(RMG) and a trailer. 
            
collision between a rubber-
tired gantry crane (RTG) 
and a trailer. 
            
collision between straddle 
carriers (SC) and a rubber-
tired gantry crane (RTG). 
            
collision between the quay 
crane and the ship.             
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                                      Attributes 
 
 Failure Event                                 
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected  
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of 
terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
collision between two quay 
cranes.             
crane break down due to 
human error.              
moving the crane without 
raising the Boom (lifting 
arm) of the gantry crane. 
            
leakage/ emission of 
dangerous goods from a 
container. 
            
ignition sources from 
equipment near dangerous 
goods premises. 
            
person falls from height due 
to being too near to 
unprotected edges. 
            
person falls from height due 
to non-provision / 
maintenance of safe access 
between adjacent cargo 
bays. 
            
person slips, trips and falls 
whilst working on surfaces 
that are not even. 
            
person slips, trips and falls 
whilst working on surfaces 
with presence of leaking 
cargo. 
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                                      Attributes 
 
 Failure Event                                 
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected  
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of 
terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
slips, trips and falls whilst 
working on surfaces with 
presence of water / ice. 
            
person slips, trips and falls 
whilst working on surfaces 
with presence of oils. 
            
person struck by falling 
object/s.             
person handling dangerous 
goods in containers that 
have not been declared. 
            
person struck by quay crane.             
person struck by straddle 
carriers (SC).             
person struck by chassis-
based transporters.             
person struck by trucks.             
person crushed against a 
fixed object and ship / 
terminal structure. 
            
person crushed against a 
fixed object and stacked 
containers and suspended 
containers. 
            
person crushed against a 
fixed object and closing the 
twin lift container spreaders. 
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Appendix I-4: ALL Experts Evaluations Table in Chapter 3 
 
 233 
 
                                          
Attributes 
 
 Failure Event              
 
 
 
 
 
Probability 
of failure/ Likelihood 
probability of failures 
being undetected 
 
Consequences
/ 
severity 
 
Chance of 
terminal 
operation 
being 
Disrupted due 
to failure 
Experts H M L H M L H M L H M L 
(CRMGT) 
A 0 20 80 5 15 80 70 20 10 80 20 0 
B 10 10 80 15 15 70 70 20 10 90 5 5 
C 10 30 60 10 25 65 85 15 0 30 20 50
Prior 
Probability 6.7 20 73.3 10 18.3 71.7 75 18.3 6.7 66.7 15 18.3
CRTGT 
A 40 30 30 50 30 20 50 30 20 20 40 40
B 60 15 25 60 30 10 70 15 15 10 20 70
C 50 20 30 60 30 10 40 30 30 15 45 40
Prior 
Probability 50 21.7 28.3 56.7 30 13.3 53.3 25 21.7 15 35 50
CRTGSC 
A 40 40 20 40 40 20 30 40 30 20 20 60
B 30 30 40 40 30 30 30 40 30 10 10 80
C 45 45 10 50 30 20 20 50 30 25 25 50
Prior 
Probability 35 41.7 23.3 40 36.7 23.3 23.3 36.7 40 26.7 16.7 56.7
CQCS 
A 80 10 10 80 15 5 90 10 0 90 10 0 
B 90 10 0 80 20 0 70 15 15 85 10 5 
C 80 15 5 70 20 10 90 5 5 90 10 0 
Prior 
Probability 83.3 11.6 5 76.7 18.3 5 83.3 10 6.7 88.3 10 1.7
CQC’s 
A 0 10 90 0 10 90 0 20 80 60 20 20
B 10 20 70 50 20 30 70 10 20 80 10 10
C 10 10 80 20 10 70 30 25 45 45 25 30
Prior 
Probability 6.7 13.3 80 23.3 13.3 63.3 33.3 18.3 48.3 61.7 18.3 20
CBD 
A 90 10 0 90 10 0 90 10 0 90 10 0 
B 80 15 5 70 15 15 90 10 0 80 10 10
C 85 15 0 85 15 0 80 20 0 40 40 20
Prior 
Probability 85 13.3 1.6 81.7 13.3 5 86.7 13.3 0 70 20 10
MCWRLAGC 
 
 
A 20 20 60 20 20 60 50 30 20 50 30 20
B 70 20 10 80 10 10 60 30 10 60 20 20
C 50 10 40 15 15 70 60 25 15 40 25 35
Prior 
Probability 46.7 16.7 36.7 38.3 15 46.7 56.7 28.3 15 50 25 25
A 40 40 20 40 40 20 30 30 40 20 20 60
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leakage/ emission 
of dangerous 
goods from a 
container. 
B 80 15 5 70 20 10 50 30 20 40 30 30
C 50 45 5 45 45 10 30 30 40 25 25 50
Prior 
Probability 56.7 33.3 10 51.7 35 13.3 36.7 30 33.3 28.3 25 46.7
ignition sources 
from equipment 
near dangerous 
goods premises. 
A 10 20 70 10 20 70 50 30 20 50 30 20
B 10 10 80 70 20 10 60 30 10 60 40 0 
C 15 25 60 10 20 70 60 30 10 60 30 10
Prior 
Probability 11.7 18.3 70 30 20 50 56.7 30 13.3 56.7 33.3 10
person falls from 
height due to 
being too near to 
unprotected edges. 
A 10 20 70 10 20 70 20 20 60 10 20 70
B 10 20 70 70 30 0 50 30 20 30 30 40
C 30 25 45 50 30 20 40 30 30 10 30 60
Prior 
Probability 16.7 21.7 61.7 43.3 26.7 30 36.7 26.7 36.7 16.7 26.7 56.7
person falls from 
height due to non-
provision / 
maintenance of 
safe access 
between adjacent 
cargo bays. 
A 30 30 40 30 30 40 40 40 20 30 30 40
B 10 20 70 60 30 10 45 45 10 40 20 40
C 15 35 50 30 40 30 45 45 10 20 20 60
Prior 
Probability 18.3 28.3 53.3 40 33.3 26.7 43.3 43.3 13.3 30 23.3 46.7
working on 
surfaces that are 
not even. 
 
A 60 30 10 60 30 10 70 20 10 30 30 40
B 50 10 40 60 30 10 50 30 20 40 30 30
C 60 35 5 60 35 5 70 15 15 25 35 40
Prior 
Probability 56.7 25 18.3 60 31.7 8.3 63.3 21.7 15 31.7 31.7 36.7
person slips, trips 
and falls whilst 
working on 
surfaces with 
presence of 
leaking cargo. 
A 60 30 10 60 30 10 70 20 10 40 40 20
B 50 30 20 70 30 0 60 30 10 40 40 20
C 50 25 25 70 20 10 70 20 10 45 45 10
Prior 
Probability 53.3 28.3 18.3 66.7 26.7 6.7 66.7 23.3 10 41.7 41.7 16.7
presence of water / 
ice. 
 
 
A 70 20 10 70 20 10 60 30 10 50 25 25
B 70 30 0 60 30 10 60 30 10 50 30 20
C 10 40 50 70 20 10 60 30 10 25 25 50
Prior 
Probability 50 30 20 66.7 23.3 10 60 30 10 41.7 26.7 31.7
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person slips, trips 
and falls whilst 
working on 
surfaces with 
presence of oils. 
A 60 30 10 60 30 10 70 20 10 40 40 20
B 60 30 10 70 20 10 70 25 5 30 30 40
C 65 35 0 60 30 10 70 25 5 30 40 30
Prior 
Probability 61.7 31.7 6.7 63.3 26.7 10 70 23.3 6.7 33.3 36.7 30
person struck by 
falling object/s. 
 
A 55 35 10 50 30 20 20 30 50 20 30 50
B 50 30 20 40 30 30 60 30 10 30 30 40
C 55 35 10 55 20 25 40 40 20 20 30 50
Prior 
Probability 53.3 33.3 13.3 48.3 26.7 25 40 33.3 26.7 23.3 30 46.7
dangerous goods 
in containers that 
have not been 
declared. 
A 10 10 80 10 10 80 80 20 0 80 20 0 
B 50 40 10 60 30 10 80 20 0 80 20 0 
C 80 10 10 70 20 10 80 20 0 10 40 50
Prior 
Probability 46.7 20 33.3 46.7 20 33.3 80 20 0 56.7 26.7 16.7
person struck by 
quay crane. 
A 30 40 30 30 40 30 20 40 40 10 20 70
B 20 40 40 30 30 40 40 20 40 30 30 40
C 20 40 40 30 45 25 30 40 30 5 15 80
Prior 
Probability 23.3 40 36.7 30 38.3 31.7 30 33.3 36.7 15 21.7 63.3
person struck by 
straddle carriers 
(SC). 
 
 
 
A 40 40 20 40 40 20 20 40 40 10 20 70
B 30 30 40 30 30 40 40 30 30 20 30 50
C 10 30 60 25 25 50 50 20 30 20 15 65
Prior 
Probability 26.7 33.3 40 31.7 31.7 36.7 36.7 30 33.3 16.7 21.7 61.7
person struck by 
chassis-based 
transporters. 
A 40 40 20 40 40 20 20 40 40 10 20 70
B 30 30 40 30 30 40 20 60 20 10 20 70
C 30 30 40 40 30 30 60 10 30 10 20 70
Prior 
Probability 33.3 33.3 33.3 36.7 33.3 30 33.3 36.7 30 10 20 70
person struck by 
trucks. 
 
 
 
A 40 40 20 40 40 20 20 40 40 10 20 70
B 40 30 30 40 30 30 60 30 10 10 20 70
C 40 40 20 40 40 20 50 40 10 10 20 70
Prior 
Probability 40 36.7 23.3 40 36.7 23.3 43.3 36.7 20 10 20 70
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person crushed 
against a fixed 
object and ship / 
terminal structure. 
A 20 20 60 20 20 60 20 40 40 10 20 70
B 10 10 80 60 30 10 70 10 20 30 30 40
C 15 15 70 15 15 70 40 30 30 10 20 70
Prior 
Probability 15 15 70 31.7 21.7 46.7 43.3 26.7 30 16.7 23.3 60
person crushed 
against a fixed 
object and stacked 
containers    
A 40 40 20 40 40 20 20 40 40 10 20 70
B 50 30 20 50 30 20 50 30 20 20 30 50
C 40 40 20 40 40 20 80 10 10 5 15 80
Prior 
Probability 43.3 36.7 20 43.3 36.7 20 50 26.7 23.3 11.7 21.7 66.7
closing the twin 
lift container 
spreaders. 
A 20 20 60 20 20 60 20 40 40 10 20 70
B 10 10 80 20 20 60 20 40 40 10 20 70
C 15 15 70 20 20 60 20 40 40 5 15 80
Prior 
Probability 15 15 70 20 20 60 20 40 40 8.3 18.3 73.3
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Appendix II-1: The Questionnaire used for AHP Technique in Chapter 6  
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School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Byrom Street 
L3 3AF UK 
Phone : 0044 0151 231 2028 
Fax : 0044 0151 298 2624 
  
13 Jun 2015 
 
 
To: WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out with 
regard to the container terminal safety and it is specific on the risk management for container 
terminal safety. This subject would become a critical topic in the maritime community 
internationally due to the fast expansion in containerisation and the global economic recession 
over the past decade.  
 
The aim of this study is to investigate and examine the significant Hazard Events (HEs) that 
affecting the container terminal safety in order to optimise the terminal operations efficiency. 
Furthermore, the current risk assessment of the container terminal industry will be explored in 
order to conduct analysis on how risk factors influencing other parameters in the container 
terminal sector. At the end of this research, a conceptual methodology and an advanced model 
would be generated that can be used by container terminals stakeholders to investigate, mitigate 
and control the HEs in order to maintain the efficient functionality of the terminal operations 
and to obtain a cost effective strategy. To achieve the above aim, the research objectives are as 
follows: 
 
3. To investigate the most important factor/s influencing the efficient functionality of the 
terminal operations by using a pair-wise comparison technique. 
 
 
A number of evaluation criteria have been determined in this research. All the evaluation 
criteria need to be measured by using the technique that have been mentioned above. This 
process is required to provide reliable data by identifying an expert opinion of each evaluation 
parameter. A set of questionnaires is compiled in this letter. 
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I should be most grateful if you could kindly spend your valuable time to complete the 
accompanying questionnaire and email it at the address shown above. Your vital feedback will 
greatly benefit and contribute to the formulation of an industry wide opinion. I can assure you 
that the confidentiality of your response will be honoured and respected.  
 
 
 
Yours faithfully,  
 
Hani M.A. Alyami 
PhD researcher, School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute  
Room 2.23, LOOM Research Institute 
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The procedures and guidelines for answering it are explained as follows: 
 
 PAIR-WISE COMPARISONS TECHNIQUE 
 
To proceed with the “Pair-wise Comparisons” technique, an expert has to understand the ratio 
scale measurement used in this study. The table below contains two parts which describe the 
numerical assessment together with the linguistic meaning of each number. The first part is on 
the left hand side which explains “IMPORTANT”, while the right hand side is the second part 
of the table which describes “UNIMPORTANT”. 
  
Numerical Assessment Linguistic meaning  Numerical Assessment Linguistic meaning 
1 Equally important  1 Equally important 
3 A little important  1/3 A little unimportant 
5 Important  1/5 unimportant 
7 Very important  1/7 Very unimportant 
9 Extremely important  1/9 Extremely unimportant 
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values of important  1/2, 1/4, 1/6, 1/8, 
Intermediate values of 
unimportant 
 
An expert is required to give a possible judgement to all questions based on his/her 
expertise and experience in the shipping industry. The judgment process has 
to be focussed on how to achieve the goal for each part. For instance: 
 
Goal: To select the most important component of computer 
1) Monitor Screen                 
  Unimportant Equally Important Important 
  1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the 
above goal, 
how important 
is the Monitor 
Screen compare 
to the mouse? 
              /   
To achieve the 
above goal, 
how important 
is the Monitor 
Screen compare 
to the 
Keyboard? 
          /       
To achieve the 
above goal, 
how important 
is the Monitor 
Screen compare 
to the CPU? 
/                 
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Explanation of the above example, 
i) The monitor screen is 7 times more “Important” than the mouse. It is because we can 
still use our computer even without the mouse. If the mouse is broken, then we can use 
the short cut system to access any file or document in the computer by using a keyboard, 
for instance: to print (Ctrl+P), to save document (Ctrl+S), etc. 
ii) The monitor screen is 3 times more “Important” than the keyboard. It is because we can 
still explore a computer even without the keyboard, for example, to search file in My 
Document by using a mouse. Additionally, we can read any journal or article papers on 
the monitor screen even without the keyboard. The only thing we cannot do without the 
keyboard is typing. 
iii) The monitor screen is 1/9 times less “Unimportant” than the CPU. The monitor is use-
less without the CPU.  
 
 PAIR-WISE COMPARISONS TECHNIQUE 
 
Goal: To select the most important factor influencing the container terminal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Risk reduction 
    
  Unimportant 
Equally 
Important Important 
  1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the above 
goal, how important 
is the Risk reduction 
compare to the 
Handling capacity 
(TEU/H)? 
                 
To achieve the above 
goal, how important 
is the Risk reduction 
compare to the Cost 
(£)? 
                 
To achieve the above 
goal, how important 
is the Risk reduction 
compare Terminal 
Resilience (% of fully 
operational terminal 
after HE occurred)? 
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2) Handling capacity (TEU/H) 
    
  Unimportant 
Equally 
Important Important 
  1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 
 
1/5 
 
1/4 
 
1/3 
 
1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the above 
goal, how important is 
the Handling capacity 
(TEU/H) compare to 
the Cost (£)? 
                 
To achieve the above 
goal, how important is 
the Handling capacity 
(TEU/H) compare to 
Terminal Resilience 
(% of fully 
operational terminal 
after HE occurred)? 
                 
 
 
3) Cost (£) 
     
  Unimportant 
Equally 
Important Important 
  1/9 1/8 1/7 1/6 
 
1/5 
 
1/4 
 
1/3 
 
1/2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
To achieve the above 
goal, how important is 
the Cost (£) compare 
to Terminal Resilience 
(% of fully operational 
terminal after HE 
occurred)?? 
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Appendix II-2: Experts Evaluation On Risk Reduction (RR) in Chapter 6  
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School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Byrom Street 
L3 3AF UK 
Phone : 0044 0151 231 2028 
Fax : 0044 0151 298 2624 
  
20 August 2015 
 
To: WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out with 
regard to the container terminal safety and it is specific on the container-shipping sector. 
This subject would become a critical topic in the maritime community internationally due to 
the fast expansion in containerisation and the global economic recession over the past decade. 
 
At the end of this research, a conceptual methodology and an advanced model would be 
generated that can be used by container terminal management to investigate and mitigate the 
risk affecting the operations of the terminal in order to obtain a cost effective strategy. To 
achieve the above aim, the research objective is as follows: 
 
 Support the decision-making system by evaluating the risk of HE6 after applying 
alternatives to mitigate the risk affecting the operations of the terminal. 
 
Your vital feedback will greatly benefit and contribute to the formulation of an industry wide 
opinion. I can assure you that the confidentiality of your response will be honoured and 
respected. Any refusal or incomplete questionnaire will be excluded without any 
responsibility on the participant. Completion of the questionnaire will indicate your 
willingness to participate in this study. If you require additional information or have 
questions, please contact me at the addresses listed below.  
 
If you are not satisfied with the manner in which this study is being conducted, you may 
report any complaints to the LJMU-LOOM research centre.  
(https://www.ljmu.ac.uk/research/centres-and-institutes/faculty-of-engineering-and-
technology-research-institute/loom/get-in-touch-page)  
 
Hani M.A. Alyami 
PhD researcher, School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations 
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Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute  
H.M.Al-Yami@2010.ljmu.ac.uk 
 
 
Introduction 
The most significant hazardous events (HEs) and its consequences on the RSGT container 
terminal safety level operations were investigated and examined for each HE locally and 
globally (i.e., for individual HE and all HEs aggregated collectively). As a result, the most 
significant HE that has a great impact on the RSGT container terminal operations locally and 
globally is HE6: Crane break down due to human error which was chosen for further analysis. 
The aim of this study is to support decision-making system in order to re-evaluate the risk 
of HE6 after applying alternatives to mitigate the risk affecting the operations of the terminal 
in order to select the appropriate container port safety plan to optimise the operational 
efficiency.  
  
A number of Risk Control Options (RCOs) have been determined in this research. All the 
RCOs criteria need to be measured by using TOPSIS technique. This process is required to 
provide reliable data by identifying an expert opinion of each evaluation parameter. 
 
The procedures and guidelines for answering this set of questionnaires are explained 
as follows: 
 
The linguistic meaning 
To proceed with the proportion technique, an expert has to understand the ratio scale 
measurement used in this study. The table below describe the numerical assessment together 
with the linguistic meaning of each number.  
  
Numerical Assessment Linguistic meaning 
                  0 ൑ ܮ ൑ 100 Low (L) 
0 ൑ ܯ ൑ 100 Medium (M) 
0 ൑ ܪ ൑ 100 High (H) 
 
An expert is required to give a possible judgement to all questions based on his/her expertise 
and experience in the shipping industry. The judgment process has to be focussed on how 
to achieve the goal. The total assessment for each parameter must not be over 100%. For 
instance, you have two types of Roads and two types of cars as shown.  
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The Goal is to evaluate the risk of driving deferent types of cars on deferent types of 
roads with 30 mph speed. 
 
Explanation of the above example, 
i) The probability of driving a formula 1 on rugged road is 100% High risk because it 
cannot be driven on this type of roads and the consequences of driving it, is 100% 
                                            Attributes 
 
 Failure Event                                 
Probability Risk As-
sessment Scale 
Consequences Risk 
Assessment Scale 
H M L H M L 
How likely to drive a formula 1 on rug-
ged road? 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
How likely to drive a formula 1 on 
gravel road? 90% 10%  0% 95% 5% 0% 
How likely to drive a four-wheel vehi-
cle on rugged road? 40% 20% 40% 45% 15% 40% 
How likely to drive a four-wheel vehi-
cle on gravel road? 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
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High risk because it will be instantly severely damaged. That means the risk assess-
ment of driving a formula 1 on a rugged road is 100% High risk, and recommended 
not to drive. 
 
ii) The probability of driving a formula 1 on gravel road is 90% High and 10% Medium 
risks because it can be driven but not for long time and the consequences of driving 
it, is 95% High and 5% Medium risks because the damage will increase as it runs on 
the road. That means the risk assessment of driving a formula 1 on a gravel road is 
reasonably High risk, and recommended not to drive. 
 
iii) The probability of driving a four-wheel vehicle on rugged road is 40% High, 20% 
Medium, 40% Low risks, and the consequences of driving it, is 45% High, 15% Me-
dium, 40% Low risks because the speed limit. That means the risk assessment of 
driving a four-wheel vehicle on rugged road is reasonably Medium risk, and recom-
mended to drive with extreme caution. 
 
iv) The probability of driving a four-wheel vehicle on gravel road is 100% Low risk and 
the consequences of driving it, is 100% Low risk. That means the risk assessment of 
driving a four-wheel vehicle on a gravel road is 100% Low risk, and recommended 
to drive. 
 
The Attributes description 
 
L describes the failure occurrence probability. It means the rate of failure occurring in a 
designated period, which directly represents the number of failure frequencies 
during the design life span of a particular system.  
 
C describes the consequences/ severity. It represents the magnitude of possible loss when 
risk happens, which is ranked according to the severity of failure effects. 
 
P defines the probability of failures being undetected (P). It refers to the probability that 
possible failure can be detected before occurrence.. 
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R defines the chance of container terminal operations being disrupted due to a failure. It 
refers to the probability that possible disruption happens given the occurrence of 
a failure event. 
 
RE is the Risk Evaluation. It is the only output used to produce safety evaluation for 
a particular cause to technical failure. 
 
Note: The Probability of the failure mode should be given on an annual basis. 
 
Parameters 
The degree of the parameters estimated for each hazard may be based on knowledge of the 
results of similar past events and can be defined as follows.   
 
High (H): loss of ability to accomplish the operations or operation failure; death or 
permanent total disability accident risk; loss of major facility damage; severe 
environmental damage. 
 
Medium (M): degraded operations capability or readiness; minor injury accident risk that 
disrupted operations over 3 hours a day; minor capability to equipment or 
system, facility or the environment; minor damage to facility or environment.   
 
Low (L): little or no adverse impact on operations capability; minor medical treatment in 
accident risk; slight equipment or system damage but fully functional and 
serviceable; little or no facility or environment damage. 
 
Alternative 1: 
 Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate the HE crane break down due 
to human error, if the Hiring Highly Qualified Crane Drivers alternative applied using the 
linguistic rating variables (H, M, and L).   
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Attributes 
 
 Failure Event                           
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected 
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
crane break down due 
to human error.              
 
 
Alternative 2: 
 Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate the HE crane break down due 
to human error, if the Hiring Qualified Crane Driver alternative applied using the linguistic rating 
variables (H, M, and L).   
 
                  Attributes 
 Failure Event                         
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected 
Consequence
s/ 
severity 
 
Chance of terminal 
operation being Disrupted 
due to failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
crane break down due 
to human error.              
 
 
 
Alternative 3: 
 Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate the HE crane break down due 
to human error, if the Regulating Situation Awareness Training programme for Quay crane drivers 
alternative applied using the linguistic rating variables (H, M, and L).   
 
                     Attributes 
 Failure Event                           
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected 
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
crane break down due 
to human error.              
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Alternative 4: 
 Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate the HE crane break down due 
to human error, if the Regulating Situation Awareness Training programme for yard crane drivers 
alternative applied using the linguistic rating variables (H, M, and L).   
 
                     Attributes 
 Failure Event                           
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected 
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
crane break down due 
to human error.              
 
Alternative 5: 
 Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate the HE crane break down 
due to human error, if the Regulating Situation Awareness Training programme for 
transportation drivers alternative applied using the linguistic rating variables (H, M, and 
L).   
 
                     Attributes 
 Failure Event                           
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected 
 
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
crane break down due 
to human error.              
 
 
 
Alternative 6: 
 Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate the HE crane break down due 
to human error, if the Regulating Intensive Safety and Security Checks alternative applied using 
the linguistic rating variables (H, M, and L). 
 
                    Attributes 
 Failure Event                          
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected 
 
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
crane break down due 
to human error.              
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Alternative 7: 
 Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate the HE crane break down due 
to human error, if the Regulating Intensive Crane Maintenance Programme Drivers alternative 
applied using the linguistic rating variables (H, M, and L). 
 
                           Attributes 
 Failure Event                           
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected 
 
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
crane break down due 
to human error.              
 
Alternative 8: 
 Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate the HE crane break down due 
to human error, if the Appling Automated Crane operations on quay area alternative applied using 
the linguistic rating variables (H, M, and L). 
                          Attributes 
 Failure Event                           
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected 
 
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
crane break down due 
to human error.              
 
Alternative 9: 
 Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate the HE crane break down due 
to human error, if the Appling Automated Crane operations on yard area alternative applied using 
the linguistic rating variables (H, M, and L). 
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                          Attributes 
 Failure Event                           
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected 
 
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
crane break down due 
to human error.              
 
Alternative 10: 
 Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate the HE crane break down due 
to human error, if the Appling Automated Crane operations on transportation area alternative 
applied using the linguistic rating variables (H, M, and L). 
 
                    Attributes 
 Failure Event                           
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected 
 
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
crane break down due 
to human error.              
 
Alternative 11: 
 Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate the HE crane break down due 
to human error, if the Appling fully Automated Crane operations alternative applied using the 
linguistic rating variables (H, M, and L). 
 
                     Attributes 
 Failure Event                          
Probability of 
failure/ 
Likelihood 
probability of 
failures being 
undetected 
 
Consequences/ 
severity 
 
Chance of terminal 
operation being 
Disrupted due to 
failure 
H M L H M L H M L H M L 
crane break down due 
to human error.              
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Appendix II-3: Questionnaire Used for Alternatives Rating in Chapter 6 
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School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Byrom Street 
L3 3AF UK 
Phone : 0044 0151 231 2028 
Fax : 0044 0151 298 2624 
  
15 October 2015 
 
To: WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out with 
regard to the container terminal safety and it is specific on the container-shipping sector. 
This subject would become a critical topic in the maritime community internationally due to 
the fast expansion in containerisation and the global economic recession over the past decade. 
 
At the end of this research, a conceptual methodology and an advanced model would be 
generated that can be used by container terminal management to investigate and mitigate the 
risk affecting the operations of the terminal in order to obtain a cost effective strategy. To 
achieve the above aim, the research objective is as follows: 
 
 Support the decision-making system by selecting the optimal measure/s to mitigate 
the risk affecting the operations of the terminal. 
 
Your vital feedback will greatly benefit and contribute to the formulation of an industry wide 
opinion. I can assure you that the confidentiality of your response will be honoured and 
respected. Any refusal or incomplete questionnaire will be excluded without any 
responsibility on the participant. Completion of the questionnaire will indicate your 
willingness to participate in this study. If you require additional information or have 
questions, please contact me at the addresses listed below.  
 
If you are not satisfied with the manner in which this study is being conducted, you may 
report any complaints to the LJMU-LOOM research centre.  
(https://www.ljmu.ac.uk/research/centres-and-institutes/faculty-of-engineering-and-
technology-research-institute/loom/get-in-touch-page)  
Hani M.A. Alyami 
PhD researcher, School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute  
H.M.Al-Yami@2010.ljmu.ac.uk 
Introduction 
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The aim of this study is to support decision-making system in order to select the appropriate 
container port safety plan to optimise the operational efficiency. The most significant 
hazardous events (HEs) and its consequences on the RSGT container terminal safety level 
operations were investigated and examined for each HE locally and globally (i.e. for 
individual HE and all HEs aggregated collectively). As a result, the most significant HE that 
has a great impact on the RSGT container terminal operations locally and globally is: Crane 
break down due to human error which was chosen for further analysis. 
  
A number of Risk Control Options (RCOs) have been determined in this research. All the 
RCOs criteria need to be measured by using TOPSIS technique. This process is required to 
provide reliable data by identifying an expert opinion of each evaluation parameter. 
 
 
The procedures and guidelines for answering this set of questionnaires are explained as 
follows: 
 
The linguistic meaning 
The following questions are based on pairwise comparison technique. An expert is required 
to give a possible judgement to all questions based on his/her expertise and experience in the 
shipping industry.   
 
The following linguistic rating variables could be used to express your judgments for each 
alternative with respect to each criterion under uncertainty, vagueness, and/or incomplete 
data. 
 
 
 
Very High  (VH) 
High  (H) 
Medium  (M) 
Low  (L) 
Very Low  (VL) 
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Based on your experience on RSGT, could you please evaluate each Alternative against 
each Decision Criteria in order to eliminate and/or mitigate the Crane break down due to 
human error using the linguistic rating variables (VH, H, M, L and VL).   
 
The objective: selecting the best alternative in order to eliminate and/or mitigate the Crane 
break down due to human error.  
 What would be the impact on the TEU movement/H, if applying A1, A2, A3, A4 and 
A5. 
                                             
                                            Decision 
Criteria 
 
 
 
Alternatives  
C1 C2 C3 
Actual Benefits 
in term of 
Operational 
efficiency 
Cost 
 
(£) 
 
Technical 
Difficultie
s 
 
 
A1  Hiring Highly Qualified Crane Driver 
   
A2  Hiring Qualified Crane Driver    
A3  
Regulating Situation Awareness 
Training programme for Quay 
crane drivers 
   
A4  Regulating Situation Awareness Training programme for yard crane 
drivers 
   
A5  Regulating Situation Awareness Training programme for 
transportation drivers 
   
A6  Regulating Intensive Safety and Security Checks 
   
A7  Regulating Intensive Crane Maintenance programme 
   
A8  Appling Automated Crane operations on quay area 
   
A9  Appling Automated Crane operations on yard area 
   
A10 Appling Automated Crane operations on transportation area 
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 How much would be the Cost to apply A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5? 
 what would be the Technical Difficulties to apply A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5? 
The Definition of each Criteria: 
 
Criteria Description of 
criteria 
Type of 
Assessment 
Definition Category
C2 Additional Benefits 
Linguistic 
Assessment 
Improvement on operational 
efficiency (i.e. TEU 
movements, crane turning 
journey, etc.) 
B 
C3 Cost   (£) Real Data Capital required to apply the alternative. C 
C4 Technical Difficulties 
Linguistic 
Assessment 
The ability of applying the 
required alternative accurately 
and dependably. 
C 
 
The Source of each Alternative: 
 
Alternatives Type of Reference 
Hiring Qualified Crane Drivers  Literature and Experts 
Regulating Situation Awareness Training 
programme. 
Literature and Experts 
Regulating Intensive Safety and Security 
Checks 
Experts 
Regulating Intensive Crane Maintenance 
programme 
Experts 
Appling Automated Crane operations on 
quay cranes area 
Literature 
Appling Automated Crane operations on yard 
cranes area 
Literature 
Appling Automated Crane operations on 
transportation area 
Literature 
Appling fully Automated Crane operations in  Literature 
 
 
A11 Appling fully Automated Crane operations  
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The Key Concepts of Container Terminal Efficiency: 
 
Objective Eliminate and/or mitigate the Crane break down due to human error 
Perspective Decision maker: the shipper Key stakeholder: the consignee 
RCOs 
Hiring Qualified Crane Drivers 
Regulating Situation Awareness Training programme. 
Regulating Intensive Safety and Security Checks 
Regulating Intensive Crane Maintenance programme 
Appling Automated Crane operations 
Decision attributes 
Risk Reduction 
Handling Productivity (TEU movement/H) 
Cost (£) 
Technical Difficulties 
Constraints Required time and waiting time 
Risk factors (not 
controlled by 
decision makers) 
Nominal journey time, nominal postponement and adjusted journey 
time 
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